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ABSTRACT

Divided into seven sections, the presentations contained in these proceedings give an international perspective on the growth of democracy in the world, and the many obstacles that might inhibit it. The first section, on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union contains papers from four East Block scholars who discuss the rise of democracy in communist Europe. The section on Africa includes papers by four African panelists who discuss the development of democracy in light of the continent's historical, geographical, cultural, social, and political background. The "Luncheon Session" section has four presentations on democracy and human rights, focusing on Central American and Caribbean countries. The section on Latin America and the Caribbean includes papers by four panelists who discuss democracy against the backdrop of the region's economics, politics, social change, and serious problems such as drug trafficking, which influence and are influenced by democractic reform. The section on Asia contains four papers that discuss democratic development in China, India, the Philippines, and Turkey. A section headed "Senatorial Remarks" contains brief addresses by U.S. Senators John McCain and Lloyd Bentsen, in which they comment on the conference and democratic changes in the world. The final section contains four addresses presented at the "Idea of Democracy" panel. Final sections report on the conference's State Department reception, the award luncheon, and the president's meeting with awardees. A list of conference participants other than those whose names approved as speakers is given at the conclusion of the book. (AS)

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

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

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A Conference Sponsored by the

National Endowment for Democracy

May 1 and 2, 1989
Washington, D.C.

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THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Proceedings of a conference
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All of the photographs in this book were taken by, and are the property of, Ms. Nancy Roth. We would like to express our gratitude for her work.

Introduction

The National Endowment for Democracy's conference on "The Democratic Revolution" took place at a unique historical moment. On the very day the conference opened— May 1, 1989— an election was taking place in Paraguay, signaling a possible democratic transition in one of Latin America's most entrenched authoritarian systems. At the same time, a surge of democratic protest was sweeping Beijing and other Chinese cities. Just weeks earlier, Solidarity was legalized in Poland and elections were held in the Soviet Union for the Congress of People's Deputies which saw the defeat of senior Communist Party officials. In Hungary, too, a transitional process was underway, with elections scheduled for the following spring.

These were but a few of the events that set the context for this conference on "The Democratic Revolution," arguably the most important, and certainly the most hopeful, global phenomenon of the past decade. This revolution has swept over almost all of Latin America. Its impact can be felt in the Philippines, South Korea, Pakistan and elsewhere in Asia. It is shaking the Communist world to its very foundations. Even where it has been set back, as in South Africa, Burma, Haiti and now China, too, the movements that have been crushed or thwarted are actually further evidence of the universality of the democratic quest. And even though countries where democracy has triumphed may face a difficult future, as in Peru, Brazil or Argentina, this does not alter the view that the long-term prospects for democratic advance remain propitious.

The conference offered an opportunity to examine this phenomenon

NED Chairman William E. Brock (far l.) and President Carl Gershman (far r.) pose with the recipients of the Endowment's "Democracy Award," Jacek Kuron and Monica Jimenez de Barros.

with some of the key participants in the democratic struggle, and also with some writers who have thought most deeply about it. The discussions enhanced our understanding of the prospects for democracy in different parts of the world and the obstacles, both internal and external, that might inhibit its advance. It also drew together people who are pursuing democratic objectives in countries and contexts that are vastly diverse, in the hope that each movement would benefit from such interaction. It was our hope in the National Endowment for Democracy that such discussions would enable us to become even more effective in assisting the growth of democracy in the world. I believe that the conference accomplished these different objectives.

Representative Dante B. Fascell opens the conference as fellow NED Board member John Richardson (L) listens.

The success of the conference was largely due to the quality and diversity of the speakers, most of whom are Endowment grantees. We also appreciated the contributions of other Endowment grantees who travelled to Washington from many distant countries to attend the two-day event. Many told us afterward of how encouraging it felt to be a part of a true international movement for democracy—a "democratic international" of sorts that embraced movements in Poland, South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, China and many, many other countries.

The conference was organized under the guidance of the Endowment's Board of Directors and we are grateful to all Board members for their contributions. In particular, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Endowment's Board, Bill Brock, for his assistance. We also appreciate the willingess of Congressman Dante Fascell, the first Chairman of our Board, to play host to the event in the House Foreign Affairs Committee room.

Congressional support for the Endowment's work has grown significantly since our establishment, and this was clearly evident in the course of the conference. Many Members of Congress took time out of their busy schedules to participate in the panel sessions and special events. We especially appreciated the contributions of Senators Kennedy and Lugar, who so willingly and eloquently addressed our award luncheon.

Though the Endowment is a private nongovernmental organization, coordination and consultation with government agencies is a regular and important part of our work. We appreciated the attendance at the conference sessions of representatives from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and others. I would particularly like to thank Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt for stepping in at the last moment and doing such a gracious job of hosting the State Department reception in honor of the conference participants.

We are also grateful to the Endowment's four core grantees—the Center for International Private Enterprise, the Free Trade Union Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs—for participating in the conference and, moreover, for the crucial work they do in promoting our democratic objectives.

Many other individuals, too numerous to mention here, contributed to the success of the event. The State Department interpreters, in particular, should be noted. I would also like to thank Jacek Kalabinski for the excellent job he did of translating for Jacek Kuron. And we are indebted to our indefatigable conference photographer, Nancy Roth. The quality of her work is obvious throughout this book.

Since we chose to fund the conference out of private contributions, it would not have been possible without the generous support of the following individuals and organizations: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), American Trucking Associations, Amway Corporation, The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Mr. Marshall Coyne, William H. Donner Foundation, The Joyce Foundation, Robert Krieble Associates, John M. Olin Foundation, Sarah Scaife Foundation, and SIFCO Industries.

Finally, I would be remiss if I neglected to thank the dedicated group of individuals who made the conference and related events come together so well. I am speaking of the members of the Endowment staff and in particular Diane Bettge, whose tireless and efficient efforts in managing the organization of the conference were evident to all in attendance.

We are pleased to have the opportunity here to reflect back on the conference and to share it with you.

Carl Gershman, President
National Endowment for Democracy

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica is greeted by NED Board member LeGree Daniels (r.)

NED Board member Polly Baca addresses the conference participants.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

***Jacek Kuron** is a leading advisor to the independent Polish trade union Solidarity and one of Poland's most respected political activists. Mr. Kuron is recognized within the Polish democratic movement as the individual most responsible for developing the strategy of building civil society which was adopted by Solidarity. He has been a leading advocate of a new opening toward democratic pluralism which was reflected in the recent historic agreement between Solidarity and the Polish government.*

The very fact that in a totalitarian Communist country the authorities met halfway with an antisystemic opposition in order not to coopt this opposition, but to negotiate with the opposition as an autonomous force, is of primary importance.

It is a very unusual fact, and in a way it's a fact denying totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is an attempt to command centrally all social life. It's based on the monopoly of the power center to organize any activities. The monopoly is so total that if citizens gather freely and discuss freely a matter as simple as roof repairs on a block of flats, this constitutes a challenge to the central authority.

This is a monopoly of organization. But the next most important monopoly is a monopoly on information, meaning that every printed word— not to mention the electronic media— is centrally steered by central authority. Therefore, that leads to a monopoly of decision, meaning that all decisions are made by central authority.

It's almost superficial to say that such an ideal cannot be implemented. But any attempt to implement it destroys social, economic and political life.

Therefore if the organized opposition enters into negotiations with the authorities, negotiations which are uncensorially transmitted by television and relayed to every household, one can say that totalitarianism has been broken since all those monopolies were broken. But that, of course, was not the beginning.

The real breakthrough took place in 1980 when the massive wave of strikes

Participating in the panel on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are, from l. to r., Janos Kis, Jacek Kuron and translator Jacek Kalabinski. Other conference speakers listening from the upper tier are, from l. to r., Dette Pascual, Ricardo Bofill and Patricia Guillermo de Chea.

led to the establishment of Solidarity, an independent union which had to be recognized and was recognized by the central government. At that particular moment, the totalitarian system in Poland was broken.

At that time I wrote an essay entitled, "What Next," in which I compared the political situation in Poland with the movement of trains. A railroad schedule in which every tenth train would be independent and self-governing by an accord between the conductor and the passengers would lead to a situation in which either the principle on which the schedule of the whole railroad is built would be changed, or to a series of catastrophes.

Jacek Kuron, L, and translator Jacek Kalabinski

And that was the situation in Poland at that time, since within a totalitarian system a massive movement into which over half the population belonged was created. Since the nomenclature, the apparatus of power, did not want to make the necessary structural changes, catastrophe was inevitable; it came on December 13, 1981, as the imposition of martial law. The tanks rolled into the streets. All laws were suspended. The population was terrorized and was submitted to a military and police dictatorship.

One could say that if totalitarianism was broken in Poland in 1980 by this massive popular movement, the imposition of martial law restored totalitarianism. No, this is not my opinion. It's an example, one could say, that certain social processes are irreversible.

The explosion of Solidarity was a denial of totalitarianism, but martial law was also a denial of totalitarianism. Since a totalitarian system is based on those three monopolies of information, organization and decision, the more perfect the system the better camouflaged it is. It becomes nearly invisible.

For instance, in my country a parliament existed, a multi-party system existed, a number of newspapers appeared, and one could see, or one could have the illusion, that this was a normal parliamentary democracy.

If any information and any movement, any action, is centrally planned, those planners can say whatever they please. So, as in August of 1980, the peaceful popular uprising has broken this illusion. This illusion was broken a second time by the authorities themselves—declaring martial law and telling everybody we will use naked force. We will suppress the society with naked force.

And since in a totalitarian system every person, every member of society, is in some measure involved, it creates a certain social compact. We denounced this compact in August of 1980. But they broke this compact in December of 1981.

Thus, a dictatorship based uniquely on force was created, but such a dictatorship is self-destructive. The authorities had two options. One option was to maintain such a dictatorship—a dictatorship which, even more quickly than ordinary totalitarianism, destroys everything, including the economy—or to withdraw from that form of dictatorship.

And finally, after a number of attempts at different solutions, the authorities decided that a certain agreement with society is possible by making an agreement with the opposition. And thus, conditions were created for round-table negotiations, negotiations aimed at allowing society to self-organize and gradually move toward democracy. In other words, the round-table talks were a certain stage in a constant struggle of the Polish people for democracy, previous stages being the enormous social activity in the legal days of Solidarity and enormous clandestine resistance during the days of martial law.

The most important lesson of all these is perhaps that a certain assumption— that totalitarianism can be broken only from the outside since there are no internal forces capable of breaking the totalitarian system— is false. From within, self-organizing society can break and can overcome totalitarianism.

How can you self-organize under a totalitarian system? To answer this question, I have to say that this movement of self-organizing of the society did not begin in August of 1980. We began many, many years before. Looking back at those years, at something which was perceived as a revolution, I look back in astonishment.

It was so simple then. What we wanted was to read books, to talk to each other, to collect money for people needing help— the simplest human actions. And one can organize society around those simple actions and goals, and this very fact is like a time bomb under totalitarianism.

There is one more lesson from this evolution. Many of our friends, members of the opposition in Poland, asked us "Why did you go to those round-table negotiations? Wouldn't it be better to organize people, to increase the potential for social explosion— social explosion which would wipe out this system?"

We said no. We don't want to destroy the system by force. Several explanations and reasons can be given for our view. The simplest reason is that totalitarianism is a system artificially created, artificially designed so to speak, and such a system destroys all life around itself.

If you destroy a political system you cannot bring over another system from the past, nor can you import another system from abroad. You have to create a new system. But that new system would also be a system artificially constructed and such a system would bring back all the faults of the old system.

The lesson, therefore, is that the road to democracy has to be a process— a process of gradual evolution, of gradual building of democratic institutions. It is a revolution in the sense that we radically change the system. We go from totalitarianism to democracy. If it should be a road to democracy, if it should be a democratic revolution, it must be achieved in a gradual process.

***Janos Kis** is in the U.S. for a year as professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York. Since 1973, when he was ousted for political reasons from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he has actively participated in the democratic opposition. He is a founder of the journal **Beszelo** and of the Association of Free Democrats, which is working for the establishement of multi-party democracy in Hungary.*

THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE:

Eight Theses on the Opportunities and Risks Hidden in the Present, Pre-Transition Situation

1. The birth of democratic movements in Eastern Europe has taken place in the last fifteen years, at the same time as authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America

began or completed their transition to democracy. Until now, however, the East European movements stopped short of initiating a transformation of the political system itself. Their strategy was invariably limited to the reconstruction of civil society within the framework of the Communist party's unchallenged control over the government and the coercive apparatuses. Now, the era of such self-limitation appears to be closing. In Poland and Hungary, power-sharing and the disassociation of the state from the Communist party are real issues. Czechoslovakia may follow these two countries very soon.

Janos Kis.

2. Both in Poland and in Hungary, it was the Communist leadership itself which made the offer to opposition movements to be legally consolidated and to share in the government. I think it crucial to understand the motives and meaning of this gesture. It would be misleading to interpret it as a repetition of the 1980 Gdansk negotiations. At that time, Poland's Communist leaders, pushed to the wall by a particularly vigorous strike movement, accepted the talks because they felt unprepared to *exclude* the opposition from the political arena by force. This time, however, they offered talks under much weaker pressure, because they are interested in *including* the opposition in the power structure. By the end of this decade, the beginning of which was marked first by official recognition and then by the outlawing of Solidarity, both Polish and Hungarian Communists have to recognize that there is no way to stabilize their regime in face of the ongoing economic crisis and social decay without sharing the responsibility with partners who are really independent of them. For the first time since the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, ruling parties are in need of a legal opposition so that, by coopting it into the power structure, they can use *its* authority to legitimize austerity measures and to demobilize social resistance.

3. By joining the game started by the offer of negotiations, both sides face tremendous risks. The danger for the Communist leadership consists of the very real possibility that the process which was initiated by their offer leads much farther than they intend to go. The breach opened up in the wall of the monocentric party-state system may progressively widen, until the process achieves equilibrium in a truly competitive parliamentary democracy. This chance indeed provides the only justification for the democratic opposition to accept the bargain. But the opposition must face the danger that, instead of initiating a relatively ordered transition to democracy, the deal may stabilize Communist power or at least deprive the society of any credible opposition force.

4. Being manipulated into the role of legitimizers of Communist rule is not, however, the only risk the opposition in Poland and Hungary has to face. The transition process, even if it gets started, is not going to be a stable one. On both sides, the control which the parties to the contract exercise over their organizational basis will probably be subject to severe strains. Communist apparatchiks in strategic positions may try to upset the deal by sabotaging it or by stage-managing outright provocations. Opposition radicals, on the other hand, may initiate a campaign to delegitimize any compromise with the Communists. The social contract may thus collapse before producing any tangible results.

5. Another danger threatening the transition process is connected with the economic crisis. Unavoidable austerity measures and continuing decay may convince the so-called silent majority that democratization is making the situation worse. The opposition might be perceived as partly responsible for the accumulating hardships. Such a development could be seen by Communist leaders as advantageous to them, because it would discredit any conceivable political alternative. Indeed, it might result in an increasingly widespread longing for order and discipline, which would favor the appearance on the scene of a "Man of Providence" to save the Fatherland from political and economic chaos. A chain reaction of spontaneous outbursts of mass violence could also result from the general delegitimization of all kind of politics, official or oppositional.

6. There are risks hidden in the international environment, as well. A new conservative stabilization in the Soviet Union, similar to that which the Brezhnev leadership was able to realize after Khrushchev's ousting, is improbable. Sharp oscillations in Soviet politics cannot be excluded, however, and these may easily destabilize internal processes of change in East Europe. Ethnic and national conflicts may deflect public attention from the issue of democracy and might encourage authoritarian leaders to mobilize nationalist forces to consolidate their power, as in Serbia.

7. These cursory remarks may give the impression that the chances for a peaceful, orderly transition to democracy in Eastern Europe are very slim indeed. One must notice, however, that the present situation in Poland and Hungary does not result from just a chance opportunity. The Soviet empire has entered the era of its decline and dissolution. Clearly, the Soviet state still has the *military* power to restore its dominance over the region by force. But it has exhausted its *economic* power to consolidate the order it would restore by force of arms. That is the main reason explaining why Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe is becoming less and less probable. And that is the main reason explaining why economic decline and political unrest are spreading irrevocably through Eastern Europe. There is no other way to stabilize the region other than through the establishment of market economies and democratic political regimes. There is, thus, a reasonable hope that the dangers threatening the transition process can be overcome; but in order for it to succeed, we must carefully anticipate those dangers. All the internal and external actors interested in a democratic transition should have a strategy for stabilizing the process.

8. Since we are gathered here in Washington, let me now focus my remarks on what Western governments can do.

First, they have some leverage over accelerating the economic transition process and diminishing its social costs. A reduction of the debt burden strangling both the Polish and the Hungarian economies, and maintaining (in the case of Hungary), or resuming (in the case of Poland), the credit flow seem to be absolutely necessary. I do not propose, however, a policy of continuing to pour easy money into the bottomless pit of loss-producing economies. Debts should not be cancelled but partly transformed into industrial assets free to be resold. Reprivatization should be encouraged; creditors' consortiums should ask for the power of direct supervision. Extension of new credits might be tied to the condition that reprivatization goes ahead at a promising speed. As a guarantee for meaningful changes in the economic sphere, political pluralization should be linked to these issues.

Second, the *Ostpolitik* which consisted in cooperating with governments only is to be rejected. But, in cases where there is a significant chance for negotiated transition, the Cold War attitude which involved a complete rejection of serious talks with governments should also be abandoned. What Western governments ought to support is not one side against the other but the forging of a social contract between the two. This, however, must not mean abandoning the opposition to the goodwill of the so-called reformist wing of the Communist party leadership. By recognizing the de facto pluralism of the political arena, Western governments can contribute to its consolidation and further development.

Third, the time is ripe to change the perspective from which the West views the issue of peace and stability in Europe. One is accustomed to approaching this issue as if it consisted of nothing but the problem of armaments. Actually, the asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not merely a matter of the imbalance of the military forces stationed on their territories. There is also an imbalance in organization. East European governments had to surrender, to a very large degree, control over their own armies to the Soviet high command; occupying Soviet troops move unchecked on allied territories, and there are no provisions excluding military threat or intervention from the relationships of the Warsaw Pact member states. Until this situation changes, the Warsaw Pact will remain an unpredictable and dangerous power factor in Europe. It is thus necessary to ask that Soviet troop withdrawals be accompanied by a reassertion of national sovereignty over national armies and territories within the Warsaw Pact and by an explicit renunciation by the Soviet Union of the use of force or of threats to influence the internal affairs of East European countries. The sooner this happens, the better will the democratic transition be insulated from shocks caused by oscillations in Soviet policy.

Finally, the West should firmly support the case of oppressed national minorities in Eastern Europe. Actions like Serbian encroachment upon Kosovo's autonomy should not go unanswered. Ceausescu must be isolated, and his potential successors must be told that Romania won't be able to return to the community of civilized nations without democratization, which must include safeguarding and protecting minority rights. The alternative to such a firm policy is Balkanization which would, in turn, justify attempts to reestablish the Pax Sovietica over the region. But there is no way to return to Pax Sovietica any more, and Balkanization is far from the only alternative to it.

***Vladimir Bukorsky** is a writer and scientist who was imprisoned and exiled in the Soviet Union for his dissident views and activities, particularly for his protests against psychiatric abuse, and then released in 1976 after a worldwide campaign on his behalf. Mr. Bukorsky is a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Democracy in the USSR, a New York-based organization which works to foster democracy and human rights in the Soviet Union.*

I think, as is so usual in our world, that we have good news and bad news— they always travel together. The good news, as we all know, is that the Soviet regime is bankrupt. This is probably the best news we've had in this century. The result is that the Soviets have to pull out from all the areas in which they tried to spread communism for so many years. We hear about Vietnamese troops being withdrawn from Cambodia, Cuban troops being withdrawn from Angola— all kinds of good news about the Third World.

What was previously dangerous in attempts to change systems from oppressive and dictatorial to democratic was that this fragile and vulnerable process could be hijacked by the Communists and used for their own advantage. Suddenly, that is not so dangerous. Soviet involvement in international terrorism, in international communist expansion, has been scaled down. We have good news all over.

But the Soviet Union is not only experiencing an economic crisis, not only a bankruptcy. It is a political and ideological crisis— a crisis of the idea of socialism. Two hundred years after it was conceived and one hundred years after people tried it, it has been proven that there can be no productive form of socialism. Even one of the richest countries on earth, Russia, became bank-

Vladimir Bukorsky addresses the panel on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as Janos Kis (r.) listens.

rupt and exhausted while attempting to develop socialism in an extensive manner.

But in order to come from an extensive economy to an intensive one, one must somehow reform the political system as well. It so happens that if you try to reward people for their merits and talents and promote their performance, then they will not join the Communist party. And if you do not promote them for their talents and reward their merit, then they will not perform.

The crisis as perceived in the Soviet Union is exactly that, a structural crisis—how much of a role the Communist party should and can play in development, and how much this crisis could be cured by the government which is trying to reform the system.

It's paradoxical from the standpoint of the government, because the more they reduce the power of the Communist party in running the economy, the more they reduce their power. Gorbachev, after all, is only General Secretary of the Communist party. So by reducing the power of the Communist party he is reducing his own power; he is in a way cutting the branch on which he sits.

Therefore, one of the solutions was to involve people into this process more than before. Essentially, if you translate it from Marxist jargon into human language, it boils down to: if you share property, you should share power. They want broader participation of the people, not only in economic development, but also in government.

It is a retreat from the position of absolute master which the Communist party occupied for seventy-two years into that of a senior partner—but still, a senior partner, still the only political party in the country, still the only economic power in which the ownership of means of production (as they say in Marxist language) must still remain in the State's hands. It is not supposed to be privately owned.

But nevertheless, that is an orderly retreat which allows them to somehow improve performance and stabilize the situation. You see a repetition of this pattern all over. You see in Poland an attempt to deal with Solidarity as a partner; you see in Hungary the same attempt to find some kind of participation for society. Those cases, of course, go much further than in the Soviet Union; Poland and Hungary are well ahead of us. The situation in the Soviet Union is slightly more controlled and less free. And here I'm coming to the bad news.

Contrary to popular belief, the Soviet Politburo did not suddenly convert to democracy. Contrary to what people think here, glasnost is not freedom of speech, and perestroika is not an attempt to introduce a market economy. No, it is still an old attempt to square a circle, to find one variety of socialism which might somehow work—to hope for a miracle.

As for democratization, a popular joke in Moscow is: What is the difference between democracy and democratization? Oh, it's as much as a difference as between canals and canalization.

The bad news, of course, is that this attempt has already failed. The economic reforms did not produce the desired result and the people, at the same time, used the opportunity given to them by a slight opening to forward their own agenda. The government is trying to square a circle and no one believes that it will produce any positive results in the economy.

But at the same time, whatever was given to the people by democratization, even limited as it is, suddenly brought forward questions regarding independence of different nationalities in the Soviet Union and questions of human and religious rights. By the end of last year, the Soviet regime found this too dangerous to handle. Therefore, they effectively suspended reforms. The most important reforms, such as price reform, convertability of the ruble, and decentralization, were postponed indefinitely. The government has said that these might be renewed in 1991, but who knows what will happen then.

At the same time, measures were taken by the Soviet regime to take back what had already been given in the political sense. We suddenly hear about clashes all over— a massacre in Georgia where hundreds of people were chopped with spades by Spetsnaz Units and poisoned with gas. And we know how the Soviets tried to handle Armenian unrest and legitimate demands for independence.

We do know that the tanks are already in the Baltic countries. They are not used yet. During the day the tanks are withdrawn from the cities, but at night they sometimes go in. It's a turning point and we don't know when they will actually introduce martial law there.

Meanwhile, very few people in the West noticed that the Soviet regime was preparing for martial law and other measures of repression throughout the fall of last year. The Soviets introduced a law extending the power of police to the army. And they introduced laws restricting freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. Just a couple of weeks ago Gorbachev signed a new law, a new version of Article 1790, the notorious Article under which we were all imprisoned.

This new version is actually worse than the one we had to serve under in Soviet jails; it is a death sentence to glasnost. If these Articles are to be applied in the Soviet Union they would practially have to arrest everyone, starting with Gorbachev himself who signed that new law. And I can assure you that they are going to apply this Article.

They are trying now to reverse the process of democratization. We will hear more and more stories about clashes between the authorities and the people, and I can assure you that the people will not stop.

There is no peaceful solution in this situation. I don't think the Soviet people will ever accept Mark Twain's advice to the American people— that it's good to have constitutional freedoms and enough common sense not to use them. I don't think that will ever happen.

And when given half a chance, the Soviet people will take it into their hands and press forward. Therefore, each time it has to be curbed. But at the same time, if the Soviet authorities want to make their model more productive they have to give people more initiative.

So we are observing a kind of cyclic development, a fluctuation between the tough phase and the liberal phase. In a liberal phase there are attempts to improve the economy, yet it begins to erode power structures in the Soviet Union. In a tough phase it stops the erosion of power structures, but the economy suffers even further. In between these two is going to be a cyclic process for the next fifteen years, at least.

There is good news and bad news in this. The good news is that in the period of this cycle there will be some moments when one or another nation in Eastern Europe or one or another nation even in the Soviet Union will have a chance to free itself from Soviet control. I think that if the Soviets introduced martial law tomorrow and used the army to calm down workers in the Ural Mountains, they wouldn't have enough power to invade Hungary or Poland at the same time. So there will be a chance in the period of turmoil for some nations to escape.

Finally, and unfortunately, at this time we do not observe much help from the West. There is euphoria in the West about the Soviet Union. The whole Western world wants to support Gorbachev, forgetting about democracy in the Soviet Union. They support the regime instead of supporting the people who have already spoken— they want democracy, not a socialist pluralism, or whatever Gorbachev is trying to do.

In the worst possible moment, we suddenly have the West announcing its agreement to hold a conference on human rights in Moscow exactly at a time when the regime went backwards and already started introducing all this repressive law. In doing so, the West didn't even raise a question about Armenians, and at that time the whole Karabakh Committee was in jail, including even two members of the Supreme Soviet. There were no concerns expressed by any European government or the United States government about the Georgian massacre, let alone a condemnation of it.

The impression I have is that the West is very much confused and is supporting the wrong side in this conflict. The conflict is inevitable, but the West is on the wrong side of it, not realizing that they have to, and should, strengthen the opposition in the Soviet Union.

In considering examples of other countries, including the example of Poland, we know that the stronger the opposition the less bloody the conflict between the authorities and the people. The more organized the opposition, the more cohesive forces in the society, the better handled is the conflict.

We don't have such a strong and well-organized opposition as the Poles do. They have had a lot of years to organize that. And they have the Catholic Church, a very important cohesive force in the country to unite people.

We don't have that at all. We are heading for a very chaotic and bloody conflict. And unless the West realizes that and gives much more support to the opposition forces— not to Gorbachev and his reformers from the Politburo— we will see a terrible clash between the people and the regime. We will see bloodshed in huge proportions.

***Vilem Precan** is a Czech who, in the 1960s, was one of the historians to call for the restitution of historical truth in Czechoslovakia. His position at the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences put him at the heart of many of the era's controversies. In 1968, he coedited a collection of materials about the Soviet invasion and the nonviolent popular resistance to it which achieved world renown as **The Czech Black Book.** He was purged from the Academy in 1970 and emigrated to West Germany in 1976, where he is the executive director of the Czechoslovak Documentation Center.*

A hundred and forty years since Marx and Engel's well-known pronouncement about Europe being haunted by the spectre of Communism requires some modification: Communist Europe is now haunted by the "spectre" of democracy. One can hardly deny that democracy is not only the key concept in the political vocabulary of those trying to solve in practice the number one issue facing that part of the world: i.e., the irreversible transcendence of the Soviet-style totalitarian regime. It has become the most frequently used expression even of those who are trying to save the system.

In three countries of the external Soviet empire, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia— also known as Eastern Central Europe— democracy is quite clearly on the march, although at a different pace in each of them. In Poland, the April 1989 agreement— a milestone in the past forty years' history of that country— represents a major step towards renewing society's inner sovereignty vis-a-vis the Communist state and paves the way toward parliamentary democracy there (even though some may undoubtedly regard it as a snare prepared by the present Communist establishment in order to trap the democratic opposition into sharing in the regime's own demise and discrediting itself through abetting unpopular economic measures).

In Hungary, where the regime does not have a recent history of military rule a la Jaruzelski or Czechoslovak style normalization, it looks from the outside as if part of the ruling party leadership was borrowing ideas from the democratic opposition and preparing itself for a political contest under conditions of free elections and a multiparty system. (Perhaps Hungary most aptly fits Zbigniew Brzezinski's analytical observation about the possibility of winning over the Communist elite to a more permanent system of national values.)

But even in Czechoslovakia, which would seem to be a European leader in political inertia and where the ruling political establishment continues to resist any idea of dialogue with society and makes known in every possible way its opposition to any genuine shift or change, democracy's cards have been laid on the table. As the leading independent Czech commentator Milan Simecka said: "There is one thing we can be sure of. Things would be totally different here had our democratic political culture not been destroyed. Our only hope, if we are not to hit rock bottom, is to create it anew; it is the only idea that can lend meaning or purpose to our future."

This idea was worked into a political programme in the "Democracy for All" manifesto brought out in Autumn 1988 by the independent Movement for Civil Liberties. Vaclav Havel has called that manifesto the most important political card of 1988 as far as his country was concerned, in that the seemingly self-evident truths it contained were set out in a single document, publicly, and as a basis for political activity. For the fact is that the manifesto is an appeal for society to step into the political arena, seeing that the present rulers— those who are to blame for the moral crisis, the lack of democracy, the limitations on our national and state sovereignty, and our economic and technological decline— are unwilling to abandon their totalitarian style of government. The manifesto explicitly challenges the legitimacy of the so-called leading role of the Communist Party and asserts democratic pluralism as the fundamental political principle. This means, according to Havel (who was one of the manifesto's signatories), that everyone has an equal right to compete for political power.

Vilem Precan offers his presentation at the East Bloc panel; to his left is Endowment Board member Charles Smith.

Can this march of democracy come under the heading of "democratic revolution?" This expression, which surprises a lot of people and is not very frequent in Europe, has an optimistic ring to it and inspires hope and great expectations – maybe too great, in fact. Even so, it is a functional enough term – with the following provisos:

1. "Democratic revolution" is used to describe the underlying trend of the times towards democracy, a system based on spiritual, political and economic pluralism and mutual tolerance.

2. The democratic revolution has grown out of the gestation of elements of civil society which have gradually established themselves inside the totalitarian system, but which exist relatively independent of the totalitarian power structures. The democratic revolution commences the moment when civil society advances the demand for changes in the system on the basis of democracy and freedom and formulates a political programme for achiveing them.

3. The democratic revolution, whose progress is one of the fundamental or even key phenomena of the present time in societies under Communist rule, is one of the least violent revolutions in history. Cars are not set on fire in the name of democracy, nor bombs exploded. It is not a revolution that rallies the masses beneath banners with demagogic slogans. Its advocates are staunch opponents of violence and civil war. They are open to compromise and to ideas of national or social reconciliation that would break the existing chain of violence that is inherent in Communism.

But the era of democratic revolution is one full of violence and suffering. The threat or actual use of violence varies from country to country and comes from those currently in power – the party of guardians of the

From l. to r., Congressman Tom Lantos, NED Board member Charles Smith, Vilem Precan and NED Board member and panel moderator John Richardson.

status quo and its police, its crack units, and in certain cases, such as in Czechoslovakia, its terrorists from the ranks of the secret police posing as incensed members of the public.

The democratic revolution of the nineteen eighties, our topic here, has its historical forerunners or portents. The Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, the Solidarity era of 1980–81 (and to a certain extent even the thaw under Khrushchev) all had something in common, in spite of their individual characteristics and particular historical contexts: they all expressed society's desire to attenuate, limit and finally eliminate the totalitarian nature of the Communist system.

One distinguished antecedent, possibly the key initial step in the direction of the democratic revolution, was the "moral revolution" which served as the basis for the dissidence of the 1970s: the new concept of human rights emergent from the critique of Communist totalitarianism, the cultivation of citizenship, the implementation of the principle of life in the truth, independent culture and samizdat. The achievements of the moral revolution, often ignored or even ridiculed by advocates of "realpolitik," are now becoming plain to see and are being reassessed as civil society enters the arena as a self-assured and sovereign political partner or opponent of the existing political establishment.

The democratic revolution we are now witnessing differs from its predecessors in that it is taking place in the period of "the terminal crisis of Communism" of the "progressive decay and the deepening agony both of its system and its dogma," to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski. The crisis is of such magnitude that it cannot be solved by means of piecemeal remedies while leaving the system intact: the belief in the irreversibility of the Communist system has been shaken to its foundations. The democratic revolution is a response to that crisis while being at the same time one of the factors of the further deepening of the crisis, above all because it points to a radical solution that goes to the heart of the matter.

The question is sometimes asked whether the reforms undertaken or planned by the present Communist establishment are not in fact part of the democratic revolution. To my way of thinking, these are two phenomena which differ in many respects, particularly in terms of their aims, but cannot be entirely separated from each other.

The democratic revolution in the Soviet bloc in the eighties has its own authentic roots and sources of inspiration. It is not derived from any socialist ideology, nor from any discussion about socialism, whether true or false, unsullied or sullied. Nor is it an offshoot of Gorbachevism, even though its dynamism is– in different ways, depending on the country– indirectly influenced by it. The goal of the democratic revolution is not a further attempt to square the circle, i.e. to modernize the Communist system and make it more efficient while retaining its essence. The aim is to do away with it once and for all. Democratic revolution is therefore nothing to do with "democratization," but with democracy– free from any further misleading adjectives like "people's" or "socialist." It does not advocate "glasnost" but free speech. It counters the idea of socialist pluralism with a programme of freedom, spiritual, political and economic pluralism, and the emancipation of citizens and civil society from the state.

The democratic revolution's sources of inspiration are not primarily remembrance of a democratic past, even though efforts to draw inspiration from all the spiritual and political roots of democratic thought do play an important role in each of the countries. It derives its legitimacy from the universal applicability of human rights and it substantiates its arguments with an open analysis of the contemporary situation in the individual countries of the Soviet bloc, an analysis devoid of any socialist phraseology.

The democratic revolution is therefore also a reaction to those societies' forty or more years' experience of Communist totalitarianism– whether called "socialism," "existing socialism," "socialism with a human face" (or without) — and particularly in the last two decades, since the failure of the latest attempt at reform on the basis of so-called revisionism. Equally, it is the outcome of the experience of prosperously functioning democratic systems in Europe and North America, not to mention the successful transitions to democracy in Spain, Portugal and elsewhere. In this respect, the global context has seen a positive change. The democratic ideal, scorned and ridiculed in the inter-war years, and even as late as the fifties, is now more favorably placed than at any time this century.

We talk about a "general" or "overall" crisis of Communism, but apart from its general features, it also displays very specific characteristics in individual countries. As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, it is fair to say that no Communist party in any other country of the Soviet bloc ever managed to lose moral prestige, confidence and legitimacy in the eyes of society to the same extent as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Twenty years of "normalization" used it up well and truly. Even its last remaining weapon of any power, the — until recently — much-vaunted "consumer and social guarantees of socialism," is losing effectiveness in the face of reality. With a certain exaggeration, one might say that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has written itself off as a political force capable of generating an alternative to the present establishment.

Apart from a small circle of people who still entertain 1968-vintage reformist illusions, no one in Czechoslovakia believes that the Czechoslovak Communist Party is capable of any sort of "renewal" or that it embodies any sort of hope for the future. Distrusted and rejected by society, particularly the younger generation, and lacking any intellectual base, it is not capable of following even the Soviet, Polish or Hungarian examples.

And whereas people — not so long ago they were called the "silent majority" — are losing their fear, the establishment is beginning to feel threatened. They are now so isolated that they must instinctively know themselves that their fate is sealed. Being unable to produce from their midst an alternative political elite — even as a stop-gap measure — capable of initiating a dialogue with society, they are merely treading water, and they regard each additional month they manage to survive as a success. Meanwhile they go on making one mistake after another and strengthening the solidarity and activity of civil society.

In the course of 1988, we witnessed more social movement in Czechoslovakia than at any time during the previous twenty years; that trend has continued non-stop. People's determination to assert their civil rights is manifesting itself in every possible way: peaceful demonstrations and rallies that have taken place despite threats from the highest places and in spite of the danger of police terror and subsequent judicial persecution; and the growth of independent citizens' initiatives, with petition after petition being launched since the beginning of this year. These have gained the signatures of thousands of people from the so-called "official structures," in other words, the cultural, artistic and academic establishment in support of people described by government leaders, in parliament and in the mass media as "provocateurs" and "enemies of socialism."

This eruption of social activity in the form of civil disobedience is by no means economically motivated — the result of a radical decline in the standard of living. It is above all people's reaction to twenty years of lies and humiliation, and their own conformity. It is a chain-reaction sparked by a yearning for a healthy public life, for plain speaking and for the undistorted truth about what everyone can see with their own eyes.

The most actively involved are young people who find the official cliches and lies intolerable. There are no taboos as far as they are concerned. They are not burdened with ideology, nor does the past weigh on them. They have no sentimental attachment to socialism. They are often surprisingly well-informed, since modern communications media open their horizons to the entire world. And they feel that it is their future—literally their whole lives—that is now at stake.

In addition, the broad current of "civil disobedience" continues to attract the growing support of many members of what is now the older generation—those who backed a loser when they went along with the restored order and now want to burn their bridges after years of living a lie, years of conformity and dissimulation. And they will undoubtedly be joined even by certain timeservers who forged themselves cozy "collaborationist" careers at the beginning of "normalization" and who now, as they feel the ship beginning to flounder, will want to be on the "right" side again.

Important factors in the political destabilization of the regime are developments in neighboring countries: Hungary, Poland—and the Soviet Union. These have done much to alter the political climate in the country by fostering the impression of an overall historical trend, boosting people's self-confidence, and strengthening society's awareness of the inevitability of change while acting as a catalyst in bringing it about.

The regime's stability is also being eroded—in a number of respects—as a result of the end of jamming Radio Free Europe. Its prompt news reporting from within Czechoslovakia, which is heard throughout the country, combined with the growth of activity on the part of the independent solidarity committees and groups, including those of longer date and numerous new ones, has served to attenuate the fear of persecution as immediate retaliation for each and every expression of civic courage. People realize that persecution cannot be an anonymous matter any more and they are no longer isolated individuals at the mercy of the regime. Another encouraging factor, in this respect, is the growth of international solidarity combined with a general interest in Czechoslovakia.

In spite of all the optimism with which we may speak about the present "democratic revolution," despite the fact we can feel it in the air, and although historical analysis indicates that a democratic solution is the only logical outcome, we remain skeptical. Things could still go wrong. The democratic revolution may not achieve its ends and its victory might be postponed. There are numerous reasons for such doubts and they have all been analyzed.

No one can know just how far the metropolis of the Soviet empire will be prepared to let democratic developments in Eastern Central Europe go. There is no way of estimating the price it will be prepared to pay at any given moment, which priority will prevail, which loss will be considered the lesser of two evils. But there is an even more fundamental question: what are the chances of a democratic revolution in the Soviet Union itself? Or more to the point, among the Russians themselves? Caught in the throes of "perestroika's" insoluble dilemmas and their fevered pursuit of their own political identity, will the Russians have the time or the opportunity to understand the demand for sovereignty of the nations of the external empire?

The Soviet threat—obviously enough—is not, of course, the only barrier to a victorious democratic revolution in the Eastern Central European countries. The Communist regimes in those countries may well have come into existence as satellites of the Soviet superpower, but they keep themselves alive by their own efforts, using their own resources, and in their own interests. In Czechoslovakia, since January 1989, the whole country, not just a narrow circle of dissidents, has been aware of the sort of brutality that can be expected from the so-called "forces of order." And the entire democratic world must have realized how powerless it was when confronted by a single isolated situation, when it was not yet even an immediate question of survival for the Communist establishment. I refer to the political leadership's decision to

***We are at the hinge of history.
We are connected to the past, but we are swinging
in new directions. And whether you personally agree with
the voices of hope and optimism that we have heard, or the
voices of doom, there is little doubt in the minds of any of us
that this is an extraordinary moment in modern history . . .***

***The people who have put their lives on the line
in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere
need our dramatically intensified support—financial, political,
diplomatic, economic, military, psychological, moral—in every
conceivable way. And we have to recognize that there is a new
element in the leadership which, for reasons of its own,
is prepared to make major compromises. It is my judgment
that we have to deal with this leadership. We have to
see to it not that it stays in power for good, but,
as Mr. Kis indicated in his brilliant analysis,
that it moves toward a social contract with
civil society in the respective countries.***

The Hon. Tom Lantos
U.S. House of Representatives

Congressman Tom Lantos.

imprison the country's greatest moral authority and one of the spiritual leaders of Czechoslovakia's democratic revolution— Vaclav Havel.

However— as Timothy Garton Ash has convincingly demonstrated— the system of power and the interests of the nomenclature are not the only factors inhibiting the transformation of the Communist system into a liberal democracy with a mixed economy. There are also the interests, attitudes and fears of many of the ruled. In each of the countries in question, so many problems have accumulated, particularly in the economic sphere, that they appear virtually insurmountable. It is impossible to predict the role that might be played by the fears and uncertainties of the labor force who will bear the main burden of consequences for overcoming economic stagnation and backwardness. For the most part, the Czechoslovak workers remain silent; fear of their possible reaction is a further source of inertia within the Communist leadership.

There are, of course, sources of hope, and these too have all been identified and analyzed. On the one hand, the Soviet superpower is preoccupied with itself and, on the other, the leading Western democracies now have a better grasp of the situation in Eastern Central Europe. The greatest source of hope is the progress made by civil society within the crisis-torn Communist systems: the spiritual, political and professional/occupational emancipation of individuals and groups, new kinds of civic solidarity, the discovery of new forms of freedom of expression and organization. More and more capable and willing people are emerging from anonymity, and therein lies the true hope of the process of the democratic revolution.

Czechoslovak optimists and pessimists alike are agreed on one thing— the existing system is inexorably doomed. They only differ in their estimates of how long it will take. The optimists count in months, the pessimists in years. The optimists add: Our morale is excellent, the only worry we have is the thought of our friends in prison. Only because of them does the time factor matter. Otherwise there would be no need for haste. The regime's delaying tactics will turn against them in the end, because the longer they put off tackling the country's pressing problems, the more difficult it will be to use piecemeal or half-hearted solutions.

However, as yet neither the optimists nor the pessimists have any idea of when or how the stalemate situation in which the political leadership finds itself will end. It could well be that Czechoslovakia's path to democracy will substantially differ from the Polish or Hungarian versions.

Africa

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Present day Sudan has probably come closer than ever to fulfilling the description that it is Africa's ungovernable country. That belies the situation three or four years ago in the aftermath of the euphoria that followed the overthrow of the Nimeiri dictatorship. At that time, almost any Sudanese citizen, when questioned about the prospects for democracy in his country, would have replied emphatically that democracy was the choice of the people and there to stay. That optimism for democracy's prospects was perhaps justified, considering the country's post-independence history of two military dictatorships having been overthrown by popular uprising. However, after three years of arguably the most inept democratic practice the country has ever endured, many Sudanese would not be so foolhardy as to conclude that democracy has much of a chance in the foreseeable future. That is likely to remain the case unless the political contours of the country change appreciably. Certainly, there are objective conditions which could make for that change, not least of which would be the peaceful settlement of the current civil war.

Bona Malwal.

Despite the people's desire for democracy, it is not easy for a developing country like the Sudan to attain the levels of democratic practice attained elsewhere in the world. A look at the country's historical and geographic background, the cultural and religious diversity of its people, together with its strategic and geopolitical location, would illustrate the complex nature of the Sudan and why it is not so easy to achieve a universal national outlook or ideology from which a practical framework for running the country could evolve.

It ought to go without question that there needs to be created an ideological, cultural, religious and racial harmony within Sudan if democracy is, indeed, to be at home and flourish. In the absence of such harmony, the politics of the nation have been reduced to mere lip-service to democratic principles, neither backed up by deed nor practice. Different religious, tribal and cultural groups, as opposed to political affiliations of a strict ideological nature, have managed to shape the political ideas of those in whose hands the state machinery has been entrusted. This has resulted in a shift towards the furtherance of particular groups as they entrench their power at the centre, at the expense of the development of a national character. Rather than promote harmony, this group behaviour, in present day Sudan, has led to widespread alienation and even stronger national divisions than in the past. No one politician or grouping in the power-centre of Khartoum has been proved capable of overcoming this nor demonstrated the political will to attempt to do so. Instead, the predictable result has been the weakening of the state's infrastructure and the strengthening of regional, tribal and religious groupings pulling the country in every-which-way, thus leaving the centre ever weaker.

Observers of post-independence Sudan can hardly fail to have noticed that regionalism, tribalism and religious bigotry have grown stronger over the past thirty-four years, which in turn has promoted the importance of the individual's identity to one's tribe, one's region or one's religion, at the expense of the larger national identity. Religious bigotry, in particular, has become increasingly pronounced amongst those Moslem groups that have lacked a strong tribal or regional identity. In a country with a conglomerate of strong tribal and regional identities, these Moslem groups have sought to use their Islamic identity as the only means to attain and then hold on to power. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism has, in this sense, become a quasi-embodiment of the identity of the politically ambitious Moslems who have neither a strong tribal nor regional identity. As Islam would seem to offer a more universal appeal, in Northern Sudan anyway, than would a tribal or regional identity, this group of Islamic fundamentalists has even had the audacity to state that Islam is the ideological mainstay of national politics.

Religion, however, has complicated the political and ideological picture in Sudan as well as the tribal and regional one. There is now the present-day situation where group interest takes preference over the national one and the differing groups find it almost impossible to identify with one another. In that sense, Sudan has become a mere geographical and historical reality, whilst being a modern-day political entity in name only. Perhaps the two best examples in recent years of how groups now narrowly identify themselves are to be found in the behaviour of government leaders in the current civil war.

In November 1987, the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a largely, but not exclusively, Southern Sudanese guerrilla force, captured the Northern Sudanese garrison outposts of Kurmuk and Gissan in the southernmost extremity of the Blue Nile Province on the Sudan-Ethiopia border. This was the first time that the SPLA had gained a foothold in Northern Sudan, although it had encroached into it on many previous occasions. The Khartoum government's reaction to these events was hysterical, to say the least. Proclamations were made calling on the people of Northern Sudan to mobilize, contribute material and support the national army in its bid to recapture the "Motherland from the enemy." Every attempt was made over television, radio and through the pro-government newspapers to de-Sudanize the SPLA in the eyes of the Northern Sudanese population, whilst no effort was spared to rally international Arab support for the fight against the "infidel hordes invading from the South." Large donations were gathered, the army was mobilized and some Arab countries contributed arms and supplies. The two outposts were recaptured from the SPLA a month later.

Contrast those events with the current situation in Southern Sudan, where the SPLA has captured larger and more important towns than Kurmuk and Gissan. There has been little shouting and outrage in government circles in Khartoum, except concerning the plight of government soldiers fleeing into neighboring Uganda as refugees. This lack of concern over the fate of army outposts in Southern Sudan clearly demonstrates the racist attitudes of the authorities in Khartoum, as well as the

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NED Board Member and Panel Moderator Eddie N. Williams.

narrowness of what constitutes for them the national interest.

The second example concerns the attitude of the government to the Southern Sudanese people displaced as a result of the civil war. It is estimated that from among the two million displaced Southern Sudanese, as many as one and a half million have fled, or attempted to flee, to Northern Sudan. Of these, anything up to a quarter of a million are thought to have starved to death on the journey or in Northern Sudan. The remainder of them now live in extremely disparate conditions in the North, the vast majority in shanty towns around Khartoum.

They are living virtually on the doorstep of the government and yet little is being done by the government concerning their plight. The government has limited itself to using the displaced people as a stick to beat the SPLA with when justifying their policies to international opinion. To paraphrase the words of Prime Minister Sadiq El Mahdi, the fact that these people have run to the North shows that they have nothing to fear from their Northern brethren, but plenty to fear from the people they are running from, namely the SPLA. This is symptomatic of the lack of any practical government response to problems brought about by the war and demonstrates the narrowness of the government's view when dealing with the new situations arising as a result of the conflict. There is also an implicit racism on the part of the government when all the above is contrasted with the state sponsored relief effort that was mounted to resettle the few hundred Northerners displaced by the fighting in Kurmuk and Gissan.

Even in Northern Sudan, efforts to impose an Islamic homogeneity have not prevented challenges from the African areas of the North to those Moslem Arabs holding central authority in Khartoum. Many ideas of a temporal nature have crept into the relationship between these groups, mainly to do with the lack of development in the African areas. That relationship, more often than not, is now being viewed by the Northern Africans in terms of what services the state renders to them. In the past, in spite of their Islamic allegiance, these peripheral areas of Northern Sudan have been neglected by the powers that be in Khartoum. Appeals from Khartoum to the Islamic sentiments of these people are no longer holding sway, as the realization has dawned on these communities that, if they finally achieved some degree of national influence, they would then receive a more significant proportion of the national cake, which in the past has been inequitably enjoyed by those communities closer to the power-wielders in Khartoum. The increased educational opportunities that over the years have trickled through to the peripheral communities have seen the emergence of a vocal intelligentsia from amongst them, more prepared than ever to push the case of these areas in the national political arena.

The Sudanese democratic experiment is running the risk of disappearing into oblivion because of the government leadership's misconduct. All the problems besetting the country now were present in embryonic form when the present democratic experiment began in May 1986, due to the poor condition of the country that was inherited from the defunct regime. It had been widely thought that the political parties, which swept into government office in such an optimistic atmosphere, would have immediately set about reversing the disagreeable policies of the military regime that they had all opposed. Primarily, it was expected of the government that it would bring about a speedy conclusion to the civil war. Nimeiri's abrogation of the autonomy of the South and his introduction of Islamic law had been major causes of the renewed civil war.

The electoral propaganda of the major parties preceding the April 1986 elections suggested that these were two policies that could and would be reversed. After nearly three years as Prime Minister, Sadiq El Mahdi and his Umma party have failed to cancel the Islamic laws and, at the time of writing, are the closest political allies of the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF), the NIF being staunch advocates of the imposition of Islamic rule throughout the Sudan. The alliance between the Umma and the NIF has shifted the government well away from the mainstream of Sudanese politics and the crises which have ensued are endangering the already precarious nature of the democracy.

In order for Sudan to become a governable entity in the future, a national consensus of some kind needs to be struck by all parties. As there is no one single ethnic or religious group that is politically, economically and militarily strong enough to impose its will on all others, then a democratic process would be the most appropriate vehicle for achieving any consensus. If a consensus could be reached, then the civil war, in particular, could be negotiated to a peaceful end.

One of the main requirements to the end of the civil war would seem to be the acceptance of the equality of citizenship irrespective of race, culture, religion or region of origin. That would be something on which the South could and ought to risk its future. Of course, such a risk has been taken in the past and the sense of national citizenship has been violated. The two civil wars are clear evidence of the consequences of such violations. However, it is an infinitely preferable risk for the South to take when contrasted with the prospect of a Northern hegemony based upon religion or any other criteria. If Northern Sudan accepted the principle of Sudanese citizenship at its face value, it ought to be possible to reach a national consensus. A secular Sudan, or at least a

Sudan in which Islam was not used as the basis for central authority, ought to be able to accommodate all its diverse people, cultures and religions.

For a meaningful and practical democracy to be initiated in the Sudan, there would have to be ensured by law greater regional autonomy and equitable regional representation in the central government elected by the regions themselves, as opposed to the present practice whereby the Prime Minister selects them.

If these basic requirements of equitable power-sharing were to be implemented and assured for the future, then the other equally important issues of equitable sharing of economic and developmental resources throughout the country and regional representation in the public services, army and security apparatus could then be settled. Without such an arrangement evolving, democracy in the Sudan will remain the charade that it presently is or a mere pipe-dream; the groups constantly denied their rightful say in the running of the country will continue to rebel and the threat of a military take-over will loom larger than ever.

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Unlike the other speakers who have contributed to the discussion so far, I come from a country that claims to be part of Western, European tradition, in other words, a democracy. Now recall the words of Jacek Kuron when he spoke about countries that give the illusion of a normal parliamentary democracy. A lot of people who come to South Africa often go away with the unfortunate illusion that our country is a normal parliamentary democracy.

Let's go back a little in the history of that unhappy country. At the end of the Anglo-Boer War, Britain forced a union on various Afrikaans speaking colonies – three Afrikaans speaking, one English speaking – that resulted in the union of South Africa. Indeed a form of parliamentary democracy was instituted – for white South Africans. At the time, one colony, namely the Cape Colony, or Cape Province, did have a number of black South Africans on the common voters roll. It was to the credit of Cecil Rhodes, the great empire builder and mining magnate, that his party insisted on the retention of that vote for black South Africans, and those of mixed breed. Finally, there were endless problems as the racist regime, namely the Nationalist party, fought over the years to remove those who were not white from that common voters roll. And they finally achieved this in 1948.

We are hoping that the democratic revolution as it appears on the horizon will envelop that part of the world called Africa. Unfortunately, it looks like that is not to be. South Africa has, in fact, moved backwards. Those of you who have read the monumental study on South Africa by Thomas Karis and Gwendolyn Carter will recall that over the years, black South Africans have in fact lost the little democratic power that they once had. Today, in 1989, the seventy-three percent of the people who are black have no vote and no chance to participate in the affairs of their country.

It was only when Harold McMillan, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, came to South Africa and warned about uhuru— freedom coming from the north, from Nigeria and Kenya— and how black South Africans would finally challenge the status quo, that South Africans for the first time addressed the question of democracy for all these people. But the Prime Minister at that time, a man born in Holland called Hendrik Verwoerd, said that the country called South Africa did not exist; what did exist in fact were ten territories, occupied then by blacks. These were the territories into which the wars of liberation had pushed the black population— any little territories that the white man did not want for himself. He then set about creating ten independent black states; four of them have since acquired so-called independence from South Africa and six are still so-called national states. But for the rest of South Africa, which comprises eighty-seven percent of southern Africa, we have a racist regime that is in control. But that is not to say that this democratic revolution has not affected South Africa.

Nthato Motlana addresses the Africa panel while Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu listens.

When finally, because of pressure, the South African regime was forced to introduce a tricameral parliament that made provision for representation for those South Africans of Asian and "coloured" origin, power of course remained in the hands of the fifteen percent that was white. They were forced, I repeat, to introduce that tricameral parliament, but pressures have not receded. Black South Africans and other democrats came together in 1983 to form a broad front called the United Democratic Front, which continues to exert tremendous pressure on the ruling party. It has been said that the ruling National party is in fact disintegrating. Unfortunately, as it disintegrates, the majority of white South Africans are moving to the right.

to a newly-formed party called the Conservative party. Very few of the white electorate are moving to the left, agreeing that power must be shared. So we have a scenario in South Africa today of a white electorate that is massively moving to the right— in other words, rejecting the idea of a shared society— and a small minority moving to the left to accept a non-racial, democratic South Africa.

The interesting development recently has been the establishment of a law commission that looks into the question of human rights. You will recall, I am sure, that forty years ago, December the tenth, when the convenants of human rights were signed in the United Nations, South Africa remained one of the very few countries, and remains I think, the only country today, which has refused to sign those covenants on human rights. In other words, basically, our government says it does not accept the concept of human rights.

I repeat, however, that it does not mean that the democratic revolution has not affected the powers that be within South Africa. There is no doubt that the broad majority of South Africans, black and white, accept that a racist regime cannot go on ruling forever. And one of the reasons this has happened was referred to by Vladimir Bukovsky. He puts it beautifully when he says the Soviet Union is moving out of Eastern Europe and her surrogate territories in Africa because she is broke. One thing that is certainly happening in South Africa is the racist regime is going broke. The economy simply cannot be maintained under the present circumstances. And it has been forced to liberalize, to get rid of the pass laws, to start trying to convince lots of us that it believes in a market economy. If you believe in a market economy, you cannot believe in chains. The one area of South Africa that is growing, and is growing exponentially, is the so-called informal sector. And that informal sector is almost ninety percent black. And so we see this very interesting development in which economists are saying to the South African government, "If you are going to be able to pay your way through this world, you are going to have to free the economy."

Let me conclude my short address by referring to what is in fact the cutting edge in the struggle for a democratic South Africa. I refer to grassroots organizations; my own civic association was formed in 1978 and has led to the formation of other grassroots organizations throughout the country. I refer to the trade union movement, to the very strong religious movement within South Africa— mainly the Council of Churches— and to the soldiers of the struggle, namely the students in the universities. It is these who have joined up with democrats throughout the country— white and black— to form a massive organization that is exerting tremendous pressure on the South African government. This pressure is so strong that the debate as I left home two days ago was about how to write a constitution that will guarantee rights for white South Africans, who claim to have created this modern day miracle called South Africa, while giving to the black majority the rights they deserve.

The human rights commission I referred to a few minutes ago is at this moment battling with the question, "What are human rights?" Can you protect group rights, as the South African racist regime insists, while at the same time giving the individual rights? The debate has come down finally, among thinking South Africans, that there can be no group rights. Because if you speak of group rights, what group are you talking about? South Africa, as you know, consists of immigrant communities that came out of Britain, Germany, Poland, and many other countries. If you speak of group rights, are you going to say that because someone happens to be of Caucasian stock, we need to protect their rights as Caucasians? Are you then going to exclude those who came from Paraguay? Are you going to exclude Asians who are, in fact, Caucasians too?

The state president-elect, Frederick de Klerk, has said very clearly that we are going to draw up a new constitution.

And so maybe we are going to be part of this democratic revolution. I am not very hopeful; as Mr. Bukovsky is so very fearful of what might happen in Russia, I am just as fearful that the securocrats of South Africa may decide that we have gone as far as they would like us to go, and seize power. In conclusion, I must remind you that South Africa is ruled by this Nationalist party, by this racist party under a state of emergency declared on the thirteenth of June, 1986 and still is enforced up to this day.

***Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu** is president of the Center for the Study and Research of Pluralistic Democracy in the Third World (CERDET) in Dakar, Senegal, and professor on the faculty of law and economics at Cheikh Anto Diop University in Dakar. Dr. Nzouankeu is a former civil administrator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon.*

The topic of my presentation is the recent problems in the transition to democracy in Senegal. I will draw lessons from recent events in Senegal and other African countries, particularly over the last two years. But first I would like to state my concept of democracy, which is what CERDET published in a 1985 manifesto setting forth our criteria for democracy.

First, there must be a pluralistic structure, multiple political parties and, in particular, there must be a legal opposition. Press freedom must also exist, as well as an independent judiciary. Free elections must be held, and there must be a peaceful change from government to government. I had not met President Obasanjo before this meeting but you see that there is full convergence between us on these points. These criteria enabled us, two years ago, to establish what we have called the "map of democracy." At that time the map included the following countries in North Africa: Egypt, the Gambia, Morocco, Mauritius, Senegal, the Sudan, and Tunisia. Two years later, we could also include Madagascar in the larger map of African democracies. And we hope that Nigeria will return to the democratic family, and will be followed by Algeria.

As you know, the last two years have been marked by major political events in our part of the world— the election of the national assembly in the Republic of Senegal, legislative elections in Tunisia, and the presidential election in Madagascar. In every case the democratic principles which I have just cited were put to the test. Each case involved an incipient democracy— a country emerging gradually from an authoritarian regime and undertaking the transition to democracy. I would like to base my presentation on these experiments and what we have experienced. In my conclusion I will state the tasks that lie ahead and that are incumbent on the governments to perform if they want to ensure democratic transitions.

Concerning the legal opposition, the experiments that I have described show that the issue involves the representative quality of that opposition; most opposition parties are not fully representative. Some were created only recently and have not had time to establish themselves; some which were forbidden during dictatorship periods have only now begun to reorganize. Still others have existed for many years but do not have a highly representative quality. In other cases, the actions of the opposition parties are hampered by civil war.

To help such parties become more representative, several solutions have been adopted. One is what I call support legislation— changing the constitution to help parties in danger of



Jacques M. Nzouankeu (center) addresses the Africa panel as General Olusegun Obasanjo (r.) and translator Alec Toumayan (l.) listen.

vanishing. In Senegal in 1978, the constitution was amended so that eighteen members of the National Assembly could call upon the Supreme Court to have a law cancelled or annulled. The number eighteen was chosen because there were eighteen members in the opposition party. Subsequently several members of the opposition resigned and the opposition only had ten members in parliament. The constitution was changed again to say that ten members of the National Assembly could petition the Supreme Court. In spite of this, members of that same opposition party continued to resign. Another example is the electoral system. In Senegal, we had an electoral system which could only benefit the majority parties. The electoral rules were changed in 1982 to enable the opposition to be represented, but this change was not sufficient. We have changed the electoral system again so that we will have flexible structures in place to enable members of the opposition to be members of the assembly.

I am not sure that a policy of support legislation is the solution to the problem of the legal opposition. The non-representativeness of some opposition parties is due to the fact that there is often no consensus in the nation—no one agrees on the boundaries of the country nor on the constitution or the kind of society one wants to build.

Beginning with these conditions then, one must review the situation and change the political system in order to enable a genuine opposition to manifest itself. The platform of the consensus for this must be reduced, because in some cases religious or other factors will create a unanimity which prevents a genuine debate from taking place. The feeling is created that, yes, there are

> ***The democratic process is a very old thing in African tradition. African laws and values are based on the democratic process and democratic principles. The only divergence is that African traditional law stresses an emphasis on the protection of the family as a unit rather than on the individual. This does not mean that it is less democratic than the traditional jurisprudence as you and I know it . . .***
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> ***There is great hope that as African states find difficulty in extracting surplus from the African population, the democratic process will continue to go forward, and the African producer will continue to exercise his influence in the marketplace. And it is in the marketplace where the permanent, as opposed to transient, forces and influences of the democratic process— as has been seen in the various regimes which have come and gone in Africa— will be established.***
>
> Geoffrey Onegi-Obel
> *The Financial Times*
> Uganda

parties, but everybody follows the same discourse. Therefore there is no genuine debate.

Free elections are one of the criterion of democracy. The material means to organize free and genuine elections is an important support that can be given to democratic regimes.

This being said, the opposition in some of the regimes I have mentioned has assimilated the idea of free elections as a given right. So when the opposition does not win the elections, it says that the elections were trumped up. Surely there is no way for the opposition to win if the election process is falsified. But this does not mean that the elections were rigged just because the opposition failed to win. The propaganda of the opposition in this area has really jeopardized the progress of democracy. Even those who wanted to fight against electoral fraud have interpreted the behavior of some parties as irresponsible in this regard. It is incumbent upon young democracies to organize themselves so that this problem can be resolved.

This can be done in three ways. First, electoral processes can be established to eliminate, to the fullest extent possible, the opportunity for fraudulent elections. There are procedures available in the Third World to that end. Second, ensure that citizens understand and appreciate that elections indeed bring a change and that there is something to be gained by voting. To achieve such citizen participation, elections must be held more frequently. To achieve this, you can elect half of the assembly at a time and separate presidential elections from legislative elections in order to create a more active political life.

The press can do more as well. Everyone agrees that the press has not fully played the role it should have in the period we went through two years ago. We observed a confusion in the press between press freedom and systematic criticism of everything the government was doing. In the press, everything the government was doing was bad, whether in the political, economic, or social arena; there was not a single point on which the government was deemed to be right. That too is a quest for sensationalism and does not help democracy. We have to have a free press able to criticize democracy and the government. But the press should also propose solutions so that the process of democracy can go forward.

Finally, I would like to address the role of the judiciary. We know that the impartiality and independence of the judiciary is a pillar of democracy. But in Senegal's transition some judges confused freedom of the judiciary with opposition to the government. They understood that a judge was independent if he was against the government. It being understood that discontent is very widespread because of economic difficulties, we sometimes saw judges interpreting the law in such a manner as not to create any difficulties for themselves vis-a-vis the people who were experiencing these economic difficulties. There was a focus on judicial popularity and not on rendering justice; that can jeopardize and endanger democracy. Indeed, we will have to review the status of the judiciary. In the final analysis there are two solutions. The first is that judges will have to follow the rules of the game of democracy with impartiality. If that does not work, some power will have to be transferred to the law to guarantee individual freedom and reduce the judges' power of evaluation and leeway.

Transition to democracy is a decisive stage in our countries' evolutions. This transition can either be made by an authoritarian government attempting to prepare the ground for that process, or it can be made by the government of a young incipient democracy which wants to set the future framework for full democracy. In every case, we have to look for a theory of transition government. A transition government cannot act as a normal democratic government would, and will be constrained to take a number of measures which may appear to be abnormal when viewed by established democracies. But without these measures, the process that we want to be gradual and irreversible could very well be endangered again.

Also of key importance is the action and training that people— judges, journalists, and all those involved in the democratic process— receive. Today we are giving the highest priority to such action and training. If we do not promote a democratic state of mind all our efforts could be reduced to naught. This is of the utmost importance in the struggle of the democratic process.

Geoffrey Onegi Obel, editor of the Financial Times *newspaper in Uganda, comments on the Africa panel discussion.*

General Olusegun Obasanjo *was head of the federal military government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Nigeria until handing over power to a democratically-elected civilian government in 1979. A successful farmer in Nigeria, General Obasanjo has often been called into service as an international statesman, most notably as Chairman of the African Leadership Forum and Co-chairman of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group on South Africa.*

I observe that in the National Endowment for Democracy's focus it is admitted and accepted that the transition to democracy may be an uneven, long and rough process. Let me add to that the problem of having an exactitude shared by all in the definition of democracy. Rather than for us to be bogged down in the quagmire of definition, I will identify certain basic elements that we must accept as minimum standards for democratic principles and practices.

Necessary ingredients to achieve democracy include:

Periodic election of political leadership through the secret ballot; popular participation of all adults in the election process; choice of programmes and personalities in the elections; an orderly succession; openness of the society; an independent judiciary; freedom of the press to include freedom of ownership; institutional pluralism; a democratic culture and democratic spirit; and fundamental human rights.

General Olusegun Obasanjo.

The last point should be particularly emphasized because without fundamental human rights there can be no democracy.

Let me go back to the theme of this conference—"The Democratic Revolution." We are far from the stage of a revolution in the democratic process in Africa. And yet democracy is the option which the governed prefer and which is easily denied them by the government. To me, that is the hope of those who live in democracy all over the world; the natural instinct of man as a governed animal is for democracy. I believe that democracy will not only survive but it will spread, and it will gather momentum as it spreads. It is pertinent to remind ourselves that before the advent of colonialism, we had democracy in sub-national groups which worked.

Democracy releases the total energy of all citizens for development. And to develop, we must move to democratize. Restraint and repression associated with authoritarian regimes breed resentment and resentment breeds violence.

These three reasons make an evolutionary process of democracy inevitable in our region—the signs are already perceptible. The military and the populace wherever they are ruling have come to realize that military regimes have limitations. The economic situation in Africa has brought the limitation of military regimes vividly home to us all. Economic performance does not obey military command. And what is more, and with great respect for my former colleagues in the military all over Africa, economics is normally not a strong point for most of them. As a footnote, I do think that many political leaders in the West, for that matter, are elected for either their economic knowledge or performance.

How then do we advance the process of democracy in Africa? It is Africans themselves who should be in the vanguard of democracy. Africans who believe in the ideal, in the process, in the principles and in the practice. Without being immodest, the four of us on this panel have, in our own little ways, been working to establish or strengthen democratic processes and practices against heavy odds at times in our different localities. We can and should do more to widen the circle of those who accept the challenge of working for democracy.

What can an organization like the National Endowment for Democracy do? Let me warn against two things that should not be done. You should not expect all of us to have a U.S.-style democracy. For instance, a one-party system that allows all the ten elements I mentioned earlier will not pass the litmus test of U.S. democracy with its multi-party system, but it will be a great advancement from an authoritarian military regime.

You should not appear too overbearing or too visible in strengthening and assisting democratic processes in our region because it can be counterproductive. You must offer the kinds of assistance you have been offering and even more. We must be partners in the task of advancing democratic processes. We must be undaunted as we meet obstacles and setbacks. You must assist us with institution-building, training and exposure of our colleagues to your institutions.

With patience, perseverance and persistence on our part and if we have some assistance with the provision of the tools, we will do the job. This is an area where empowerment is required and must be provided.

Let me sound another note of caution. Poverty and under-development tend not to help the advancement of democratic processes. In such a situation, the populace yearns for strong leadership to take them out of the economic morass. In the end they get a dictator who compounds their poverty and problems and makes the situation worse. The argument that tribalism or sectionalism breeds non-democratic regimes is false. Democracy is the only integrative glue that can weld our different sub-national groups together into nations with common destinies, equal stakes and common identities on a permanent basis.

What we lack mostly are leaders imbued with democratic ideals, orientation and spirit. But we will get them if only in small doses or in stages. Small gains must be consolidated and democratic processes must not be destroyed.

Finally, let us examine democracy in different stages of transition in Africa:

Non-military one-man rule; military one-man rule; military turned-civilian one-man rule; one-party rule; and one-party rule in a one-party dominated multi-party environment.

The personal and political instability and insecurity inherent in all types of one-man rule are making almost all of them seek wider and at times greater popular participation in the political process. This must be encouraged and sustained by all believers in democracy. The natural instinct of the governed for the democratic option is the greatest driving force to make the trickle turn into a democratic flow in Africa. The prospect for democracy today in Africa is better than it has ever been since independence. Democracy is diffusion. But its appeal lies in its pragmatism and realism as a means of guaranteeing individual rights, interests and social justice. It preserves harmony within communities and it promotes prosperity and integrates societies. It promotes peace within nations and between nations. In addition to all these, I am sure that it can also be made to generate growth and development and distribute wealth more equitably. It will then be seen as the necessity of the future in our part of the world, and not just a hope.

In conclusion, let me comment on efforts at establishing democracy in my country, Nigeria. After thirteen years of military administration, our government, mine and my immediate predecessors', drew up a four-year stage-by-stage political programme of returning to elected civilian administration. That programme included drafting a new constitution by a selected group of men of different political opinion and affiliations, the consideration of the draft constitution by a Constituent Assembly, local government reform and elections for all elective offices. The new civilian administration lasted four years and three months before the military intervened again. The pretext was that the politicians never learned any lessons and their old habits died hard. Within twenty months, a palace coup ousted the immediate post-second republic military administration. The new administration which came to power in August 1985 promised and prepared yet another political programme. The distinguishing feature of this programme is the blanket ban on politicians who still have grassroots influence and support.

It is too early to see how, by legislation, the grassroots influence and support will be washed off by the military or how the banned politicians will use their grassroots influence and support in the unfolding drama of military audacity and political subtlety. Will the new breed learn the old trick by adopting the banned politicians as their godfathers and deal with the military kingmakers when they become kings or are we in for a new era that we have not seen before? The signs are inauspicious and the environment is unsanitized. It will, in the end, lead to one side having the upper hand. But whomever has the upper hand, will it lead to stability and consolidation and sustenance of democratic processes, principles and practices? That is my concern and the challenge facing our nation.

Luncheon Session

***Violeta Chamorro** is the General Editor of the independent Nicaraguan newspaper **La Prensa**. Mrs. Chamorro became president of the Board of Directors of **La Prensa** in January 1978, following the assassination of her husband, Pedro J. Chamorro Cardenal. In July 1979, she became a member of the first Junta of the Government of the National Reconstruction; she resigned in April 1980, in disagreement with the course of the government.*

There are few opportunities for Nicaraguans to address such a distinguished audience and describe the obstacles which have kept the democratic revolution in our country from being successful. I want to thank the National Endowment for Democracy and all of you for your interest in Nicaragua.

During my presentation, I will follow the questions that the Endowment sent me while making the preparations for this event. I began by asking myself what impact, if any, a democratic revolution has had in Nicaragua. During nine years of Sandinista revolution this question has tormented me, as I saw how the Sandinista government thwarted the triumph of democracy in my country, thus wasting a great historical opportunity.

In my opinion, the fact that the goals of the Nicaraguan revolution were social justice and democracy explains why it was fought and why it won in 1979. Its initial Constitution, the basic statute of September 1979, called for a revolution based on freedom, pluralism, a mixed economy and a democratic system of government.

I was a member of the Governing Junta, and when I became convinced that the Sandinistas were betraying that platform, that commitment, and that they were trying to impose a totalitarian dictatorship, I resigned. With my limited strength and resources—but with all my determination and will—I tried to denounce and fight the regime that, with deceit and in a dictatorial manner, was striving to impose Marxism-Leninism on my country. I began this still ongoing battle from *La Prensa*, shoring myself up with my husband's moral legacy.

What are the future prospects for democracy in the next decade? I think that we would have to consider the results of the fight against Marxism-Leninism in my country in order to measure and analyze future prospects for democracy in the next decade.

The Nicaraguan people, encouraged by *La Prensa* and political, labor, and religious leaders, have resisted the Sandinistas. Although political analysts tend not to understand it, the resistance has been tremendously successful since it has kept the Sandinistas from turning us into another Cuba, which is their model.

In connection with that resistance of the people of Nicaragua, I want to mention an extraordinary group of Nicaraguan women and young people who are here at this conference. They are the best representatives of our people who, at the expense of tremendous suffering and sacrifice,

Violeta Chamorro.

have successfully resisted the imposition of the Cuban model.

Thanks to the struggle of these people, the Sandinista defense committees' typical means of totalitarian control have failed. Political and economic centralization measures have also failed.

Agricultural collectivization has created a storm of protest; it was the main cause of the civil war. Despite their many efforts and brutal persecution, the Sandinistas have not been able to overpower the Church. And the people have found different ways to make their feelings known—by refusing to produce, by going into exile, or by means of armed or civic struggle denouncing the country's politics and its mixed economy.

The fact that this has been achieved in the worst and most oppressive situations means that the Nicaraguan people have the faith and will to fight for democracy. As a new situation emerges and as the pressures of the free world become better coordinated, there will be great prospects for the complete victory of the republican and democratic system fought for by those who overthrew the Somoza dictatorship.

What are the main obstacles to democratic progress? I feel that the main obstacle is inherent to democracy—the lack of national unity. Achieving national unity is precisely the objective of *La Prensa*. The friendly pressure of democratic and free governments can help keep the inner unity from breaking and provide for a shared, unswerving campaign.

What can be done to strengthen democracy in the future? What Nicaragua lacks is not democratic idealism and fervor, but an example of a democratic government and education for democracy. Apart from economic reestablishment, which will need great support, a precondition for democracy is the help of friendly governments and institutions that share our ideals. We need help in creating structures for democratic participation that give a sense of civic responsibility and duty to the community.

I am convinced that this communal spirit, in other words democracy operating at all levels, is the most relentless enemy of communism. We have to work with political parties, labor unions, schools and universities to carry out an education for democracy crusade that will set an example for the Americas and lead to a victorious response after Nicaragua's ordeal under Marxism-Leninism.

Given the weakening of discredited utopian ideologies, can democracy fill the resulting void? With the ideas I have shared here, I answer yes, and I say so based on the struggle against Marxism in my country.

Following the failure of the Sandinistas' communist project, Nicaragua will have been vaccinated against communist demagoguery. We must know how to replace the centralization of Marxist socialism with very active forms of democratic participation designed to favor the community.

We must create a climate of dialogue and solidarity to replace the hierarchical ways used by Marxism-Leninism to exact obedience, and we must never stop presenting the people with our criticism of what the Sandinista front did, and how it dehumanized Nicaraguan society.

Can democracy enhance its attraction to intellectuals and political activists in the Third World, as well as in the Communist world and in the West? It not only can, but policies must be set forth with the backing of intellectuals and cultural representatives—exactly the opposite of what the Sandanistas have done.

The democratization of culture must be promoted, supported and advocated in a nonpartisan, decentralized and free manner. We must have scholarships, cultural centers, and exchanges in which the state's role is limited to being a generous sponsor of private initiatives.

How can we establish a foundation of democratic beliefs, advocating a series of democratic ideas and ideals to influence the worldwide democratic movement in the upcoming decades and help democracy prevail over its nondemocratic rivals?

Violeta Chamorro (L) and Senator Nancy Kassebaum.

It is a great pleasure to be able to be here and hear Senora Chamorro. I visited with her about a year and a half ago in Managua and admired so much the leadership she has provided for the opposition to the repressive Sandinista government. She's a light that can't be diminished in Nicaragua—and they've tried . . .

For those of you who have been engaged in the struggle for freedom of expression—through the written or the spoken word—it's a leadership to be valued by all of us who care about the principles of democracy. There is no better example of courage than Violeta Chamorro.

The Hon. Nancy Kassebaum
United States Senate

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I believe that fighting and facing up to the aberrations of the 20th century, like those we have experienced in Nicaragua, strengthens democracy, teaches us more about it and opens new possibilities.

Although democracy was born in Greece long ago, in my mind it is the 21st century that will be the great century of democracy. It is incumbent upon those of us who have learned from the terrible trials of this century to make it so.

A broad based congress of men and women involved in the field of culture, intellectuals and institutions, guided by the spirit of the National Endowment for Democracy, could lead to the creation of a body to gather together and organize the most lofty values of what we would call democratic culture to keep the sacred fire of democracy alive, calling for the assertion and defense of democracy, fostering its movement, development and initiatives.

***Roberto Brenes** is a senior member of the Executive Committee of the National Civic Crusade for Justice and Democracy in Panama. He has served as president of the Panamanian Association of Business Executives and as Secretary of the National Council for Private Enterprise of Panama. Mr. Brenes is presently exiled in Caracas where he works for the "Movement for Democracy in Panama."*

On Sunday, May 7, barely six days from now, the people of Panama will massively go to the polls for Presidential and legislative elections. Far from being the cursory and continuous exercise of a democratic tradition, these elections will be a referendum for democracy or dictatorship. Worse still, they perhaps will be the last pacific attempt of the Panamanian people to vote out the twenty-year military regime currently led by the sadly famous General Manuel Antonio Noriega.

The Immediate Scenario

It is no secret what Noriega has in mind. Riddled by economic stagnation and political isolation, with dwindling support of less than fifteen percent of the population and growing pressures from the international community, "El General" seeks the legitimization of the regime through rigged elections. No efforts have been spared to that effect; for more than a year now all independent media has been closed, political and Civilista leaders have been arrested and deported and the constitutional rights of the people, the necessary prerequisite of free elections, have been destroyed.

Neither the conditions nor the mechanics of the electoral process have been left to chance by the regime. The electoral tribunal is totally controlled by Noriega, preempting any possibilities of appeal by the opposition. There is growing evidence that electoral listings have been adulterated, eliminating known opposition supporters.

It is a proven fact that over one hundred and sixty thousand electoral IDs have been fabricated for single-person multiple voting. The official electoral population statistics reflect an abnormally large five-year growth, evidencing either the inclusion of an artificial voting population or the traditional "cemetery voting" so popular in places like Mexico and the Philippines under Marcos.



Roberto Brenes

Noriega is smart enough to know that the larger the turnout the larger the absolute difference of votes in favor of the opposition. Under such circumstances, fraud will only be possible through an open, outright seizure of the electoral results that, in turn, will defeat the regime's objectives of seeking electoral legitimacy.

In order to discourage would-be voters and prevent a large turnout, the dictatorship has resorted to terror and coercion. Public servants are personally warned by their bosses about the consequences of casting an opposition vote. They are forced to assist in pro-government rallies under threats of being fired. Despite Constitutional prohibition, the President and the Ministers openly rally for the regime's candidate.

Electoral violence and intimidation by government supporters and paramilitary forces have been commonplace throughout the campaign. The regime's intelligence forces have been fabricating all sorts of espionage, violence and U.S. invasion stories to justify state terrorism. It is predicted that before the end of the week the level of violence and intimidation will escalate, leading to a scenario similar to the 1987 Haitian elections.

Finally, the regime is making international observation very difficult. Except for a hand-picked few, the regime refuses to allow impartial observers. And new visa and migration requirements have been set up to discourage foreign travellers.

The international press will be subjected to very strict regulations. Hotels will be controlled by the Immigration Department in an attempt to prevent lodging of uninvited observers. Car rental companies have been warned about renting cars to opposition forces and to unauthorized foreigners.

So far, the Panamanian people have held firm. The desire to terminate twenty years of corruption and incompetence and the long neglected hopes for justice and democracy are far more powerful than intimidation, bribery and outright cheating. If nothing extraordinary happens, the people of Panama will be at the polls Sunday exercising their very first duty towards a democratic future.

But to achieve this, the people of Panama need the support of all democratic nations of the world. Sunday's elections must be an event closely watched by the international community. Regardless of government restrictions, active observers must be sent to monitor the event. The media community of the free world must be there. If fraud prevails, international solidarity must act with energy, isolating the regime until it collapses.

Victory must come on Sunday!

The Long Term Outcome

The short-term scenarios beginning Sunday are difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the long-term scenarios are not. If victory for democracy does not come Sunday, it will still come, sooner or later. Democracy is now a planetary phenomenon, too much a part of the contemporary world to be outlived by an historical aberration in military uniform.

Our worries begin when democratization begins. Democracy seldom depends only on the successful outcome of an election or on the termination of military rule. Panama is no exception.

The political realities of my country are the product of a complex historical process brimming with contradictions between internal and external forces. Noriega is not the offspring of spontaneous generation; he is a collective creation of those forces and their contradictions.

Therefore, the long-term survival of democracy in Panama will depend largely on our ability to successfully recognize and deal with those forces—forces that are the essence of our political situation today and, no doubt, an important factor in our future.

When we analyze from a distance Panamanian political realities we can recognize three major forces, two internal and one external, that have had a decisive impact upon the present day scenario. First, there is a structurally weak partisan system; second, the emergence of nationalistic forces independent of the traditional partisan system but seeking recognition in the political mainstream; and third, the historical dominance of U.S. defense policy in local politics.

Internal Forces

Before the military coup of October 1968, Panama enjoyed an imperfect democracy that regularly held elections. Despite that fact, the political arena was characterized by a large number of weak political parties, most lacking an objective political agenda and functional only every four years. Most of the parties were dominated by the local oligarchy and seldom did the middle or lower classes have any party relevance.

While these parties have evolved and are generally recognized as "the opposition," they are still comprised largely of old fashioned structures. Unable throughout the years to galvanize steady and loyal constituencies, these parties are today the temporary beneficiaries of the anti-regime, anti-Noriega sentiment and the trustees of the peoples' expectations of justice, freedom and democracy.

On the other hand, the so-called government parties are the product of Omar Torrijos' grand political scheme. After the 1968 coup, Torrijos incorporated neglected sectors into the political mainstream and attempted a new political style of open consultation. In the Torrijos scheme the pro-regime parties should have evolved into independent political forces as the military faded out of power.

But when Torrijos died, his democratization project also died. His experiment degenerated into the government-supported parties of today: civilian appendices of the Army with no autonomous decision-making or independent party ideology.

If a basic premise for a strong democracy is the existence of political institutions—and if strong political institutions are only the consequence of strong and dedicated parties—then the first task of Panama's democratic revolution begins there.

The long and intense struggle against the regime has fostered expectations for the larger mass of Panamanians who have been traditionally left out but feel they have a right to their future. Most Panamanians have never experienced life in a democratic society. Sixty-seven percent of the population was under ten years of age in October 1968. Fifty-three percent was not even born then and roughly half will vote on Sunday for the first time. Most of these are members of the educated middle class: students, teachers, doctors, bureaucrats and businessmen. Most of them have been in the streets, fighting against the regime; they know first-hand the weaknesses of the present party system.

Only if the political parties recognize the need to modernize and reflect upon the longing of the people will Panama be able to overcome a worn-out political establishment and move toward stable democracy. If the party system, new or old, fails and yields to partisan ambitions, the social forces will overtake the political leadership and the system will plummet into anarchy and dictatorship.

External Forces

Panama, a local scholar once said, is a country out in the open. For centuries, the very nature of its transit economy and its strategic position has attracted foreign interest that, in turn, has decisively influenced domestic political scenarios. In the last eighty years none has been more intense than the influence of the U.S. None has done more for militarism.

Because of the Panama Canal, U.S. interest in Panama has been largely strategic and its approach to local politics has responded more to national security goals than to foreign policy guidelines.

With the advent of the Cold War, and under the reasoning that strong local armies would prevent the escalation of international Communism, the U.S. set out to back its Latin military allies, often overlooking the issue of democracy. Those were the big times of the Somozas and the Batistas. History has long proven the blunders of such policy; more Communist regimes emerged all over the world after World War II from right-wing dictatorships sponsored by the U.S. than from direct Soviet intervention.

In those countries where right-wing military dictatorships did not readily emerge, the military became increasingly important political actors and democracy languished until it collapsed. The political history of Central America during the sixties and the seventies attests to that fact; all countries with U.S.-backed armies followed the pattern. However, Costa Rica, a country with no army since 1948, has enjoyed a strong and consistent democracy—the exception proves the rule.

During the late seventies and the eighties, U.S. policy in Central America was drastically reversed. The issues of human rights and democracy took the front seat and the former military rule yielded to freely elected governments. It seemed that the U.S. was finally learning the hard lessons of history. However, this was not the case in Panama, where military rule existed since 1968. There an important strategic issue was at stake—the Panama Canal.

In September 1977, the Panama Canal Treaty, better known as the Torrijos-Carter treaty, was signed. The treaty resolved for good the issue of the transfer of the Canal to the Panamanians. However, the annexes of the treaty referring to neutrality and defense of the waterway perpetuated U.S. intervention in Panama and provided the legal structure for a larger and more sophisticated army, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), for the so-called "Canal defense." This was a larger army for a Canal that was declared indefensible by U.S. military experts. This army, trained and equipped by the U.S., has, as recent history confirms, only served the purposes of the military dictatorship.

In its new role as escrow agent of American security in the area, the PDF was accommodating in more than one way. As things began to sour in

Nicaragua and some countries in the Caribbean, the PDF and especially Noriega became intelligence assets of the U.S. Needless to say, as long as Noriega worked for U.S. intelligence, all pledges for democratization previously made by the regime were obliterated.

Not only did the U.S. remain silent during the early eighties as Noriega undid some of the democratic improvements led by Torrijos, but the U.S. was also the first government in the world to endorse the fraudulent victory of the regime's candidate in the 1984 presidential elections. After that election, the Panamanian people had had enough. The rest is history.

The Need for a New Relationship

It would be tiresome to review all recent events that have led to the reversal of U.S. policy towards Noriega. It would also be out of place to recite here the collection of blunders that has characterized U.S. policy against Noriega in the last eighteen months. While, formally, the policy calls for an all-out opposition to the regime, the actions of the U.S. appear to remain stranded between the eternal dichotomy of the democratic values it praises and the national security issues it cherishes.

The telling lessons of these events should make a strong case for a truly value-oriented policy towards Panama. Such a policy will then be consistent with policy actions and in harmony with overall policy towards Latin America.

In order to accomplish this, it is essential that the democracy-security dichotomy is resolved in favor of the former, otherwise U.S. policy will remain a hindrance to the long-term stability of democratic life, and thus of lasting peace.

A new relationship based upon mutual respect between the U.S. and Panama is necessary. I am speaking of a relationship of equals and friends where friendship does not become confused

Congressman Steve Gunderson listens to the presentations at the luncheon session.

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with dependence, and where independence is never synonymous with hostility. This should be a relationship of friends and true partners in two common enterprises — the Panama Canal and the commitment to a democratic society.

Manos a La Obra!

After this bird's eye view of the facts and the tasks before us, one must certainly feel overwhelmed by the challenges ahead. Getting rid of the twenty years of military rule is a feat in itself. Building a democratic society nearly from scratch is quite another. Yet, the very struggle has provided us with the tools and the conviction with which to succeed.

For twenty-four consecutive months now, the people of Panama, under the leadership of the National Civic Crusade, have challenged the military regime with no other weapon than their moral and civic conviction. The ordeal has put to the test the validity of democratic ideas and has taught Panamanians that freedom and justice are "luxuries" much too important to be left to chance. The remembrances of the past will steer the spirit of the future.

As for the Crusade itself, its role in the future should remain that of the promoter of the democratic ideal over and above partisan or individual goals. It should also become the nursery of the new political leadership for the consolidation of democracy, transforming for good our historical contradictions into a democratic society by and for the Panamanian people.

The road is long but we do not despair. No matter what Sunday brings, the Civilista spirit shall prevail. Quoting Simon Rodriguez, the cherished teacher of Simon Bolivar, "Either we create or we blunder!"

I would also like to say a word about the National Endowment for Democracy . . . As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and in the Budget Committee when we were asked to approve the funding for the Endowment, I was one who had grave reservations that this could ever succeed. I thought it might just be another Washington think tank.

My apologies to all those here who have helped make it succeed, because I think it has gone beyond our highest expectations. One example that is imminent are the elections in Panama next Sunday, May 7th.

The National Endowment for Democracy has been a group that's been there and has been focusing on the importance of these elections; it will be able to call to the world's attention any fraud and manipulation that takes place. I salute you because these are important elections and certainly what happens there should be called to the world's attention.

The Hon. Nancy Kassebaum
United States Senate

***Leopold Berlanger** is the president of the Haitian International Institute for Research and Development, which is working to promote democratic values and processes and encourage cooperation and dialogue among private sector groups committed to democracy in Haiti. Mr. Berlanger, who served as a program coordinator for the Haitian Development Foundation, has also been a professor of development economics and land management.*

Leopold Berlanger

I am delighted to be here with such a distinguished assembly of people fighting all around the world for democracy. Again, we want to congratulate the National Endowment for Democracy for its efforts and initiatives and for making this gathering possible.

During the last three or four years, Haiti has been a critical test for the spread of the democratic revolution. The wave of democratic change in the 1980's which affected political regimes of the American subcontinent also found its way into Haiti. The downfall of twenty-nine years of brutal and corrupt dictatorship in February 1986 was welcomed by the Haitian people as a second independence. Most Haitians believed the 1986 revolution, based on people's sovereignty and political rights, would give full meaning to the 1804 victory over colonization.

Today, democratic principles and values have become the latest motif for politics – the common ground for political consensus and Haitian hopes for freedom, responsible government, and for a better life. We all have in mind the tremendous effect on the world's political context of the human rights policies initiated by the Carter Administration. Also, these policies were strengthened throughout the hemisphere by the Catholic Church's new commitment to elementary rights against political oppression.

In Haiti, the most sensible and perhaps most crucial achievements to date as a consequence of this new era are indisputable – freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and more space for pluralistic organizations of civil society.

Yet in this painful surge for a new beginning, the Haitian people have not been able to choose democratically their own leaders, and the fulfillment of their aspirations – clearly expressed through a constitution, massively voted by the people in March 1987—still remains a dream.

But this difficult birth of democracy is consistent, on the one hand, with the firm conviction of the Haitian people to struggle for a new democratic society and, on the other hand, with the enormous obstacles that handicap the process.

In today's Haiti, threats against democracy come from every direction. First of all, one has to take into consideration the weight of historical heritage. The political culture is dominated by an authoritarian tradition which favors the exclusivism of a small group against the will of the many. Of course, this type of political culture favors neither the common surge of consensus nor the general equilibrium of the political system.

The lack of adequate institutions at the state level is also an important obstacle to democracy, especially without the institutionalization of the armed forces along professional criteria. Under a clear perception of the supremacy of a legitimate civilian government, the risk of a coup d'etat or a military coup could remand a regular pattern.

Another major problem is the judiciary. Until now, the idea of justice has been considered as a luxury for the strong, while the weak, or the majority, have to struggle every day against oppression. Nevertheless, the institutionalization processes of democracy also rely heavily on the shoulders of civil society. Strong leadership based on political parties, as well as structured unions, is a known prerequisite for stable democracy. Such structures will take a great deal of time, effort and know-how.

Above all, however, corruption and poverty are the most crucial obstacles to democracy in Haitian society today. Systematic abuses, enormous privileges and monopolies are current practices for an oligarchic fraction of society.

Those elements are antagonistic to every conceivable positive step toward democracy and development. Such corrupt practices are the basis for actual perceptions of preeminence of personal and particular interest over national interest and common good. In this perspective, the democratic revolution is also a moral revolution.

On the other side, massive poverty is by all accounts an awful plight and impediment to democracy. It goes hand in hand not only with hunger, but also with ignorance. Poverty and ignorance are exploited by the political extremes who can build on them slogans of totalitarian revolution and systematic immediate rupture at any expense, at any cost.

Today in Haiti democrats stand a fighting chance to overcome the totalitarian and authoritarian challenge if they show enough realism to mold democracy according to social and historical realities. Three years of political and governmental instability spell, apparently, chaos and anarchy. But these years are also years of searching for something better than dictatorship. In fact, the social and political instability demonstrates society's willingness not to go back to an ancient and traditional solution.

This proves that democracy stands as the only workable alternative in Haiti. The democratic society the Haitian people are striving for may not be an ideal or fully genuine one for the next decade. Today and in the years ahead, Haitian democrats must be careful not to give way to absolute political competition. Moderate political consensus will be the only reasonable path for some years to come. At this stage, it means also a genuine expression of democracy. Again, it points out that a democratic revolution is a gradual revolution.

Finally, despite the primary responsibility of government policy in establishing the rule of law, the real fight will be from the bottom up. A major portion of this initiative will have to come from grassroots levels.

It is consequently imperative to strengthen political processes by making them instrumental for social and economic transformation, mostly to the benefit of the disenfranchised, which represent a national majority today. Although there have been many difficult problems on the paths of Haiti's progress toward democratization, its ongoing struggle is an expression of confidence and a testament that the people of Haiti want democracy, and they will attain it.

The future of six million Haitians is at stake. Social change is inevitable. Our duty is to make it happen as peacefully as possible and in what we believe are the best interests of our country.

Our presence here today means that we share a wish to work together to promote, protect and defend the basic human rights of liberty and social justice. Yes, democracy will prevail.

***Ricardo Bofill**, the former president of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and its current representative abroad, is a former professor of Marxist theory at the University of Havana. Mr. Bofill founded the Havana based Committee for Human Rights in 1976 and served as its president until his forced exile in October 1988. He spent 12 years in Cuban prisons on charges of "ideological deviationism" for his defense of human rights in Cuba.*

Ricardo Bofill

I am from Cuba, a small island country in the Caribbean where we have seen a mixture of Spanish and African cultures. I'm speaking on behalf of a human rights group—the Cuban Committee for Human Rights—which is virtually illegal there because the government fails to recognize its existence and prosecutes its members.

I must first say something that many of you probably know, namely that Cuba under Fidel Castro has become one of the most repressive countries in the world—along with North Korea, perhaps, and Albania. Castro has even rejected glasnost and perestroika, the examples being set by the Soviet Union, and instead proclaims himself an orthodox Marxist following the example of Stalin.

Since I must be brief, it is impossible to describe in detail the current status of human rights in Cuba. However, for those interested in further information on this issue, I would refer you to the report of the United Nations Human Rights Commission published only a month ago in Geneva.

This report is comprised of the joint efforts of six ambassadors who visited Cuba. It contains testimonials and reliable evidence showing that there are disappeared persons in Cuba and that political opposition members have been assassinated—as was the case in Argentina under their military dictatorship and as has been occurring in Guatemala for many years. The report also gives convincing evidence that political opposition members are tortured and submitted to degrading

NED Board Member and Chairman of the Luncheon Panel Jay Van Andel treatment and even measures leading to extermination.

This four hundred page report presents convincing evidence that almost all human rights are being violated in Cuba— economic and social as well as civic and political. And lastly, I should again point out that this report was prepared by six ambassadors, one of whom is the Bulgarian ambassador; he cannot be accused of being anti-communist, nor of working for the CIA.

So you can well imagine what the current status of democracy is in Cuba. However, late last year, two hundred intellectuals from throughout the world, including six Nobel Laureates and other very well-known figures (Jean-Francois Revel and Vladimir Bukovsky among them) sent a letter to Fidel Castro calling for a plebiscite in Cuba similar to the Chilean plebiscite.

The Cuban authorities in Havana responded by saying that no plebiscite was needed— that there was a plebiscite thirty years ago. Castro says he is the leader of the Cuban government and no elections are required— they were held in 1959.

So the situation of thirty years of military rule and dictatorship in Cuba is truly atrocious. Perhaps the best reflections of what life in Cuba is like are contained in Armando Valladares' book, *Against All Hope*.

The Republic of Cuba is presently experiencing a serious economic and social crisis. In 1952, Cuba— and as you know it's a one crop economy— was producing seven million tons of sugar annually with a population of five million people. Today, the population has doubled and yet sugar production is only at 7.2 million tons.

The internal opposition has organized the struggle against Fidel Castro by using a weapon that was used in many of the Stalinist countries. In other words, we have rallied around the cause of human rights and we are advocating full respect for the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.

Our program has been made up of the thirty points included in the Declaration and it has also been based on passive resistance and civil disobedience to some extent. If the law, for example, bans freedom of expression, then we have disobeyed that unfair law when necessary.

I cannot conclude my remarks without thanking the United States Congress for having adopted an item in the 1985 budget that financed the activities of Radio Martí, making it possible to send messages of freedom and democracy to Cuba. And I would also like to thank the Congress for having approved a budget— just a few days ago— to begin broadcasting TV Martí.

These two things in no way represent intervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba because they are the result of the determined efforts of Cubans who live in exile. At the present time, the United States has an exile population of one million Cubans— in other words, one tenth of our population now lives in your country.

So this represents the effort to have our ideas defended through radio and television, and this has been accomplished thanks to the work of the groups of Cubans who live in this country and who have brought this idea to the United States Congress. This is the only way for us to defend democracy. Democracy must be defended by a struggle based on ideas.

Friends, the appeal of Castro's government has been lost, just as throughout the world the appeal of Stalinist totalitarian regimes is being lost. In Latin America we have few examples of tyranny left. Perhaps two or three governments like Fidel Castro's remain. They no longer have a monopoly of power.

Latin America and the Caribbean

***H.E. Eugenia Charles** is the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica and also serves as Minister for Finance, Economic Development and External Affairs. Formerly leader of the Freedom Party, she was swept into office in the July 1980 elections and was reelected in 1985. She became a member of the House of Assembly in 1970 and from 1975 to 1980 served as Leader of the Opposition.*

Listening all day as I have, I feel a little bit like the odd man out since I didn't have to struggle for democracy. It was handed to us on a platter by our early colonial masters in two stages when they took us as a colony and then when we graduated to an associated state. And when we became independent they assisted us with our constitution, which was devised on a very democratic basis, with both sides of the political structure taking part in it, as well as the public making comments, many of which were adopted. Out of that process the constitution grew, and it was truly a democratic constitution. Although some of us now think that there are changes that ought to be made in it, that maybe the Western pattern is not exactly what we want in our part of the world now, at least we didn't have to fight for democracy. So I feel a little bit that I am cheating on this since all of the other representatives here have had a difficult time coming to democracy.

H.E. Eugenia Charles

But we did have a revolution— a constitutional revolution— in Dominica in 1979. There were public demonstrations when certain laws were being passed which would have restricted freedom of speech. The public just decided to shut the country down— it was a matter of the employers shutting the gates and the workers going on strike so that nothing could happen on the island for three weeks. And then the government capitulated and decided that there was no point in staying on since it was so obvious that the public didn't want them. We didn't go directly to elections at the time— one of the reasons being that we knew that the government had been ousted by public voice and we decided to have a proper list of candidates drawn up before we went to the next election. So we waited a year.

We had an interim government. And it was again by public discussion— not a ballot, but a public discussion— as to no, this man won't do, we don't want him on the cabinet, but this man will do. And through that method, a very close to the heart method, we chose the interim government whose job was in fact to bring on the next election. A few things happened in between, including disastrous hurricanes, but we persisted and within twelve months we had an election in which my party was able to lead the government, because we had a proper system laid down for elections.

Democracy may come in many ways, but once it is there it doesn't just exist by itself. One has to work at making it exist. You really have to keep on working at it to ensure that it stays. This is especially true for the Eastern Caribbean, since there is a strong group in each of the islands close to us which is interested in embracing totalitarianism. This is not because they are convinced that totalitarianism is the best policy, but that it is the system that can bring them into power and keep them there. So once they got in they would, in fact, remain in because they would adopt the system which is entirely opposed to the system which now exists.

The system which now exists requires that you have elections every five years, and that you have a judiciary which is not elected by the government, or the people, but appointed by a group of wise men who deal with it; as a result I think you have an extremely impartial judiciary. We also have in our system a civil service that remains in place, impartially, professionally doing their work. I realize that these things have helped to give us the stability that we have.

Now perestroika and glasnost aren't unimportant to us, but Moscow hasn't paid us too much attention. In the 1940s Moscow was much better than the Western countries—they realized that it was important to make friends with these countries. And they did this by sending missionaries to the universities where our people were in school who insured that they enlisted quite good, intelligent, important people into their thinking so they could go home and spread the gospel. The fact that they haven't completely succeeded doesn't mean that these were not good selections, but that the people, mostly agricultural, are so close to the land that they are not easily taken away and brought out of the system. Moscow has also shown a little interest, strangely enough, in our trade unions—allowing some of our trade union leaders to come to Moscow to learn about independent trade unions. That is to me an amazing thing, and I'll never quite understand it.

But the country which has the most influence and is inclined to a different system than ours is Cuba. And you know that they don't understand the words perestroika and glasnost—they deny that they even exist. Cuba still remains powerful in our area—in this respect—they have learned that the way to go about their business is to gain the confidence, the minds, the faith, and the thinking of our young people. Free training in professions is a splendid opportunity to brainwash people. And therefore they like to form the opinions, the ideas, and the policies of our young people who will then return to Dominica.

Some of them are perhaps not as enthusiastic with the Cuban system as the Cubans might have wished. They don't like the fact that they can only own one pair of shoes when they come home, nor that they have to queue up for food. They come back and complain about those things. So some of the mystique gets thrown away with the discomfort. But there are many who come back completely sure that the Cuban system is a system that would work for us. So we have to constantly battle this. And you know many of your non-governmental organizations in this country encourage that sort of thinking. I sometimes think that one of the things the United States could do for democracy would be to look into the method and manners in which your non-governmental organizations operate in our country—the people they look for, the people they use, and the methods they use. Often the non-governmental organization representatives are the ones who spread the most dissatisfaction in our country.

Democratic people have high aspirations; they demand a great deal of their democratic leaders. They want their leaders to remain democratic, energetic, and successful at solving all their needs. It must be much easier to

From l. to r., Congressman Mel Levine, Patricia Guillermo de Chea (partially hidden), Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and NED Board member and panel moderator Sally Shelton Colby

be a leader in a non democratic country, I think. When democratic leaders fail in bringing progress and necessities to their people, there is always a small group which is ready to engender dissatisfaction and create some sort of chaos. As I said before, this is not because they are satisfied that this is the system they want, but that it is the system that will give them power, and keep them in power forever. That is why they continue along these lines.

So one has to work as hard at keeping the democratic ideas alive as one has to work to have a democratic revolution. You cannot rest on your laurels and you cannot be complacent. You cannot believe that everything is going fine, we've got a parliament, we have elections, everybody has the right to speak, there is a radio station belonging to the government but there are more on the radio criticizing the government, so everything is all right. It doesn't take much to turn these things away. It is important, therefore, to keep the public informed. And unfortunately there is no Western country that will assist a small poor developing country in having the proper system, the proper radio station even, to keep people informed. They won't touch it— that is propaganda! And therefore we cannot interfere with democracy!

It is hard to be democratic. It is important to ensure constant public participation. Certainly people talk about what they think. Not only will they talk, but one must listen to what they have to say. And one cannot always give in to the things they want, but one has to explain why you are refusing and what you are accepting, and what the need is for the acceptance. So it is important to listen to the ideas, the thoughts, the beliefs, and the expressions of needs by members of the public. And one can't just cast aside the fact that you cannot give something that is needed. You have to listen and say to them, "This you cannot get today because there isn't the money for it." You've got to make them— make everybody— cognizant of the fact that the country is theirs and therefore they have a right to decide what they want but they also must understand what they cannot get and why they cannot get it.

I sometimes find fault with your organization because it doesn't see that it has enough of a role to play in democratic countries that continue to be democratic. It may be because there are so many other countries that are struggling to become democratic, so more energy has to be spent on that than on maintaining democracy in some of our countries. But I do not think that this should be ignored. Perhaps this is not the National Endowment for Democracy's fault because this is, in fact, the way the United States works— by responding to crises. Once a crisis is over and you have overcome that— fine, everything is smooth, we can forget about you now. But that is not right.

We who are entrenched democracies require assistance to maintain democracy. For instance, how absurd it is for you— for the National Endowment for Democracy— to refuse assistance to any of our countries during election years. It's one of your rules, I know, but I just can't see any reasons for it. I understand that it might look like interference, but shouldn't your desire be to ensure that parties which enhance and further the course of democracy be assisted to continue their work? To me it is hypocritical as well as foolhardy and shortsighted not to assist democratic leaders in remaining democratic, and in remaining in government as democratic leaders. You would prefer to step in later when you see democracy on the wane. It is far more expensive to do it that way, I can assure you.

And would that be less interference? I don't think so, and I feel very strongly on this matter. Larger and better off countries which say they wish all countries to be democratic must realize the part they must play to ensure this. You do not have democracy in a country which is suffering from great poverty, from great deprivation. People are dropping dead— they are not being democratic. They can't afford the luxury of democracy because things are so bad. So economic well-being is an important threshold for democracy. Aid, and better still trade, are of vital importance for countries that you want to remain democratic. In short, we must not only be given encouragement in written pamphlets and books, but it must also be given through the helping hand, stretched out through friendship and in a sincere show of equality in recognition of the effort being made to keep democracy alive in my part of the world.

***Patricia Guillermo de Chea** is the former president of the Center for Political Studies (CEDEP) in Guatemala. Since 1984, CEDEP has played a key role in promoting the political participation of Guatemalan citizens in that country's democratic process. Ms. Chea currently serves as advisor to the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues in Geneva.*

It is interesting to review events in Central America over the last ten years. This region comprised of five countries— united not only by geography but also by history— today represents a challenge to the world's democracies.

With the exception of Costa Rica, one can say that the Central American countries have been afflicted by unsteady democratic development. As

Patricia Guillermo de Chea

a result, we now have a country like El Salvador conducting presidential elections under the threats, and fire, of a nine-year-old guerrilla force that does not want the elections to take place. Yet, in an effort to maintain a formal democracy, the elections were held.

Then there is Nicaragua, a country which a decade ago unleashed a fierce struggle to overthrow Anastasio Somoza. Having achieved this objective – with the participation of the major active sectors of the population – Nicaraguans undoubtedly saw the struggle as an opportunity to steer their country down the path to prosperity and democracy. Later, Nicaraguans saw this oasis begin to disappear as the country became one in which neither true political pluralism nor true freedom of thought was possible. One must also note, of course, the ongoing war with the Contras.

El Salvador and Nicaragua are the most complex cases and do not lend themselves to easy solutions. A number of important steps must be taken if real democracy is to be achieved in these countries.

With regard to Honduras, one must note that although the country has not suffered grave problems in the establishment of its young democratic institutions, it must be careful to cultivate the economic and social factors that will contribute to the stability of the system since its neighbors have encountered the greatest difficulty in these areas. On the other hand, Honduras' border with Nicaragua has been home to the Contras, a policy that has been criticized by countries in the region as a clear intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs. The problem of the Contras was a special issue in the Guatemalan Accords, signed on August 7, 1987, when Esquipulas II was carried out and at the most recent presidential summit meeting where an agreement on their demobilization was reached.

Now we will analyze what has taken place in Guatemala and what my own experience has been as the former president of the Center for Political Studies (CEDEP). Over ten years ago there was not the slightest possibility of living under a democracy in Guatemala. Although we had an elected president, repression and political violence prevailed. This period saw great political leaders such as Manuel Colom Argueta and Alberto Fuentes Mohr assassinated, as well as labor and student leaders. And one must not forget the peasants and Indians who were in one way or another accused of loyalty to the guerrillas.

Undoubtedly, those years created a fermentation that provoked uprisings. This in turn invited more effective repression: whole families were assassinated in the highlands, urban couples were murdered, and cases of mistaken identities were frequent. This situation produced a great deal of frustration and fear among students, professionals and intellectuals. Many chose to leave the

We are at a critical point in terms of the threat that the economic crisis portends for the democratic gains that have already occurred in Latin America. I hope that we will now focus on them in a way that we have not been able to when we as a nation were so focused on Central America in the last decade.

The elections in Paraguay, Argentina's upcoming elections, and the plebiscite in Chile all represent hopeful signs, all deserving of U.S. political support. And, working with NED and with those of you from around this hemisphere, it is my hope that we will be able to join hands and hopefully respond to the economic exigencies that need to be dealt with if we are to nourish and foster the democratic gains that we are already seeing in the hemisphere.

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country, and those who remained behind risked assassination if they expressed their views.

Within this context of terror, the general elections of March 1982 were scheduled. Many politicians and citizens thought that change might still be possible, but they were disillusioned when the elections were once again fraudulent and won by the government-backed candidate. During these difficult days, the people made their displeasure known, expressing indignation about recent events. Confrontation was inevitable and led to the coup d'état of March 23, 1982.

Undoubtedly, this radical change modified the course of Guatemalan history. From this date on there was a feeling of general satisfaction and the prospects for a return to democracy looked good. Many political observers noted that for the first time in the history of our country the coup had been received with enthusiasm by almost all Guatemalans.

During this period, a number of non-governmental organizations that sought a return to full democracy began to emerge. Naturally, the first step was to convene a National Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a new Constitution. Thus, many professionals, students, workers and political leaders began stating their opinions, but in an almost hesitant fashion— one does not easily forget the years of repression, nor the fact that isolated cases of kidnappings and political violence still occurred. These events provoked a certain instability and lack of confidence that hampered our efforts to move forward on the road to democracy.

Nonetheless, our people engaged in profound reflection and, noting events in neighboring countries, decided to strengthen our commitment to a democratic alternative for our country. This period is characterized as being extremely active, since all sectors wanted to express themselves and contribute to the establishment of a real democracy. The population of Guatemala clamored for elections; people everywhere debated how the new Constitution should be structured. Thus, elections were called for the Constituent Assembly and then, in 1985, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo was swept into office in the Presidential elections.

Without a doubt, this entire process reflected a positive attitude on the part of the Guatemalan people, but even so there was some apathy and lack of confidence among certain sectors which required that significant steps be taken to ensure voter outreach and participation. With the support of the National Endowment for Democracy, CEDEP developed a national campaign that allowed us to break through underlying apathy, motivating people to vote and giving detailed instruction on how the process was to be carried out. This strategy was highly successful and made a real contribution to the democratic process.

The Guatemalan phenomenon is very special since it had been assumed that Guatemala would be another one of the countries that would fall into armed conflict. Fortunately, that prediction did not come true. We have been forced to work toward the construction of a true democracy. Although conflict and other obstacles still persist, the consolidation of democracy is a challenge to all of us and it requires that we work together toward the common goal of preserving and strengthening it. That is why we are currently seeking to engage all sectors of the country in a great national dialogue aimed at diluting conflicts and arriving at peaceful agreements that will allow us to live in harmony in a country where arms cannot be substituted for thoughts and words.

We must ensure that democratization becomes a revolutionary process; we must see that it replaces the anachronistic systems that have governed most of our countries. The establishment of democracy has necessitated civic education efforts aimed at disseminating democratic principles and values. This forces us to stop and reflect on the fact that an effective democratic system may bring unforeseen benefits to the countries that implement it. We must not abandon our struggle to foster dialogue, mutual respect, generalized economic improvements and individual liberties, elements which will enable us to eliminate violence, hunger and destruction from our future. The success of our efforts will depend exclusively on our own commitment.

***Monica Jimenez de Barros** is the founder of the Crusade for Citizen Participation in Chile (CIVITAS), which led the massive efforts to register voters for the historic plebiscite of October 5, 1988. In 1987, Mrs. Jimenez was a founding member of the Committee for Free Elections in Chile. She is a professor of social work by profession.*

Upon receiving the invitation to participate in this conference on "The Democratic Revolution," I must confess that my first reaction was to think that the term "revolution" was not the most appropriate one to describe the slow democratic evolution we are experiencing in Chile. The term "revolution" is associated with drastic changes and implies violence. In my country, the political situation is radically different from that. In Chile we were used to having a fast-paced and intense political life. People talked of revolution in the '60s. In 1970, the government of the Popular Unity lasted about 1,000 days, and radical changes took place during that period which could be considered revolutionary. During the period of the military government, people also talked about revolution. Many drastic changes were made that served to strengthen both the authoritarian regime and the free-market economic system.

At the present time, however, politics is viewed with patience and caution; the tempo is somewhat slower and smoother. Some say that a new political temperament has emerged, a temperament which appears less ideological, less utopian, less intense and less all embracing. Is it perhaps due to the pain of having lost democracy and of having endured repression at the hands of an autocratic government that all sectors of national life have found the right place and reached maturity? Is it that the painful exile made us understand that politics is not everything, that the road to change is slow, painful, and difficult, and that Chilean society is complex and is undergoing a process of modernization? Our society has diversity, strength and resources, as well as limitations.

On October 5, 1988, the day of the referendum, Chile demonstrated to the world certain features of this new temperament. Everything led us to believe that there would be violence. It was expected, and there was fear of demonstrations among certain sectors of the society. Fortunately, violence did not materialize. On the contrary, the great majority of Chileans showed the world they intend to work peacefully toward democracy. Chilean men and women went to register to vote; they cast their ballots in peace and with discipline. The abstention rate was only about three percent, which is an example to the rest of the world. Chileans assumed their posts at the polling tables as judges and poll-watchers, thus ensuring the cleanliness of the process. Everyone, civilians and military alike, exhibited exemplary behavior, which made us all proud. This new temperament was also shown during the celebrations which followed the plebiscite. People were willing to wait. They did not take to the streets after the returns came in, and celebrations were held calmly and joyfully. Political, social and religious leaders played an important role in channeling the joyful feeling without letting hatred and revenge mar the occasion.

Everything was done with respect and prudence. But it would be a superficial analysis not to go past this change of temperament, though we are seeing a trend toward the center in the political arena. Undoubtedly, six months after the plebiscite, the majority of Chileans continue to seek democracy without upsetting the structures and without breaking down the system. Before 1973, mainly because we lived in democracy for a long time and had not experienced life without it, the people and leaders had the motto "move forward but do not make concessions." Conversely, today everybody is cautious; everybody feels responsible for others. It seems that the clamor has changed. Now it is: "move forward, but do not forget the interests of the country, the interests of all Chileans." There is, without a doubt, an attitude of greater responsibility.

What are the causes of these developments? The painful loss of democracy

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is undoubtedly one of them; one appreciates more what one has lost. Democracy was exchanged for authoritarian rule, and this led us to come to terms with a society where power is concentrated in one sector, where government officials are imposed from above with restricted and limited political action, where citizen participation has been severely curtailed and where the actions of the political parties are very limited. In addition to this experience of the Chilean people, there has been a global reassessment of the democratic idea— a redefinition of democracy.

It seems that today democracy is not only perceived as a form of government but as the best means to attain human development, taking into account the values and needs of the individual and his relations with others. More and more, democracy is associated with respect for human rights and the idea of participation. If revolution means profound and massive change, then redefining democracy is revolutionary, because it implies a cultural change, a change of behavior and attitudes, and a qualitative change which compels us to visualize democracy as a permanent challenge. A democratic system so conceived ought to be in a constant struggle for self-improvement. Trying to reach and attain this sometimes elusive democratic ideal— founded on the values of liberty, equality and fraternity as well as on the fundamental human rights stated in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Men— democracy becomes the social order resting on individual, social and economic human rights, those that society considers as necessary assumptions for the overall development of the individual.

If democratic values and ideas are conducive to the overall development of the individual, participation is a great vehicle as it is through participation, tolerance, mutual respect, and value judgment that democracy can be taught. Citizen participation allows the formulation of needs and interests that go beyond voting or exerting influence on the government. Citizens should participate in the decision-making process at different levels of government— local, regional, national— whatever the case might be.

Participation is thus the instrument with which to struggle against passivity, conformism, dependence and loss of identity due to excessive poverty. The new evaluation of democracy, which can be seen as a true democratic revolution in worldwide terms, is in the care of people everywhere. The concept of sovereignty or full autonomy of society's body politic is presently limited. In a democracy, the decision-making power of the people is subject to respect for human rights, which are also protected by the conscience of the world community through international courts, commissions and human rights organizations.

If we understand democracy in this context, then what are Chile's prospects for achieving it in the next decade? Obviously, Chile has a great task ahead of it in consolidating the transition to democracy. It is utopian to think that we presently enjoy full democracy. It is also important to remember that, until March of 1990, we're going to be ruled by the same person who has headed an authoritarian government for the last fifteen years. And General Pinochet recently stated that he's going to remain as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. So we are presently very far from enjoying full democracy. But we are moving forward, and we will continue to press ahead.

There are critical problems which sometimes cross national boundaries and which we share with our sister republics in Latin America. Some of them which, in my opinion, are very relevant include: the role of military institutions in a democracy; how to approach the problems of distribution of wealth, social development and, at the same time, maintain and sustain economic growth; how to consolidate a social contract between management and workers in order to ensure justice and guarantee stability for investments; and how to maintain a political climate of respect, tolerance, understanding,

Aydin Yalcin (l.) and Milovan Djilas listen to the panel session on Latin America.

agreement, and responsibility where there is effectiveness, good performance, and honesty without demagoguery.

These present great challenges. And very often, the government of Chile tells us to look at our sister countries, and says, "Look at your neighbors and see how they are doing with democracy." The strengthening of democracy is unquestionably an important task and is the responsibility of all. Everyone has his own approach, of course, and I view my responsibility from an educational perspective. It is crucial to educate for democracy in order for it to be understood as a system of government based on principles and with clear-cut rules of the game, where institutions and procedures are valued, and opposing forces can settle their differences peacefully.

But, above all, it is important to teach democracy as a way of life. Life in a democracy requires individualization; each person must understand his or her personal attributes and be aware of his or her rights and responsibilities. Democracy requires a people made up of free and thinking beings whose actions are directed by values and convictions; a people willing to participate in the democratic debate; responsible people wishing to participate in the making of the society; people living in a climate of respect, open to dialogue amongst the plurality of factions and intent on finding the truth; a tolerant people, able to understand and consider objectively and calmly the reasons behind what others believe and feel whenever differences arise; a people ready to uproot sectarian and fanatical attitudes contrary to democratic ideas; a people willing to build a common history, embracing diverse opinions; and a people who love and defend freedom, who will fight for justice and be willing to practice solidarity in order to create a more fraternal society. There is no doubt that the mainstay of democracy is trust in the individual. It will be difficult to stabilize democracy without recognizing the individual as such.

In concluding, I would like to say that I am convinced that we are witnessing a universal development which could be called a democratic revolution for its massive dimensions and the profoundness of its values. It is a fragile revolution requiring international and national solidarity; with every day that goes by we become more aware of our economic, political and social interdependence. This is a democratic revolution that we have to nurture and to which I wish to contribute and serve from an educational perspective, working to change attitudes and behaviors so we can accept democracy as the responsibility of all.

Gabriel Murillo *has served as the director of the Department of Political Science at the University of Los Andes in Bogota, Colombia since 1981; he has been a professor in the Department since 1973. He helped to found the Inter-Disciplinary Center for Regional Studies in Bogota in 1977. Dr. Murillo is the author of five books and numerous articles.*

I have been asked to address the case of the Andean countries. However, in such a short presentation, I can only say that the democratic revolution has not been consolidated in these countries, and that the region's socio-economic problems provide worrisome challenges to the strengthening of democratic ideals. Nonetheless, those countries which show the greatest electoral promise, such as Bolivia, have a clear and sincere commitment to democracy. What is most serious, however, is that the majority of international interest and assistance is focused on analyzing and supporting the transitions to democracy in the Southern Cone and the prolonged civil wars in Central America.

This support gives the impression that the political institutions of the Andean region are safe, but they are not. Greater sensitivity is needed toward what is transpiring in the Andean nations. In each of them there are powerful examples which bear witness to the frailty of existing democratic structures. These examples include the popular urban uprisings in Venezuela in February 1989, the persistent violence of the left and right and the drug-traffickers in Colombia, the weakness of the socio-economic measures adopted by the new government in Ecuador, the despair and loss of prestige of the APRA government in Peru, and the uncertainty in Bolivia regarding the maintenance of current anti-inflationary policies. The case of the sixth country, Chile, has been addressed separately in this conference.

As in the rest of the hemisphere, a brutal asymmetrical gap persists, as does a socio-economic disequilibrium. In each country, foreign debt impedes the implementation of public investment programs and social policies, administrative corruption persists, and reformism proceeds tenuously without taking concrete steps to bring greater social equality. Political institutions are unable to keep up with demands for change in the region as well; in these countries it is crucial to adjust to these demands before the legitimacy of the political institutions becomes so weakened that the system becomes unsustainable.

In the Colombian case, one must note the following:

- Colombia has lived for over fifteen decades under the hegemonic control of two traditional political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals;
- Colombia is a country that in the 1950s gave rise to the second and last military dictatorship of its republican history, one that was unable to eliminate the political violence which so dramatically affected the country between the late 1940s and mid-1950s, nor was it able to provide effective alternatives to structural social injustice; and
- It is a country which by the end of the 1950s had devised an ingenious bipartisan formula based on presidential alternation and administrative equality that lasted for four governments, or over sixteen years between 1958 and 1974. Although this experiment substantially lessened violent partisan antagonisms and facilitated the country's immersion into a modernization process, it led to a restriction of democracy which is principally characterized by: an increase in "clientelism" as a key element in political representation; the ideological weakening of the parties which limited their political concerns to gaining access to the prerequisites provided by the new coalition; and the exclusion by the rigid bipartisan system of all other channels of expression and political participation of popular sectors not represented by either party. This bipartisan coalition experiment gave rise to discontent and protests against the system; it was a determining

Representative Mel Levine speaking on Latin America and the Caribbean.

factor in the erosion of the legitimacy of Colombia's political institutions.

Following the conclusion of the agreed upon sixteen year period, the efforts to slowly disassemble it were accompanied by tremendous efforts to initiate a structural political reform that would serve to recover the legitimacy that had gradually been lost. However, over the twelve years and three administrations where this was attempted (1974-1986: Lopez, Turbay and Betancur), expressions of protests increased geometrically and were accompanied by violence in all forms, an increase in drug trafficking and the rapidly expanding impoverishment of the people.

President Barco began his term of office in 1986 with a diagnostic analysis of Colombia's complex political situation provided to him by numerous specialists. With this document (that many found technocratic) in hand, Barco began to gather information on the reforms put forward by previous administrations and sought to complement them with his own policies. It would be difficult to deny that he began his tenure prepared to facilitate a transition from a restricted representative democracy to an open participatory democracy.

For this reason, Barco proposed strengthening democracy by conceding a formal space to opposition forces within the nation's parliament for the expression of their discontent. He also proposed channeling the greatest possible amount of available resources to large scale social programs. The first proposal sought to rehabilitate those areas in which the state had been characteristically absent; the second aimed at the eradication of absolute poverty.

Barco also proposed moving ahead with his predecessors' programs which were aimed at political, administrative and economic decentralization by providing the legal framework for the local election of mayors. In addition, he proposed continuing the peace process with guerrilla groups, but under the slogan "an outstretched hand, but a firm and steady shake." It was his intention to assume full responsibility for negotiations, thus avoiding the inclusion of those civil sectors lacking the resources and authority of the state. Lastly, Barco proposed moving forward with crucial constitutional reforms that would restore legitimacy to Colombia's democratic institutions, particularly public corporations and the judiciary.

These aims are, in my view, indicative of a clear effort to strengthen democracy in Colombia. Nonetheless, they have been adversely affected by the persistent structural socio-economic obstacles which limit the possibilities for real democratic progress. The principal obstacles are: violence, drug-trafficking and extreme poverty.

These obstacles generally give rise to a multipolarized conflict which is expressed by positions on the far right, through the destabilizing activities of paramilitary groups, and on the far left, through fragmented guerrilla groups dispersed throughout the country. At times the obstacles are expressed through confusing and short-lived unions among interest groups which engage in frontal attacks against democratic stability. For example, the so-called "narco-guerrillas," or the alliances between drug-traffickers and large landholders, are often obscured by the guerrillas' threats. These obstacles are also reflected in the frequent outbreaks of administrative and financial corruption both in the government and the private sector, with a resulting increase in popular dissatisfaction and frustration. Lastly, these obstacles are evidenced by the lamentable fact that the distribution of income has not progressed democratically and continues to underscore the unfortunate gap which separates the privileged minority from the underprivileged majority.

The state in Colombia, as in the rest of the Andean countries, is gigantic and society is fragmented and atomized. There has been no agreement between the two and there is a marked lack of effective and united leadership. Individual interests continue to take precedence over the common good.

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Nonetheless, the decentralization process that has begun in Colombia does give us hope—it is moving forward against all odds. Local participation has increased and mayors are being elected for the first time who will have to respond with honesty and effectiveness to their constituents. The mayors are now managing their budgets and they are doing it in a country that is not intimidated by violence and such painful and frequent anti-democratic actions. The country is tired of violence and is showing the world that it is not just the repository of violence and drug-trafficking; rather, with great dignity Colombians are exercising their commitment to the strengthening of democracy. Colombia is demonstrating that its problems are not unique within the Latin American context, even when compared to those of developed countries such as the United States. The public is also increasingly aware that sensationalism and international yellow journalism do not help to solve Colombia's problems. Not least, Colombia suffers from the lack of solidarity of those countries which persist in not recognizing, for example, such problems as the lack of resources for social development, the foreign debt and the devastating problems of drug-trafficking and the annihilation of the environment. These problems are not country specific, and are therefore part of a shared responsibility and a common search for effective democratic solutions.

__Liang Heng__ is the founder and editor of __The Chinese Intellectual__, a quarterly journal originally intended for Chinese students studying in the West but now published and distributed within China, where Mr. Liang has also established a major intellectual center in Beijing. Mr. Liang is the co-author of a number of books on China, including __Son of the Revolution__ and __After the Nightmare.__

More than ten years ago, the end of the Cultural Revolution brought a loosening of the controls on free expression in China. Since then, China's independent-minded intellectuals have been discussing democratization.

The liberal, reformist elite within the Communist Party has also raised the need for political reform, and intellectuals are encouraged by the sign of progress. In my view, however, before such reforms are implemented there should be a clear understanding of some of the basic problems China will face as it attempts to democratize.

First, we must be clear that in China the central aim of both economic and political reform is modernization.

Although there are many complex aspects to the modernization issue in China, there are two basic concerns: the development of a stable and efficient system of political organization capable of resolving problems, and the development of a socio-economic system that can ensure continuous economic development. In China, we can verify the following basic relationship: a stable and efficient government that does not overly interfere with economic activities best ensures economic development; and continuous economic development is a strong impetus toward political modernization.

The practical corollary of this relationship is that when economic development is premature or overly hasty, democratization may actually impede economic development. However, if the political situation does not gradually



Liang Heng addresses the conference as Milovan Djilas (r.) listens.

If democracy is ultimately going to work, the individual citizen must be informed, and educated and responsible not only in the exercise of the individual's rights, but in the exercise of the responsibilities which that citizen has to other citizens and to the community at large. Nongovernmental organizations can be helpful in building the responsibility of public officials and educating the ordinary citizen as well. And I believe the Endowment is the most appropriate organization to help teach these lessons of individual responsibility if democracy is going to work.

I want to thank the Endowment for sponsoring what has obviously been a very important conference, and most especially to thank the representatives from countries all over the globe for sharing with us their experiences, ideas, hopes and aspirations. It's truly an inspiration to see what you are doing in each of your own countries to foster the notion of democracy, which we think is the best system of government not only because we've chosen it for ourselves, but because we believe fervently that it respects the human spirit in a way no other system does.

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grow more democratic in the course of economic growth, economic development may also be impeded. For example, the recent student demonstrations show that since the economic reforms, the people's desire for political reform has become stronger.

From the point of view of designing a system, therefore, we must first have a stable and efficient administrative system (possibly, at the beginning, not necessarily a very democratic one), and then create the conditions for economic development. As the economy develops and people's living standards rise, we may begin slowly to carry out democratization. Second, the democratic system is the most suitable form of political organization for a modern society.

According to the evidence to date, democracy can best satisfy the needs of a modern society. This is because modern society is extremely complex, with labor minutely divided and information transferred very rapidly. Productive power grows ceaselessly, new discoveries are constantly made and the social structure is in a state of continual flux. There are an infinite number of individuals, groups, institutions, companies and political organs making an infinite number of decisions without which they could not function. In this type of society, aside from a very small number of decisions that must be made at the top level, decision-making power must be dispersed throughout the society to many levels of leaders and individuals.

In China, those party leaders accustomed to a monolithic system in which politics, economics, culture, the military and ideology are all mixed together have no way of getting used to modern society. Continued reliance on this leadership will definitely perpetuate China's backwardness. On the basis of this understanding, the Communist Party leadership must gradually give up its monolithic control. If China is to become a modern society, the two greatest tasks are continued economic development and political democratization.

Third, according to the above tasks, the central strategy for China's democratization must be separated into two areas: the political area and the social one (which we may define to include non-governmental economic activities, academia, culture, information and grassroots organizations). Self-determination in each sphere of the social area may be the most important condition for political democratization.

The reform of China's political system is unprecedented. The key question is to transform a society centrally controlled by a single party and its administrative constellation into a pluralistic, self-determined, mutually interdependent and interactive social system. Therefore, if social activities are not first shifted to a new political arrangement whereby training for self-determination can take place, not only will political democratization not promote economic growth, but it might create great chaos. We must therefore first build a social basis for democracy, which is to say, we must support the development of a wide range of self-determining organizations, including business associations, workers' groups, writers' and artists' salons, students' and educators' groups and clubs, and so forth. The most significant aspect of the recent democracy movement is that the students created their own organization independent of the government, because to date there is no opposition group that can replace the Communist party. Under these objective conditions, then, the most important concern is to establish a new civil society.

Because of this situation, our understanding of political democratization must not be limited to the political sphere. Three essential limitations must always be remembered and stressed:

1) China's democratization is affected by many important social and economic factors in addition to political ones.

2) China's democratization will require a cultural basis for support, including the development of democratic habits and beliefs.

3) There must be a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Therefore we must focus on the formation of a transitional political arrangement.

These three considerations have their special implications in China. In Poland,

Representative Matt McHugh commenting on the Asian panel as Representative John Porter and M.R. Masani listen (from l. to r.).

Hungary and the Soviet Union, there are existing social groups such as churchgoers, businesspeople, intellectuals, etc. In China, however, since the Cultural Revolution many social forms have been destroyed. Such traditions as religion, the old family system and the gentry/scholar heritage no longer exist. Any discussion of political democratization that does not take this reality into account is built on sand.

In sum, China's practical situation makes us see that there must be a transition between totalitarianism and democracy. Of necessity, the transitional political arrangement will not be thoroughly democratic. This transition is therefore a first step toward China's democratization. If the party clearly realizes that the people have tremendous potential to create spiritual and material wealth, provided they have freedom of choice, and if the people also understand how to use freedom and self-determination, then this period will be easier by far.

***M.R. Masani** is the Vice-Chairman of the Leslie Sawhny Programme, a civic training movement in Bombay, India. Mr. Masani, a publicist and author, has also had a long and distinguished career in politics. He has served as mayor of Bombay, as Ambassador of India to Brazil, as a member of Parliament, and as Chairman of the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Protection of Minorities and Prevention of Discrimination.*

I am very happy to be at this gathering, coming as I do from a country which I believe is on the periphery of the free world. That is a fair description because, while we are a democracy, we are a somewhat fragile and unstable one. It is too early to say whether democracy will survive; our fight is to build it up and make it survive.

After the British left and we re-established our constitution, we decided on universal franchise. But this hasn't worked too well because the majority of our electorate is illiterate. That doesn't mean they are stupid—they are very wise and sensible people, but you can't communicate with them because they can't read your manifesto, they can't read anything you say, and they can't read the newspapers. I've seen people holding my manifesto upside down, not knowing which was the bottom and which was the top! So communication with an illiterate electorate becomes very difficult.

Also, there is an instinct for populism and demagogy and the belief that the electorate will follow any lie so long as it promises them a paradise on earth. These are some of the difficulties that we face. On top of that, we have the British electorate system of "first past the post," and no proportional representation. This has meant that India has had a minority government from 1950 until today, but with a bogus majority in parliament of two-thirds or three-fourths, which enabled them to change the constitution and revoke the fundamental rights of the citizen. That is not democracy, and the Indian parliament certainly does not represent the people of India, nor has it done so for fifty long years now.

What are the basic causes that make one worry? I believe that the basic cause is the lack of a democratic tradition. We have heard a lot at this conference about democracy in various parts of the world, but the main thing is that people must be prepared to say no, to stand up to oppression. This is what is called "the nonconformist conscience." We don't have that—some of us do, but most don't. Mahatma Ghandi, who understood his country, used to say, "India has to learn to say

M.R. Masani addresses the Asia panel as Aydin Yalcin and Charles Smith listen (from l. to r.).

no." And it is still true that India does not know how to say no to anyone in authority. In the North of India there is a saying: "Add your yes to their yes. If they say yes, you add your yes." That way you get on, you get jobs, you get licences, you get permits. But that is not how democracies are made.

So what we really need is character to stand up to those in authority. A British poet wrote, "They are slaves who dare not be in the right with two or three." Very few people in India want to be in the right with two or three; they want big crowds around them to feel safe and secure. So the capacity to stand up against the tide, which is a necessity of democracy, is still very far from being achieved in India. The result is too much politics, too little citizenship.

The British left with us certain values and standards, for example the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free press and an efficient civil service. But that veneer is wearing thin. I am afraid there is a trend towards a reversion to Oriental traditions of despotism.

The attempt by our first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to jump from a basically feudal structure to the Stalinist pattern of socialism has retarded the progress of the country. Other countries in Asia have progressed because of the discipline and incentives which are part of the competetive free enterprise system.

The hearts and minds of the people of India are basically sound. The Indian people have the potential to become good citizens. Look at the record of Indians in the United States of America. But our country is infested by dishonest politicians.

India needs a reformation and a renaissance or rejuvenation. As a people we have become too old. Popular awareness and education are the only answers but this will take time.

We need grassroots citizenship of the kind that you have in this country. I call it "riceroots" citizenship because rice is our main crop. But this does not exist. And that is why the Leslie Sawhny Programme was established in 1968 to train people in citizenship. Young people were trained about how to be good citizens. They are taught the techniques of citizenship and why it is important to fight for a free society. And we have trained about 20,000 men and women, most of them young. Now that is a flea bite, peanuts, in a country the size of India. But we had to make a start somewhere. And I am glad to say that this kind of thinking is spreading in India. We are very satisfied with the result because most of the young people whom we call later to our refresher courses tell us that they learned how to be good citizens by attending our training courses. There they learned the meaning of patriotism, social values, and discipline. That is very rewarding. So we are engaged in a good work, and, in this task, the Programme welcomes help from within India and abroad.

Carl Gershman's excellent article in *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989) deals with this matter and the key role that the National Endowment for Democracy plays. We are very grateful to the Endowment for bringing us into this wonderful international fraternity of free spirits.

Representative John Porter comments on the Asian panel as M.R. Masani (r.) listens.

***Dette Pascual** is the chairperson and founder of the National Women's Movement for the Nurturance of Democracy in the Philippines (KABATID). Mrs. Pascual, whose field is human resource development, is the Executive Director of the Evelio Javier Foundation. She also served as Executive Director for External Affairs of NAMFREL and founded the Friends of NAMFREL in America Foundation.*

There is a Filipino saying: "One who cannot learn from looking back where he came from, cannot arrive at where he is going." It is a privilege to be here with people of rich experiences and look at journeys taken, individually and collectively, to be where we are now— advocates of democracy.

Even as I speak here, a dynamic happening is going on in different parts of the world that speaks of the democratic revolution. This is happening in Poland, Hungary, Soviet Georgia, and especially significant for us in Asia are the student demonstrations in China. I can only pray that the changes hoped for will happen as peacefully as the peoples' power revolution we experienced in the Philippines three years ago.

February 1986 saw the Philippines regain its freedom after a series of dramatic events that was triggered in 1983 with the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, the heroic opposition leader. Using their frail bodies as shields against tanks and guns, men, women and youths stood between two opposing armies and brought about a peaceful change of government. It was a people power demonstration that said: "Enough is enough! We want a change!"

I think a moment must come in every nation's life when its people must stand up and say, very clearly, "We want freedom!" And this desire must be accompanied by such a strong spirit of faith and unity that authoritarian leaders cannot help but be carried along in this tide of tremendous conviction. This happened to us.

In the Philippines today, we realize that loving freedom and regaining it is not enough. With democratic space must come responsibility. You are responsible for what you love.

What has been the impact of the democratic revolution in the Philippines?

Institutionalizing People Power

The new constitution of the Philippines now recognizes people power: "The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means."

Influence on Elections

Due in large part to the effective example of NAMFREL, monitoring the election process has become a habit with the people. Just this April, the Philippines took the last step in the restoration of the country's democratic institutions by electing the barangay officials (village leaders). There are 42,000 villages or barangays in our country.

There were over a million candidates for 294,000 barangay positions. There was a record turnout of seventy percent of voters. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declared that this was the most peaceful election to date. Only twelve people were killed in election-related violence, as compared to hundreds killed in past elections. Clearly, people have taken to heart the NAMFREL adage:"A clean election reaffirms the validity of the electoral process as a democratic and peaceful method of change."

Dette Pascual

Quality in Public Service

Last January, sixty four congressmen imported high powered guns, and senators and other government officials ordered luxury cars. So what happened? There was such an outraged public reaction that President Aquino finally had to issue a ban on the importation of luxury cars for government agencies, and the congressmen turned their guns over to the military commission.

The system works! We did not have to march and shout in the streets in order to be heard. This is one big difference between now and the Marcos dictatorship. Whereas previously we had to bear the unbearable in patient silence, now we can make known what we think.

Of course there are still unruly, vandalistic demonstrations, mostly coming from the militant left. But even these are added proof of the existence of democratic space.

Non-Governmental Organizations

A most encouraging development, and one that bears watching, is the active participation of non-governmental organizations in nation-building. I'll give two examples with which I am familiar, the Evelio Javier Foundation (EBJF) and KABATID.

EBJF is involved in strengthening grassroots democracy through leadership and value seminars for governors, mayors and barangay captains. Topics range from details of running a municipality to the lofty ideals of moral leadership.

While EBJF concentrates on local officials, KABATID focuses on the ordinary citizens and their responsibilities. Members of KABATID are women who are nonpartisan, yet politically active in the democratic process. Through public forums, seminars, and publications, KABATID highlights issues of national importance and engages in civic education.

I cite NAMFREL, EBJF and KABATID because I wish to show the natural progression of the dramatic activism necessary in the active fight for freedom to the sustained activism necessary for maintenance, which is where we are now in the Philippines. After the revolution comes the transition period.

NAMFREL concerned itself with fair elections. However, electing leaders is not enough to ensure a truly democratic government. Thus, EBJF focuses on the quality of governance. Parallel to the task of skill-enhancement for officials is the development of civic-spirited citizens who will respond adequately to these leaders. This is the role of KABATID.

So NAMFREL, KABATID and EBJF form a tripod of non-governmental organizations that can be part of a basic support structure for a democratic society. They are pulse-takers and consensus builders; they make manifest the bayanihan spirit.

Bayanihan

The literal translation of bayanihan is "people carrying a house." In the rural areas, when a man wants to transfer residence, he gives a party for friends and neighbors. After the party, the guests put their shoulders together and carry the house to the new site. This neighborly act is called bayanihan.

These days, the word bayanihan means participatory community effort. It means responsibility not only to your family, but also to your neighbors, to your community and to your country. The bayanihan concept is an indigenous appreciation of democracy that has been a Filipino tradition from the time of the early settlements of Malays on Philippine shores.

Major Obstacles in the Way of Democratic Progress

A significant aspect in the Philippine EDSA Revolution was the spirit of nonviolence. People made themselves vulnerable to enemy soldiers— offering flowers, food and rosaries. Cardinal Jaime Sin sees the EDSA spirit as "the revelation of the Filipino identity." But it seems that the virtues extolled at EDSA are the same characteristics that bog us down now— a non-confrontational attitude, not wanting to hurt, and "utang na loob," which means a debt of gratitude.

"Utang na loob" is a virtue, but its extreme manifestation can mean tolerating sloppy performance or blinding oneself to wrongdoing. At worst, it means placing wrong persons in positions of power. An article by Father Joaquin Bernas in the *Manila Chronicle* speaks of disenchantment: "Total redemption will not happen overnight . . . What the people want to see, however, are clear and dramatic demonstrations of the will to boldly confront issues like terrorism, violations of human rights, delivery of public services, to see the fall of big fish as proof that Government is serious about cleaning up . . . to see Congress buckle down to matters of substance. They want to see social justice."

What Is Being Done?

One example is the strengthening of the Judiciary. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Marcelo Fernan is decongesting the clogged court dockets. His theme is the impartial dispensation of the rule of law— "utang na loob" or not. Congress has passed the Code of Ethics, and there are recent changes in the Executive branch. Of course, time has to prove the efficacy of these changes.

What Can Be Done to Strengthen Democracy in the Years Ahead?

If one is to look for areas to strengthen, then look to the people's basic unit of government, the barangay. In the Philippine culture, the barangay officials are the "face" of the government to the people. They are responsible for peace and order, day-to-day issues like garbage, traffic, neighborhood disputes, etc. Based on their performance, people gauge the national leadership.

In the past, Ferdinand Marcos used the barangay system to ensure grassroots support. Present law has prohibited political parties from meddling in barangay affairs. However, politicians know that the barangays have the power to swing votes for the next presidential elections.

It is therefore important to preserve the integrity of the barangay system. Barangay officials get their allowance from the people. If the people want the leaders they have chosen to be independent from politics, then they should contribute to their support.

One group that has shown interest in the barangays is the Communist party. According to military reports, the Communists fielded candidates in 17,000 barangays.

Conclusion

The triumph of people power in the recent past must continue to be nurtured in the present. In the barangays there is energy to be harnessed in the right direction to accomplish this. Who can say whither goest a nation? Its citizens can, and they should— if they care enough. Enthusiasm and a positive spirit help a cause. But beyond this is the plodding routine of people development— building up the capacity to be informed and to look at issues intelligently. Then the involvement becomes a matter of values, a choice from among alternatives.

Involved in the barangays is the strength of the little people who make democracy happen in their own spheres— the ordinary citizens who keep the faith and whose belief systems find expression in the bayanihan spirit. On such strength and beliefs rests the foundation of an enduring democratic Philippines.

***Aydin Yalcin** and his wife, Nilufer, are the founders and editors of **Yeni Forum,** a twice monthly Turkish periodical featuring articles on current politics, political and economic theory, and art, literature and cultural affairs. Professor Yalcin has been active in Turkish journalism and intellectual life for forty years. He is a senior Professor in the political science faculty of Ankara University and teaches economics at the Middle East Technical University.*

Historical Background

The history of modern democracy in Turkey goes as far back as the Young Ottoman Movement in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. A group of intellectuals, highly influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution and motivated by a strong desire to save the country from decay and disintegration, initiated a process of modernization after European models. Their efforts culminated in the promulgation of our first constitution in 1876.

The architects of this first attempt for a representative and constitutional government in Turkey had faced no major obstacle in their efforts to adopt an alien political system in an Islamic state which had been the main defender of the faith during about nine centuries. The emperor of the Ottoman State, who was also the "Caliph" of the Muslim community throughout the world, signed the royal edict promulgating the first constitution in Islamic history without any feeling of sacrilege.

There were several reasons for this. First, the Ottomans were the followers of the Seldjuk Emperors who had intro-

Aydin Yalcin discusses democratic processes in Turkey as Congressmen Matt McHugh (far l.) and John Porter listen

duced pragmatism and rationalism in Islamic statecraft through a division of labor between the duties of the ruler of religious and temporal nature. The first Seldjuk Emperor, Tugrul Beg, had handed over the duties related to religious matters to the last Caliph of Abbasid dynasty, Kaim Bi Emrullah, in 1055 in Bagdad, with a sizeable pension from the royal treasury. He kept to himself all the other matters concerning "the World, the East and the West, Masrik ve magrib." So matters of law, taxation, and military affairs became a major concern of Seldjuk emperors. While they delegated religious affairs to the care of the Caliphs, they felt free to concentrate on temporal duties.[1] This tradition continued with the Ottomans despite the fact that the office of emperor and caliph were united again in the person of the Ottoman ruler after the conquest of Egypt at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century.

Secondly, Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen who initiated the first constitution to the Ottoman political structure had seen no contradiction at all between the Western system of democratic and constitutional government and classical Islamic institutions practiced by different Islamic countries. Namik Kemal, a member of the Young Ottomans group and an eminent poet of the late Nineteenth century, expounding the new concepts of "freedom, patriotism and modernization" to an ever-enlarging educated sector of society, defended this point of view in various writings and articles. As he had also been a member of the draft committee of the new constitution, the following passage from one of his articles is indicative of this viewpoint:

> The general assembly (house of representatives) which is an executive mechanism of the Islamic system of consultation, is a different version of the Arabic states' practice of "Mesvere" (consultation of notables), Tatar peoples practice "Kurultay" (general assembly of all tribal chiefs, military and administrative commanders), and Ottoman Institution of "Divan" (general council of senior statesmen and commanders). This new institution will save us from oppression which has been corrupting our administration; guarantee our personal freedoms and security; contribute to the development of our fatherland; restore order and accountability in our public treasury; oversee the execution of law and order; supervise the execution of justice; in sum, it will save our state from internal disintegration and from external dangers threatening our country by secessionist demands from Bulgaria, Herzogovina and Bosnia.[2]

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[1] Osman Turan, *Selcuklular Tarihi ve Turk Islam Medeniyeti* (The History of the Seldjuks and Turkish Islamic Civilization), Ankara: 1965, pp. 85-88.

[2] Namik Kemal, "Meclisi Umumi" (General Assembly), *Ittihat* (The Union), 12 October 1876. In *Namik Kemal*. Ed. Mithat Cemal Kuntay, Vol. p. 113.

These words show clearly how the early architects of the First Constitution saw no contradiction between Islamic and modern political systems and how optimistic they felt about its effects and operation in the Ottoman Empire. The leader of the First Ottoman Constitutional movement, Mithad Pasa, shared this conviction and optimistic expectation. In one of his interviews with the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Henry Elliot, he said the following:

> The Empire was being rapidly brought to destruction . . . The only remedy that we could perceive lay first in securing a control over the Sovereign by making the ministers, especially in financial matters, responsible to a national popular assembly; secondly, in making this assembly truly national by doing away with all distinctions of classes and religions ... Thirdly, by decentralization and by the establishment of provincial control over the governers.[3]

However, the first constitution was short-lived as Turco-Russian war intervened and Sultan Abdulhamid suspended the constitution after barely two years of implementation. A long period of autocracy followed until the "Young Turks" Revolution in 1908. Despite the autocratic interlude, the first Constitution left a deep imprint in the memory of the nation. The second constitutional period coincided with a most turbulent time in domestic as well as international affairs. The Libyan war with Italy in 1909, the Balkan War of 1912 and the First World War left no peace and political stability in the country. Under such circumstances, Ottoman statesmen had very scant chance of pursuing a policy of stabilization of democratic processes and institutions. However, the country plunged into an intensive and lively period of political activity and grass-roots organization of rival political ideas. Press and public opinion enjoyed a suitable environment to flourish and many political parties emerged. Socialist, liberal, conservative and religious reactionary parties sprang up like mushrooms. Professor Tarik Z. Tunaya enumerates about eighty political parties, clubs and associations established between 1908 and 1922 before the Republican period.[4]

The Turkish Republic which was established following a victorious War of Independence on October 29, 1923 started as a multi-party republic. The Grand National Assembly convened in 1920 was an assembly representing the people, where very lively political debate and activity continued throughout the war. The leader of the new Republic, Ataturk, was an intellectual with a deep sense of history, imbued with the lofty ideals of the French Revolution and Western democracies. Yet he was obliged to install an authoritarian single-party system with two short interludes of multi-party experiments in 1924 and 1930. He died in 1938 but left a legacy and expectation that the single-party system was a temporary arrangement in order to obtain a national consensus about the new regime.

Immediately after his death, another period of turbulence and instability followed and the Second World War broke out. Turkey maintained a position of armed neutrality throughout the war. New strains and tensions emerged in the national life; economic, social and political developments were adversely affected by hardships brought about by war conditions. The rate of economic growth dropped, and a large sector of the population suffered from inflation. War riches, speculators, big merchants and land-owning classes were enriched while small farmers, state and private sector employees bitterly suffered and bore the burden of the war economy.

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[3] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford Paperbacks, 1968, p. 164. The manifesto of the "Muslim Patriots" of 9 March 1876, explaining the object of Mithat Pasa's group to obtain a constitution.

[4] Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Turkiyede Siyasi Partiler* (Political Parties in Turkey) *1859-1952*, Istanbul, pp. 774-76.

Democratic Development in the Post-War Period

When the war ended in 1945, there was a general consensus in the country that the present situation could not continue any longer and that a new start had to be initiated as soon as possible. Nearly a century-long development in general and political culture, profound changes in the social and economic structure of the people, and a widespread effort of education of a fairly homogeneous population had created an environment which was more suitable for a new venture of political liberalization based on universal suffrage and a multi-party system.

As economic development gained momentum and the lot of the peasantry improved considerably as a result of general agricultural development, there emerged a widespread need for representation and participation in governmental processes. Historically, the Seldjuk and Ottoman system of land ownership had been conducive to the emergence and maintenance of an independent small farming population. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Law had facilitated the application of the Roman private property code to the Ottoman land-holding system and contributed to the rationalization and commercialization of the agricultural sector of the economy. As a result of a series of legal, institutional, social and educational reforms, the rate of growth of national income rose considerably and the annual increase in per capita income attained 5.3 percent during the period of 1923-1938.[5]

With the exception of the war period, the potential of growth and development of the economy and social system was quite high. Economic controls and an enlarged public sector as a consequence of the war economy and the world depression of the thirties had been felt as restrictive impediments for economic activities on a wider front.

Both internal and external factors were pushing the government to liberalize the economy and political institutions. The victory of the Western democracies over Fascist totalitarian regimes had fortified the ideological convictions of Turkish intellectuals for democracy and freedom. Public opinion, the press and a previously docile parliament turned extremely vocal and intensive debate and discussion became a general process in public life.

Opposition press attained unprecedented circulation and reached ever-widening circles of articulate groups. The Istanbul daily newspapers *Vatan*, *Tasvir* and *Yeni Asir* of Izmir became extremely influential mouthpieces of the opposition. As a result of intensive criticism in the press and a new wave of intellectuals and elites becoming more and more articulate, the monolithic governing party of President Inonu had to install an independent group to operate as the government's "loyal opposition." This step to institutionalize the function of the opposition was soon condemned as too artificial and synthetic to fulfill a real role. After a while, a group of prominent parliamentarians and statesmen resigned from President Inonu's People's Republican Party to form a genuine opposition party.

A rival and independent political party was formed under the leadership of former Prime Minister of Ataturk, Celal Bayar, and it rapidly organized itself to take part in the 1946 election. In 1950, this opposition party, the Democratic Party, won the elections with an overwhelming majority. A new period of profound change in political, social and economic life was initiated. This period coincided with Turkey's participation in economic, political, and military cooperation arrangements with the Western world. Turkey had benefitted first from American economic, political and military aid under the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Turkey joined the Marshall Plan in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949 as a founding member; finally, she became a member of the Nato Alliance in 1952.

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[5] Merih Celasun, "Sources of Industrial Growth and Structural Change. The Case of Turkey," *World Bank Staff Working Papers*, N. 614, 1983, p. 4.

Through these internal and external factors, Turkey developed a sense of self-confidence in her political maturity and political institutions. Political and social pluralism developed, Turkish people regained their self-respect, and their image abroad improved as a result of being a respectable member of the free world with pluralistic institutions and an open society. Respect for human rights and individual freedoms, a free press, a free and independent labor movement, free associations, academic freedoms, an independent judiciary, and independent media are considered in Turkey as essential parts of national life.

Fair and undisputed elections have enabled Turkey to change governments in perfect peace and order. The lively election campaigns and high level of popular participation have become a source of national pride.

However, despite all these impressive achievements, Turkish democracy has suffered three setbacks in the past forty-five years. Internal and external factors, too long to explain in this paper, have been responsible for breakdowns as testified by the military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980. Fortunately, these interventions have been of short duration and in each case the military handed over power to civilians after some constitutional and political arrangements.

Without going into a comprehensive treatment of the reasons for internal weaknesses in Turkish democracy, certain elements can be briefly enumerated as the source of the problem. The lack of adequate cultural and educational background of political elites for high-level democratic intercourse seems to be one of the main points of weakness in our public life. The system and the level of education leave much to be desired for raising the moral and intellectual level of Turkish elites for a more successful working of democratic processes. The lack of intra-party democracy, autocratic and authoritarian behavior of political leaders, and their unwillingness to compromise and cooperate on fundamental issues affecting the future of a democratic way of life have frequently driven the country to political impasses and finally to military intervention. The general level of political debate – both in the press and in the parliament – shows clearly the need to raise the intellectual content of the process of debate and political confrontations. The inadequate development of social sciences and political ideas has been responsible for the low level of political debate both in the parliament and the press. However, intellectual life has been invigorated by the expansion of university education and intensive publications in the fields of social and political science. The number of universities has increased to twenty-nine and attendance at universities and colleges attained 10.3 percent of the age group. There are now more than half a million students attending universities and colleges.[6]

In addition, the process of trial and error, occasional military interventions, followed by speedy restoration efforts to install the civilian regimes on a firmer ground, have contributed to an accumulation of richer political culture and experience. Public opinion and political elites have become more conscious and sophisticated about the pitfalls lying ahead in order not to repeat the mistakes leading to the breakdown of the democratic process.

External factors contributing to the destabilization of democratic institutions and their final breakdown by military intervention have also contributed to the dissemination of knowledge and experience about the roots and nature of the problem. Marxist terrorism which aimed openly to destroy the democratic structure of Turkey has caught the fragile structure of Turkish democracy unprepared and played havoc with normal processes of law and order. The military interventions of 1971 and 1980 emerged almost instinctively as measures of last resort in order to save the country from severe bloodshed and

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[6] YOK, *Kasım 1981-Kasım 1988 Döneminde Yüksek Öğretimdeki Gelişmeler* (Developments in Higher Education 1981-1988), p. 38.

NED Board Member and Panel Moderator Charles H. Smith

chaos. As the normal process of law and order controlled by democratic institutions had proved to be incapable of coping with the situation when more than thirty people were being murdered daily, military intervention was welcomed even by the civilian population and political parties, although with great dismay. Fortunately, at every intervention the armed forces acted in a manner safeguarding the inner discipline and chain of command. They underlined the temporary nature of intervention and promised to hand over power to a civilian to be freely elected under an amended constitution and new political arrangements. The military have learned at least as much as the civilian sector about the intricacy of the problems of civilian life and always relinquished political power as soon as possible. And it must be emphasized that the military always intervened with civilian rule with great reluctance. It is therefore extremely unfair to blame the military for the breakdown of civilian regimes in Turkey. The Turkish army is imbued with the tradition of Ataturk, who was extremely keen to keep the army out of internal politics. The Turkish army, as a Nato ally, is fully cognizant that civilian control of military power is an integral part of the democratic way of life and one of the main principles of Western political values.

Conclusion

I should like to conclude this brief survey of the development of Turkish democracy with a note of optimism. Despite occasional breakdowns in its operation, Turkish democracy is part of an irreversible process in our national life. Turkish citizens in urban and rural areas have become accustomed to the system of periodic elections for local and central government bodies. And the social structure of the country has become far too complex to be ruled by a central authority which is self appointed and closed to outside influences. The military has realized this fact by frequent experiences despite their temporary tenure of office. It is impossible to run such a vast country, with a population of fifty five million, without the active support of public

> ***I think that the pressures for democracy throughout the world come from the desire for a better economic way of life. The modern communications that have reached all parts of the world, the ease of transportation which enables us to see close up and understand other societies, and the presence of television over the last thirty or forty years have made this world truly a smaller place. We begin to see how others live and that the distance between the economically affluent and the economically disadvantaged is great . . . As people look around the world, that leads to pressures for catching up . . . I think those pressures are driving a lot of what is happening in the world today. Whether you call it modernization, reform, or perestroika, it represents economic pressures for a better life. The Soviets, of course, look first at perestroika and they bring along glasnost, political reform, only in support of the economic reform. The first thing, though, is perestroika.***
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> The Hon. John Porter
> *U.S. House of Representatives*

opinion as represented by numerous pluralistic institutions. The press, trade unions, business organizations, political clubs, and tens of thousands of associations with different interests, and a highly mobile society with developed transport and communication services, would constitute a nightmare for any future candidate for dictatorship. Democracy, despite its frequent failures and many disappointments, is still a very highly held concept— among both intellectuals as well as the man in the street. It may have several defects but, as Churchill pointed out, we think it is preferable to any other alternative. We also feel confident that the threat from international terrorism will be dealt with by the normal operation of state mechanism without resorting to emergency measures or the temporary suspension of civil liberties. An improved climate of international security will also contribute to the improvement of behavior of certain states which in the past frequently used destabilization measures and a strategy of low-level conflict against their adversaries. We also feel that the states which have been trying to destabilize Turkish democracy through active support of terrorism will come to realize eventually that there is enough resilience in our social and political system to withstand such shock treatments and it will prove counterproductive to continue.

Turkey has benefited greatly from close economic and political cooperation with the open societies of the Western world and strengthened her own democracy under the collective security system of the free world. There is what approaches a national consensus in Turkey that our way of life and our achievements will be an attractive model for many countries in our region to emulate. We feel that Islamic and Asiatic cultures are perfectly compatible with democracy, which represents the best way of life for men cherishing freedom and civilization in the modern world. Our contemporary experiences have confirmed the hopes of the early architects of our first constitution some one hundred and twenty years ago. And the success of the democratic system in Turkey has a wider relevance beyond our borders.

Senatorial Remarks

The conference session on May 2nd began with brief addresses by Senators Lloyd Bentsen and John McCain. The session was chaired by Charles T. Manatt, the Vice Chairman of the Endowment's Board of Directors.

Senator John McCain

I believe that the National Endowment for Democracy has played, and will continue to play, a key role in achieving the goals that all of us seek— that people can enjoy the basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Helsinki Agreements and other documents throughout our history.

This is a time of hope, change and challenge. We are experiencing profound changes and indeed turmoil in some parts of the world. And we are seeing progress that we never could have predicted just a few short years ago.

Senator John McCain

We are seeing nations which are now taking their first small steps toward democracy and freedom. In our own hemisphere, we have seen an incredible change over the last seven or eight years where significant countries have gone from totalitarian governments to freely-elected ones . . . All of this, I think, is good news and I don't think it's all by accident. I believe it's a result of calculated policies by this and previous administrations to support people who are struggling for freedom, whether it be because they are under the yoke of Marxism-Leninism or because they are afflicted by right-wing totalitarian governments . . .

I'd also like to point out the obvious. What has happened in this new era of glasnost and perestroika is a victory. It's a victory for the philosophy and beliefs of freedom, democracy, self-expression, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and other freedoms, and it's an expression of the failure of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism which threatened, on several occasions, to overtake the world.

I believe that those of us who have supported the struggle for freedom for people throughout the world can to some degree claim victory— we can claim it for those martyrs who died in the struggle in prisons and gulags throughout the world, and for those who sacrificed their lives in the streets of Warsaw and Gdansk and other places throughout the world where people were oppressed and repressed. This is a victory that gives, for the first time in my view, the hope, although maybe dim at times, for freedom and democracy in countries where a few short years ago there was no prospect whatsoever.

Finally, I'd like to pay tribute to the men and women in this room who have fought so long and so hard to make these days a reality. I congratulate you and appreciate your struggle and your sacrifice . . . I believe that as we approach the uncertainties— and the hopes of a new and bright future for the people of the world— you will continue to play a key role in that struggle.

Senator Lloyd Bentsen

Think how confusing it would be for a modern day Rip Van Winkle who had gone to sleep about 1969, reawakened and read the newspaper today. He would find young people standing on rooftops in Russia to protest against police brutality, or he might find a crowd of 100,000 young people in a square in China talking about leaders coming down because they weren't advancing democracy fast enough. What a change. And from our point of view, quite a victory. It is a fragile victory, but a victory nonetheless.

And for what is it a victory? It's a victory for the freedom of families to be left alone by government, for the value of a sphere of autonomy for oneself and for being able to do things in the way of choosing one's course in life.

It's a victory for the view that religious diversity does not preclude our larger unity as a people. It's a victory for the conviction that liberty and equality do not necessarily conflict. It's a victory for the idea that ordinary men and women should have the right and opportunity to make meaningful choices about their lives.

But I don't think you can overdo that euphoria. You shouldn't, because glasnost does not mean that the Soviets have become disciples of Thomas Jefferson, or even Octavio Paz, or that the Ayatollah all of a sudden believes in pluralism. Every dictator is not really a democrat in the formative stage.

We have to work hard at promoting democracy abroad, and that's the very purpose for this group existing. Promoting democracy abroad takes some resolve and takes a lot of determination and commitment. That's not always easy . . . One of the things we have to do as we work to try to

Senator Lloyd Bentsen

expand democracy is not to let the little things break it down— things like trade disputes . . . The mesh we seek of individual liberty and equality needs the lubricating grease of opportunity. And that won't grow in a world of antagonism or protectionism.

In this country, we don't set policies with rifles and guns. We don't set it by capturing and kidnaping someone's mother or sending car bombs into shopping centers. We do it through elections, and for two hundred years this country has been a beacon of opportunity, a magnet for people to come here because of the freedom of our country, freedom of expression, freedom of opportunity for families.

And we want to extend that kind of a system around the world— not by force of arms but by example. And that means we have to continue the kind of work that you're doing here. We have to work on issues as dramatic as funding for *La Prensa* . . . and as mundane as the details of the trade bill. We have to work here and abroad to make sure that America is an example not just of the past, but that the most final and inspirational chapters of this country are yet to be written.

NED Vice Chairman Charles T. Manatt.

The Idea of Democracy

Milovan Djilas** is a Yugoslav writer and internationally known dissident. Mr. Djilas served as Vice President of Yugoslavia in the post-war Communist government and played a major role in his country's 1948 break with Moscow. He served nine years in prison following his 1954 break with Tito and the publication of his famous critique of the communist bureaucracy, **The New Class.

The only real, unrefutable progress of man is his freedom. Or more precisely, expansion of his freedom is both the way and the condition of human existence. Freedom has separated man from the beast, freedom has been his way of becoming more and more independent from nature.

Democracy has been a form of power, and as such it is neither ideal nor could it be. But it embodies more than any other form of power an immanent tendency of man towards freedom and remains, as such, the best and the most human form of power.

Democracy is democratic as such– it is democracy for the others; it is subject to laws equal to all. It has to be emphasized– though the very notion of democracy entails it– that democracy, as a form of power, is authentic only if parliamentary and pluralistic.

This general principle could be applicable and fertile if– and only if– applied in accordance with concrete, in the first place, national and social conditions. Democracy bereft of reality, democracy as a pure doctrine, inevitably loses when faced with undemocratic forces, the latter being more adaptable since more inconsiderate.

Democracy has not been given once for good anywhere: if it doesn't develop and adapt to real conditions, it is condemned to doom. Democracy as well as human existence has to be permanently conquered: only he who fights for freedom every day is worth it, Goethe said.

Fundamental features of democracy are agreement and fair play. Democracy should also be resolute to resort to force in the face of violence, lawlessness, tyrants and aggressors. The same is applicable– mutatis mutandis– to the struggle for democracy, the democratic revolution. It must be patient awaiting power, obeying even unjust laws, but never get subdued to tyranny: the only means of struggle to be avoided are

Milovan Djilas addresses the "Idea of Democracy" panel as commentator Larry Diamond (r.) listens.

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NED Board Member and Panel Moderator Zbigniew Brzezinski.

those contrary to the democracy as such, i.e. those which result in civil war.

Democracy grants neither peace nor affluence– it just offers the best prospects of avoiding war and best possibilities to the majority. Democracy is no guarantee of human rights– it is just the basis of these and the condition of their respect and expansion.

I do not boast to have said anything new on democracy– it is just the way I have understood it after all the experiences of the civil war, and the authoritarian and totalitarian forms of power which I was a partaker to and against which I rebelled.

But more important, and in my opinion far more decisive, is the assessment of the developments occurring in non-democratic social orders, and especially those endowed with strong totalitarian structures. In this regard, I bear in mind East-European states, the Soviet Union included, with communist parties still holding state and economic power.

These states nevertheless differ as far as their internal orders are concerned. They have been undergoing deep, fundamental turmoils: totalitarianism in Romania, Albania and East Germany has been morally undermined, rendering the inner social organization temporary.

It follows that these countries should be approached not only from the point of view of general principles of democracy, but specifically also, since both the forms and speeds with which these have been approaching democracy differ. Moreover, in multinational states– such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia– aspirations and movements differ from nation to nation, though covered by common systemic crises.

The mentioned turmoils and changes are not and could not take place apart from the rest of the world, Western democracies in particular. But the causes remain internal– the decay of systems and the rise of national dissatisfactions. Though still dominant, the Soviet Union no longer determines internal trends in East European states. Therefore, any attempted enforcement of any foreign model, and an attempt to take advantage of the ongoing crises in order to strengthen dominant positions in particular, would inevitably postpone democratic processes and encourage authoritarian and autocratic tendencies.

Ideology has been disintegrated irrevocably; it can no longer be recovered. The same can be said for the economy: the party-state is no more capable of maintaining a monopoly over the economy, not to mention the promotion of economic activities.

The party-state has most severely supressed democratic ideas and movements, seeing them– quite reasonably– as the most stubborn and dangerous rivals. Partly for that reason, and partly because of distortion and totalitarization of consciousness, democratic movements face the disintegration of totalitarianism unready. And out of this cataclysmic chaos, unpredictable forces emerge that are also, if not even more, anti-democratic and anti-communist. To change party-state for state fanaticism would but enforce another kind of slavery, and would perhaps even encourage aggressiveness towards the external world. Therefore, democrats in the East and West, as anywhere, should cooperate, respecting the differences and integrities of each other. Common ideals oblige them to do so, as the hard times mankind has been undergoing and dark and perilous forces do.

Ideological revolutions and ideological internationalism have resulted in totalitarian domination of oligarchies over societies and nations. The democratic revolution that permeates the world emerges from national identity and individual integrity. Even if it proves incapable of uniting the world and curbing ideologies and fanaticisms, it will undoubtedly contribute significantly to human and national togetherness and better living conditions— enough for solidarity, worth sacrifice.

***Leszek Kolakowski** is a professor of the history of philosophy and religion at Oxford University and the University of Chicago. Professor Kolakowski was a leading critic of the Communist regime in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s. Forced to leave his country, he is now the Western representative of the Polish Independent Committees for Culture, Science and Education (OKNO).*

Leaving aside the historical vicissitudes of the concept of democracy and all kinds of spurious and fraudulent usage of it ("socialist democracy," "people's democracy," "Islamic democracy"), we may say that this concept, as usually understood, includes three components.

First, we think of a set of institutions of which the aim is to assure that the scope of power and influence of political elites correspond to the amount of popular support they enjoy.

Secondly, we have in mind the independence of the legal system from the executive power; the law acts as an autonomous mediating device between individual or corporate interests and the state and is not an instrument of ruling elites.

Thirdly, we think of enforceable barriers, built into the legal system, to guarantee both the equality in law of all citizens and basic personal rights which include (the list is notoriously contestable, though) freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of association, religious freedom and freedom to acquire property.

These three components are not necessarily linked; they may exist severally— both conceptually and as a matter of historical experience. The principle of majority is insufficient if we are to make a distinction between democracy and ochlocracy, the rule of the mob. The principle of majority does not yet make democracy; we know tyrannical regimes that enjoyed the support of the majority, including Nazi Germany and Iranian theocracy. We do not call democratic a regime in which fifty-one percent of the population may for any reason slaughter the remaining forty-nine percent with impunity. Neither is the second component sufficient without the third, as we easily imagine a regime in which enforceable and predictable legal rules operate without, however, assuring either equality or personal rights.

Much as all of us who are committed to libertarian values welcome the worldwide movement which aims at the establishment or restoration of democratic institutions in Communist countries, in military dictatorships and in other forms of tyranny, we should not imagine that the cause of freedom is now safe and its victory imminent.

There are numerous factors and various forces which continue and will continue in the foreseeable future to threaten democratic institutions.

One of them is the enfeebled but still living force of Sovietism. We notice, of course, the deep crisis of totalitarian institutions, the progressing reassertion of civil society in Communist countries, the economic, social and cultural bankruptcy of the "real socialism" and the collapse of the ideological legitimacy of Soviet-type systems. But the time is not ripe for the last rites. The accelerated changes which show that the rulers themselves have lost confidence in the vitality of their regimes (a clearest symptom of decay) have lasted only for a short time and their outcome is by no means certain. There are rational grounds to expect that economic perestroika in the Soviet Union will fizzle out and might result in political regression. It would be vain to speculate upon the character and the size of this. The imperialist expansion has been built into the very ideological foundation of the Soviet regime and the unambiguous renouncement of this expansion would require an ideological transformation difficult to imagine. The only potential rival of Marxism-Leninism— the Great-Russian chauvinism— would bring a mortal danger to the empire if it were established as the official doctrine, as it would inevitably inflame even more all the nationalisms of the non-Russian population. And we do not know what might happen if the ruling party faced the real threat of being removed from power. It is much too early to write the obituary of Communism.

The second source of anti-democratic energy is the growth of malignant nationalism all over the world. Patriotic feelings are not in themselves incompatible with the assertion of democratic virtues, in so far as they mean a preferential solidarity with one's own nation, the attachment to national cultural heritage and language, the desire to make a nation better off and more civilized (patriotism wants to make the nation clean, nationalism wants to whitewash it, as Chesterton says). Nationalism is malignant and hostile to civilization when it asserts itself through belief in the natural superiority of one's own tribe and in the hatred of others, if it looks for pretexts, however silly, to expand into other territories, and above all if it implies the idolatrous belief in the absolute supremacy of national values when they clash with the rights of persons who make up the nation. There is no need to prove that this kind of rapacious and potentially totalitarian nationalism is increasing in various parts of our globe.

The third factor is religious intolerance and theocratic aspirations. To be sure, the theocratic tendency, which naturally does away with the separation of state from religion and establishes an ideological despotism, is most clearly and dangerously active in Islamic countries. There are reasons to expect that it will grow. Islamic countries, however, make up a large segment of mankind; while none of them is fully democratic in the Western sense, they differ significantly in the degree of intolerance. We notice the increase of theocratic aspirations among Israeli Jews. Analogous tendencies in Christianity do not seem strong or dangerous for the time being but their seeds are quite alive and occasionally display their vitality.

The fourth menace to democracy comes from terrorism and criminal violence— not in the sense that terrorists and drug dealers might take over power in civilized states but that they might compel democratic governments to combat them— presumably with the consent of the majority— with measures that are incompatible with democratic rights. Nobody opposes, of course, security checks at airports and we naturally assume that this is no more than a trivial nuisance, a small price to pay for the relative safety of travel. But, strictly speaking, those checks imply that each of us is treated, without any grounds, as a suspected terrorist. What if the efficient fight against terrorists and criminals requires not only large-scale unwarranted searches but preventive killings, the suspension of the principle "innocent until proven guilty," widely-spread vigilante organizations and so on? We might accept such measures under duress when we feel they are needed to defend democracy but we may not pretend that they would leave all the rules of democracy intact.

The fifth— perhaps potentially the most important— danger to democracy might come from the long-term changes that affect virtually all parts of our planet. The rapid pace of economic growth in the post-war decades has produced— both in the rich and in the poor countries— the mentality of endless expectations. Somehow we got used to the hope that each of us is going to have more and more of everything in the indefinite future and to the firm belief that this is what each of us deserves. But those hopes are bound to end up with bitter disappointment, at least for the overwhelming majority. Overpopulation, shrinking resources of agricultural land and water and ecological catastrophes will certainly compel mankind in the near future to devote more and more effort and money to repair the damages already inflicted on our environment and to ward off further calamities. This will result not only in the growing restrictions imposed on our freedom of movement and property rights but above all in dampening our hopes for "more and more" and indeed in the demand that we recognize that we have enough or that we must manage with less, limit our wants and accept a more modest life. The amount of frustration, irrational rage and aggression that those imperatives are going to cause will be enormous. And they will affect rich and poor alike, for the mass of frustration does not depend on the absolute level of satisfaction but only on the distance between this absolute level and the subjective needs, and our needs can and do expand indefinitely along the endless spiral of

Leszek Kolakowski

greed. Whatever ideological expression channels this frustration might find, it is likely that in order to tame it and to prevent society from plunging into chaos or falling prey to lawless tyranny, many undemocratic restrictions will be needed.

Widespread misery is fertile ground for a successful demagogy of totalitarian movements and for the temptation to "solve" social problems by means of a military dictatorship. We have seen this more than once, especially in Latin America and Africa. If the relatively rich countries are compelled to lower human expectations— even without causing real misery— this can only add to the danger.

This is not to say that the cause of freedom is lost; we have enough proof to believe that people need not only security but freedom— as a great value in itself— as well (and these two values more often than not clash with each other). But it is proper to keep remembering that freedom is always vulnerable and its cause never safe.

Jean-Francois Revel *is a French writer and philosopher. The author of numerous books, Dr. Revel achieved international recognition in 1970 with the publication of* ***Without Marx or Jesus,*** *an essay on "the new American revolution" and its impact worldwide. The same success was achieved by* ***The Totalitarian Temptation*** *(1976) and* ***How Democracies Perish*** *(1983). His most recent book,* ***La Connaissance Inutile,*** *(1988) won the Prix Chateaubriand and is due to appear in the U.S. in 1990.*

The expression, "the democratic revolution," has been used many times yesterday and today; it is under that label that this conference is taking place. We use those words as if that revolution is already completed; we seem to be in a mood of self-congratulation and optimism. Are we right?

Globally, I would say yes. It's true that there has been progress, especially in Latin America, with the exception of the two Communist states, Cuba and Nicaragua. But also, we have had setbacks. For instance, there is practically not a single democracy in Africa.

The disappointments of post-colonialism are still there. There has been a slight improvement recently in Tunisia, but it seems that the last elections in Senegal, which was a country with democracy, were rigged.

Recent examples show the dark sides of the situation. There were mass executions in Iran last summer. During the past ten years, which we consider a period of improvement for democracies throughout the world, we have seen the disappearance of the only democracy in the Arab world, Lebanon.

We have seen the chemical genocide of Kurds very recently. And we have seen genocide in Tibet which has eliminated half the Tibetan population. We have seen repression in Algeria. Last October, the armed forces shot at children; it seems that there were about 1000 victims. We have seen the coup d'etat in Fiji. And we have seen the development both of terrorism, as Leszek Kolakowski has described, and also the strengthening of some of the most absolute kinds of despotism, as in Romania.

Dictatorship is not necessarily the only threat to democracy— there is also anarchy. We have seen, for instance, great hopes in Haiti almost immediately shattered by a bloody situation of anarchy in that country.

Above all, I would like to stress that the 20th Century has been— across the board— a terrible setback for democracy. It is a setback out of which we are only now emerging, but only partially at this point.

We must go back, it seems to me, almost one hundred years. The democratic revolution which was on the move at the end of the 19th Century and at the beginning of our century was first stopped and then hijacked, especially in Central Europe for example, and in many other places.

And now some countries start from a much lower point than when they entered the Communist world, when there were some milder forms of undemocratic rule. Communism is no longer expanding, that's true. But Islamic fundamentalism now takes the lead among the threats to democracy.

Jean-Francois Revel addresses the "Idea of Democracy" panel. Also pictured are, from l to r., Leszek Kolakowski, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Milovan Djilas.

What is the present situation? I would say first, outside the Communist world the situation is rather good and encouraging. There is no longer a Marxist alternative in any developed country, and the failure of Marxist or semi-Marxist regimes or economic experiments in the developing countries seem now to be evident facts. And there is a final lesson. Even if it's sometimes very difficult for countries which have a collectivist or semi-collectivist economy to go back to a free market economy, at least most leaders of those countries are trying to do so.

Now, what about the Communist world which is, of course, the most difficult and most important aspect of the problem. I would like to refer to Zbigniew Brzezinski's new book, *The Grand Failure,* which seems to me to present the perfect picture of the present situation, its causes and future prospects.

First of all, a great point has been achieved; it is the self-confessed failure of Communist systems. This is a failure which is both economic and ideological. By the same token, the admissions of Communist leaders today have shown the absurdity of many of our previous views of fifteen years ago about Communist economies.

I remember a television broadcast in 1976 when there was a discussion regarding Soviet agriculture; experts were trying to demonstrate that Soviet agriculture was in very good shape. And I had practically the whole panel against me when I tried to explain that a

Xavier Zavala (l.), Director of the Libro Libre book program in Costa Rica, and Jean-Francois Revel

country which had to import millions of tons of grain was probably not in a very good situation.

So, there is one point I would like to make. We were very often wrong about the Communist world during the past seventy years. Why, all of a sudden, should we have the gift of infallibility since 1985? Maybe we should also be very cautious about the way we see, interpret and understand what is going on since Gorbachev took command.

What is the present situation? I would say that the greatest changes—probably the arrival of an entirely new system—are taking place in Poland, Hungary and also Yugoslavia.

What about the Soviet Union? No doubt glasnost is a reality, especially about the past. When Gorbachev says that the Soviet Union is in a very bad situation because for seventy years it has lied about what was really going on in the country it is an extraordinary vindication of the necessity of information to build a democracy.

But there is in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, nevertheless, an extraordinary concentration of all powers in the hands of the leader, which is not exactly democratic. I read in Western newspapers that the recent purge in the Central Committee allowed Gorbachev to obtain a majority there—but this would mean that before he was in the minority. It didn't look like that; when commentators are constantly depicting things as a fight between a very weak liberal and strong conservatives, I wonder why the weak man is always the winner.

I think that very classically Gorbachev has put his men everywhere. He has colonized the apparatus, which is quite a classical way for a General Secretary to operate during the first years of his mandate.

In other aspects, and I think he himself confesses it, up to this point perestroika, economic restructuring, has failed. The food situation is worse than it was when Gorbachev came to power.

A good and very positive aspect which was shown by the recent elections is the political maturity of the people. It had been assumed that the people in the several Soviet Republics, after so many years of living under a totalitarian regime, would not be able to make a political choice or to have political judgment. On the contrary, they behaved in quite a clever way in many instances during the last elections.

And also, I think there is a great Soviet success in the Gorbachev era. It's a success in foreign policy. But I don't know if it's very good for us. The collapse of the Soviet economy is being matched by the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance.

What about the future? I think that the clash between economic reform and political change is the great issue in the Soviet Union, as well as in China. And I think that in China we are just now witnessing that clash.

Marxism is not an economic system, in spite of the fact that Marx wrote about the economy. Marxism— or Marxism-Leninism— is a political system which can only work by destroying the economy. So the real moment of truth will come when the economic reform can only go on by overthrowing the political system. When we reach that moment, what will happen?

And to make another point, we should not forget that very hard, Stalinist-type Communist systems still exist outside the main theater of the Soviet Union and China. There is still a very tough gulag in Vietnam, and I am also speaking of Ethiopia, Cuba, and a lot of "half Communist" countries.

Of course, we are witnessing a very deep crisis of the system— and probably a final crisis. But the real question is: how and when is the crisis going to be translated into real and irreversible democracy. We don't know because there is no model. It's the first time that we have witnessed such a process. We have in history, of course, many authoritarian societies— almost only authoritarian societies— that have become democratic but never a completely totalitarian regime like the Communists of Stalin or the Maoist years.

We have to see all the facts, but only the facts. Let's not refuse to see the good which is taking place, but let's also not take for granted what Gorbachev or others wish to achieve, or want us to believe they are going to achieve.

The real goal is to change things in an irreversible way. We seem always to think that change has already been completed when we see a few symptoms of change or aspirations for change. Not once since 1945 have I seen the situation in the Communist world gauged according to the facts, but only according to what was fashionable to think at the moment. Democratic euphoria can be as counter-productive as democratic pessimism.

My conclusion is rather optimistic. The idea of democracy has won— the reality of democracy, much less. The greatest enemy of democracy may be its fear to face the problems. Yes, we can do something to change things for the better in the Soviet Union. But maybe it's not exactly what Gorbachev wants us to do. Democracy is the type of culture which likes to think that it has overcome its problems, not because it solved them, but because the problems vanished or were solved by themselves. In this world, we are the only ones who can solve them.

Larry Diamond, *Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, also teaches courses on democracy in the Sociology Department of Stanford University. Mr. Diamond is the author of* ***Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic*** *and is the editor, with Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan Linz, of* ***Democracy in Developing Countries,*** *a comparative study of democratic experiences and prospects. Dr. Diamond is also co-editor of the* ***Journal of Democracy,*** *a new quarterly magazine that will be published by the Endowment.*

Democracy is not a Western concept; it's very important to denounce the claims of dictators around the world who dismiss democracy as simply a U.S. or West European notion. Democracy entails regular competition for and rotation of power, public participation in decision-making, accountability of rulers to the ruled, respect for the rule of law, independence of the legal system, and the freedoms of expression, organization, conscience, assembly, religion and economic activity. How can these be described as uniquely Western?

These are pan-human, cross-cultural aspirations that are consistent with a number of different types of institutional expression and formation. Although the forms of democracy may vary in the world, its underlying principles and values are strikingly continuous.

The contributions at this conference have underscored the utter bankruptcy and final disintegration of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology that motivates people around the world. As Milovan Djilas said, the demise of the legitimacy and motivating force of Marxism-Leninism creates an opportunity, an opening for democracy, but not in any way a certainty or inevitability of democracy. What needs to be done is to legitimize democracy as a positive alternative system of values, ideas and beliefs and not simply to rest content with discrediting Marxism-Leninism or other forms of authoritarianism.

A theme which is clear from the discussions at this conference is that, if it is to be successful, democracy must in some ways also be totalist, comprehensive and all-encompassing, like its ideological competitors. It has to organize and penetrate throughout society and culture; it's not enough to have democracy merely in the political arena. If it doesn't penetrate civil society, if it doesn't come to encompass the values, beliefs and practices of people at every level of their culture, then democracy will rest on very fragile ground.

The difference between this totalism of democracy and the totalitarianism of Marxism-Leninism comes from the pluralism that is one of the unique characteristics of democracy, from the fact that democratic values, beliefs and institutions are not forged by a single hegemonic party, institution or creed, but rather by scores of different organizations, movements and initiatives. Democracy can only be truly consolidated as a result of pluralistic– not hegemonic, decentralized– not centrally directed, and grassroots– not top-down, initiatives.

It is also very difficult to impose democracy from the outside and, again, it will rest on very fragile ground if that is its only or primary source. From our comparative study of experiences with democracy in the developing world, it is clear that one of the reasons so many post-colonial democratic experiments failed is because they were uncritically given by their colonial powers, or adopted themselves, foreign constitutions, models and institutional arrangements that were neither sufficiently continuous with indigenous traditions nor sufficiently sensitive to the particular social, cultural and other problems in the countries in question.

Here at this conference also, a recurrent theme has been the importance of authentic, indigenous roots for democracy in each country. Democracy must build organically on the indigenous democratic currents of value, belief and practice in each country's history and cultural traditions. Each country must forge its own distinctive path, its own evolutionary track, toward a stable and secure democracy.

Larry Diamond (r.) comments on the "Idea of Democracy" panel as Milovan Djilas listens.

Now this is not to say—and I think we need to be candid and realistic—that every traditional culture in the world is democratic, or that every historical circumstance has important elements of democratic experience from which to borrow. But many do, and certainly in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and even in the Middle East to some extent, there are elements of democratic practice and belief on which a democratizing project can draw. The project will have more legitimacy, more staying power, if it attempts to build on what is usable in the specific culture and society.

Obviously, external forces that are seeking to aid the cause of democracy must be careful not to impose their own models, ideas and strategies. Rather, they must respect indigenous cultural traditions. They must look to aid groups that are authentic, that are springing up from the grassroots. One of the things that distinguishes the National Endowment for Democracy, particularly from previous U.S. initiatives to promote democracy, is that the Endowment has always sought to be sensitive to local circumstances, to support indigenous democratic movements, and not to impose a U.S. notion of what democracy should look like in a country.

Although each country must find its own path to democracy, I think we've seen quite strikingly the power that can derive from international solidarity. In this sense, maybe we have something to learn from the Communist world—that there is a certain synergy that arises from the exchange of ideas, strategies, resources and enthusiasm between organizations, across national borders. Clearly, democrats around the world need to organize and cooperate more intensively and aggressively. We need to learn from, aid, and inspire one another. We need to construct a truly *international* democratic movement.

Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers increasingly fear the harsh glare of international public opinion, and isolation from the international political, economic and cultural community. This fear is a powerful resource democratic actors and nations can use to advance the cause of democracy in undemocratic countries.

We've heard repeatedly during the course of this conference that the *means* by which democracy is struggled for and achieved are crucial. We have all agreed on the importance of nonviolence in pursuing democracy, and on the importance of popular participation, grassroots organization and popular education and empowerment. But at the same time, the struggle for democracy is often one against perilous odds, as we have witnessed in South Africa, Chile, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Therefore, democratic forces cannot afford to divide and bicker among themselves. One of the most important aspects of democracy is the art of compromise, negotiation, cooperation and unity in a common democratic cause.

In a situation where authoritarianism or totalitarianism has held sway for many decades, it is simply not realistic to think that democracy will suddenly triumph and become stable from an upsurge of popular mobilization. Many of the participants in this conference have articulated the need for a strategy of gradualism, of incrementalism. They have called to our attention the need for patience and tenacity. In some cases, we may need to pass through several stages until reaching full democracy—the first and most indispensable of which is building civil society and associational life, building the pluralistic underpinnings and cultural and value foundations of democracy through a very dense network of social organizations.

Such independent, self-determining groups perform a number of crucial democratic functions. They provide a check on the arbitrary power of the state, a resource to demand accountability and an alternative source of information. They constitute—if they are democratic in their own methods and procedures—a school in the arts of participation, cooperation, negotiation and compromise, a training ground for future political leaders.

We've heard many references at this conference to the inevitability of the democratic revolution and the irreversibility of the process. Therefore, I'm pleased that the speakers on this panel have thrown a cautionary blanket on that enthusiasm. The democratic revolution has tremendous momentum in the world today; there's no denying that. The disintegration of communism, the rejection of authoritarianism, and the striking revalorization of democracy even among formerly very left radical groups in Latin America all give testimony to this.

But there is no inevitability. The recent democratic gains in the world are not consolidated; they are very fragile and quite reversible. Their consolidation—as well as new transitions to democracy—require patient, laborious struggle and shrewd and ingenious strategies of confronting authoritarian regimes and strengthening democratic movements.

Leszek Kolakowski (foreground) addresses the "Idea of Democracy" panel, as from l. to r., NED Board member Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carl Gershman, Jean-Francois Revel, and Milovan Djilas listen.

State Department Reception

It's a pleasure for me to welcome you to the State Department on behalf of Secretary Baker. Both he and Larry Eagleburger are strong supporters of the National Endowment for Democracy. Unfortunately, both of them were called to a meeting at the White House this evening and couldn't join us. So I have the pleasure of substituting.

It wasn't too many years ago, during my tour with the National Security Council, that I was present at the creation of the Endowment. At that time I was able to make a small contribution to the decision to support a broader effort on the part of non-governmental organizations to advance democratic institutions worldwide.

I hope you'll understand, therefore, and share the pride that I express at the growth of the Endowment and the institutes associated with it. They all deserve the strong and continuous support of the Administration, the Congress and the American people. But we also can't take the Endowment for granted. We should never forget that we live at a time that democracy remains a system of government available only to a minority of the world's people.

Moreover, some of our guests with us tonight remind us that there are people in the world whose commitment to democracy extends beyond rhetoric, to a willingness to face imprisonment, torture and even death on behalf of their political principles.

If democracy is to succeed, commitment must extend beyond words to actions. And that, of course, is the point of the Endowment. It has provided a focus and framework for committed action in Central and South America and the Caribbean, in Eastern Europe, in Africa and Asia. It has written the first of many chapters in its distinguished record of service, of which we can all be proud.

Robert Kimmitt
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

From l. to r., former Senator Paula Hawkins, NED Chairman William Brock, Conciencia President Maria Rosa S. de Martini, Representative Lindy Boggs, and Carl Gershman.

From l. to r., Carl Gershman, Jeanne-Marie Fascell, Violeta Chamorro and Representative Dante B. Fascell.

The last decade has seen democracy gain ground the world over, as more and more people have come to understand that only democracy can unlock all the talents and abilities which are there in every individual. The state-controlled societies have been unable to match the enterprise, originality and inventiveness which are the hallmark of free men and women. But we cannot just assume the success of the democratic system. We need to foster – as your organisation does so splendidly – democratic movements the world over and help to strengthen newly-established democracies. The United States' achievements in supporting democracy world-wide have been without parallel and free people the world over owe you their gratitude. I wish you continued success in the National Endowment for Democracy's great enterprise.

Greetings received from
The Hon. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Democracy is the main objective of international cooperation. This means that we should assist all of you who are struggling to strengthen democratic institutions in fulfilling your goal of consolidating democracy and helping it to take root in the heart of our people. To cooperate with and for democracy means eliminating violence, giving preference to organization and negotiation over aggression and intromission, and allowing the people to choose the best way of strengthening freedom. This kind of cooperation transcends mere commercial interests and sows the seeds of development. I want to congratulate you and urge you to continue your revolutionary work which is making a historic contribution to the building of democracy. I am certain that this conference will be another step down the long path which will lead to increased cooperation on behalf of democracy.

Greetings received from
Carlos Andres Perez
President of the Republic of Venezuela

Aydin Yalcin (l.) and Milovan Djilas.

NED Board member LeGree Daniels and Jacek Kuron.

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Representative Ben Gilman (l.), Paruir Hayrikian (Alliance for Self-Determination of Armenia) and Vladimir Bukovsky (far r.).

Members of the Dominican Association of Women Voters enjoying the reception, from l. to r., Sonia Torres de Mallen, Silvani Gomez, and Iberia Jimenez de Acosta.

Under Secretary Robert Kimmitt addresses the gathering.

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Jacek Kuron and members of the Uruguayan women's civic assocation Encuentro share a light moment, from l. to r., Miriam Fagundez, Mr. Kuron, Mabel Chaneton Ruvira, and Carmen Diaz

Our heart goes out to those now engaged in the struggle to secure democracy for themselves. In the same way, we are one with all who, like us, are locked in the equally crucial fight to keep freedom already attained by providing economic gains. My hope is that we will all realize that for democracy to last, it must fulfill the basic wants of its constituency. Restored democracies must be provided with the resources to effect the socio-economic changes to ensure their preservation.

People everywhere are grateful to the National Endowment for Democracy for its support to the cause of freedom in our day. I salute it for this well-earned tribute, even as I greet all those gathered in this distinguished and timely conference.

Greetings received from
H.E. Corazon Aquino
President of the Philippines

Enjoying the State Department Reception in honor of the conference are, from l. to r., Senator Orrin Hatch, Jan Nowak (Polish American Congress), Jacek Kuron, Under Secretary Robert Kimmitt, and Carl Gershman.

It is with great pleasure that I extend my greetings on the occasion of the recent world conference that took place in Washington on May 1st and 2nd of this year.

For us Argentinians, your institution is at this time very valuable. The Argentine Republic is committed to the process of consolidating democracy, and this year an event will take place which only very few Argentine constitutionally elected presidents have experienced in this century, the transference of power from one constitutionally elected president to another.

For this reason and since the consolidation of democracy is one of the main objectives of our government, we adhere and support the efforts carried out by your institution.

Greetings received from
H.E. Raul Alfonsin
President of the Republic of Argentina

Leszek Kolakowski (l.) and Marcelo Rozas, director of Editorial Andante in Santiago, Chile.

From l. to r., Dette Pascual, Tita Dumagsa (Friends of Namfrel in America), Representative Dante B. Fascell, Jeanne-Marie Fascell, and Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines.

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From l. to r., Martin Doherty (Service Employees International Union), Carl Gershman, Dr. Zofia Kuratowska (Chairman of the Solidarity Social Fund), and her husband Dr. Gregorz Jasunski.

Award Luncheon

On the occasion of the Endowment's conference, the Board of Directors was proud to present "The Democracy Award" to two individuals who have made vital contributions, both individually and as part of larger movements, to the cause of democracy.

Monica Jimenez de Barros founded and directed the Crusade for Citizen Participation in Chile, a nonpartisan civic movement that registered and mobilized millions of Chileans to participate in the historic plebiscite of October 5, 1988. Her devotion to nonviolent political participation and democratic values helped preserve social peace and advance democracy at a decisive moment in her country's history.

Jacek Kuron, a key advisor to the Polish trade union Solidarity and one of Poland's most respected political activists, helped conceive and implement the strategy of peacefully transforming a totalitarian system through the patient construction of the institutions of civil society. Repeatedly jailed and persecuted for his activities, Mr. Kuron has exemplified the personal courage and political conviction that characterize the Polish democratic movement.

In paying tribute to Mrs. Jimenez and Mr. Kuron, the Board was joined by many distinguished friends, including Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Richard Lugar. In addition, we were deeply honored to receive letters of greeting from some of the world's leading democrats.



The Awardees.

In the words of Barbara Sigmund, "the necessary catalyst for the democratic triumph of October 5 was Monica Jimenez and her Civic Crusade. Monica Jimenez was the person with the foresight, faith and fortitude to get the massive job of registration done. So that, by the time the plebiscite was called, an astonishing 93 percent of the possible electorate was registered."

Monica Jimenez was an agent of democratic change through peaceful means. Shortly before the voting, when tensions were running high, she organized a massive demonstration of Chileans on both sides of the plebiscite who ringed the city of Santiago with a yellow ribbon, symbolizing their common commitment to Chile and to nonviolence.

The Hon. William E. Brock
Chairman, National Endowment for Democracy

It is an honor to join with you today in bestowing the Endowment's Democracy Award on two courageous and dedicated individuals . . . They come from different countries with governments on each extreme of the political spectrum—Jacek has fought for freedom against the Communist government of Poland; Monica against the dictator Pinochet of Chile. Yet their struggles are for the common goals of justice, freedom and democracy sought by peoples everywhere. For those whose voices are silenced by totalitarian regimes, it makes little difference whether their oppression comes from the right or left. Tyranny has the same look everywhere, seen from the inside of a jail cell.

The Hon. Edward M. Kennedy
United States Senate

Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Senator Richard Lugar.

This is a remarkable time of celebration of democracy on all the continents of the world . . . Freedom is indivisible and the tides of democracy certainly are rising. But the sharing of those experiences, the brotherhood of the process, is so important.

We come today to celebrate additional victories in which more space has been carved out. We pray that those who are contesting these elections in Poland and in Chile and many other places in the days ahead will have courage and have heart knowing that each one of us is here— that we're prepared to witness in their behalf and in behalf of democracy everywhere.

The Hon. Richard Lugar
United States Senate

The struggle for democracy, particularly in a totalitarian country, is possible only as participation in a social movement . . . And in such an activity a great many people must participate – people whose names are unknown and shall not be known.

That's why in such an award which I'm receiving here today there is some injustice. We just pick one name – all the others remain in the shadows. And that's why I'm accepting this award only in the name of hundreds of thousands of people who have been fighting for democracy in my country – in the name of the activists, of the Workers Defense Committee, and in the name of Solidarity.

Jacek Kuron

Today I accept this award with gratitude and with humility. I believe that this award is an award to the men and women of Chile, to all those citizens that registered and voted peacefully and, also, to all who worked for free and clean elections.

I accept with gratitude, thinking of every official, and above all of every volunteer, who worked in the Crusade for Citizen Participation. Our work has been a team effort. Each gave his and her best. Convinced that our contribution was necessary, we all worked with fervor, with great love for Chile, and with great love of democracy, sure of the value of the secret ballot in determining the history of our country.

Monica Jimenez de Barros

Allow me to ratify my firm and deep conviction in the nature and objectives of the efforts that the National Endowment for Democracy unfolds constantly towards the attainment of a true and ever-lasting democracy in the countries of the world that pursue it vehemently; and to express that my people and I support and favor those efforts with the full power of our ideological goals.

Upon recognizing the priceless contribution of the National Endowment for Democracy towards the construction of a brighter future for the children of the world, I remain,

Sincerely,

Vinicio Cerezo
President of the Republic of Guatemala

The democratic revolution that is taking place in so many countries subjected until now to dictatorial regimes is a source of hope for all those who think that freedom and democracy are the only way to achieve development and social justice. The road is nonetheless still full of obstacles for us to overcome.

We should not, therefore, give up the fight for the defense of human rights and for the safeguard of democratic values. The conference you are holding now is a good step in that direction. Thus, my satisfaction in associating myself to your work and to your hopes.

Greetings received from
H.E. Mario Soares
President of the Republic of Portugal

Representative Dante B. Fascell (r.) presents Jacek Kuron with "The Democracy Award."

Jacek Kuron would be the first to point out that he is but an individual, and that in honoring him we also honor the larger movement of which he is a part. But we do honor him because he has been an unsung hero of that movement. He is a true champion who has paid a heavy price for his commitment to human rights and democratic ideals.

He has gone to jail repeatedly for the democratic cause. He has endured the death of his courageous wife in this struggle. And now, we fervently hope, he is witnessing the beginning of the realization of his dreams.

The Hon. Dante B. Fascell
U.S. House of Representatives
Member, Endowment Board

Senator Edward M. Kennedy congratulates Monica Jimenez de Barros as Senator Richard Lugar looks on.

The past decade has been one of the most significant in contemporary history. It has seen democracy grow in strength. This is primarily due to the heroic and undaunted struggle of people everywhere for their own freedom, but the role played by leading democratic countries in inspiring, encouraging and sustaining the hope for freedom has played a significant part. To this end, the support given by private institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy has been particularly valuable.

I am sure that the conference on "The Democratic Revolution" will be a major event in the new wave of international solidarity to ensure the strength of democratic forces in the world and to advance their future prospects.

Greetings received from
H.E. Benazir Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

President Bush meets with the recipients of the Endowment's Democracy Award, Monica Jimenez de Barros and Jacek Kuron, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House.

President Bush Meets With Awardees

The recipients of the Endowment's "Democracy Award," Monica Jimenez de Barros and Jacek Kuron, were honored by President Bush the day after the NED conference. The President commended Mrs. Jimenez and Mr. Kuron for the courageous contributions they have made to the democratic cause in Chile and Poland, respectively. President Bush's remarks on this occasion follow.

It's a great honor to welcome to the White House today two outstanding individuals, truly heroes of democracy.

Jacek Kuron has been a key leader in Solidarity's struggle in Poland. Solidarity has just won an important victory in Poland— not only its own legalization, but a program of other democratic reforms as well. As Poland moves towards more freedoms for all of its people, greater economic opportunity and strength, the world will be watching and applauding. And this is especially true for the United States.

Monica Jimenez de Barros founded and directed the Crusade for Citizen Participation in Chile. She educated and mobilized millions of voters in Chile's plebiscite election last October. Due in part to her efforts, Chile is on a road toward democracy. We do not deceive ourselves that this is an easy road, but we believe Chile is on an irreversible course. And Chileans who seek democracy deserve the support of everybody in the United States, everybody that loves democracy around the world.

Mr. Kuron and Mrs. Jimenez are in Washington this week to receive the "Democracy Award" from the National Endowment for Democracy. We salute you and we salute the kind of personal courage that you both have shown in the face of great obstacles. You've shown that tenacity and faith and courage in the name of democracy can make a difference for millions of people.

As I said in my Inaugural address, the day of the dictator is over. All over the globe freedom is a fact now, more than at any other time in modern history. The National Endowment for Democracy in these awards and in its other good work is giving expression to the oldest and noblest tradition of this country— the devotion to freedom for all humanity. And, thus, it is a special honor today to welcome you two outstanding democracy-builders.

Congratulations to both of you and thank you for coming to the White House at the end of what I understand has been a very good conference.

Additional Endowment Grantees Participate

In addition to the Endowment grantees who spoke at the conference, we were fortunate to have many other distinguished grantees – who came from all over the world – attend and participate in the panel sessions and special events. A list of those individuals follows.

Iberia Jimenez de Acosta, Dominican Association of Women Voters, Dominican Republic

Vladimir Alloy, Atheneum Press, France

Fina Austerling, Conciencia, Peru

Aurelio Barria, National Civic Crusade of Panama

Patricia Burke, KABATID, the Philippines

Cristiana Chamorro, *La Prensa*, Nicaragua

Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Peruvian Center for Democratic Studies

Carmen Diaz, Encuentro, Uruguay

Irma de Arias Duval, Conciencia, Argentina

Miriam Fagundez, Encuentro, Uruguay

Penelope Faulkner, *Que Me*, France

Lagramis Galang, KABATID, the Philippines

Esther Silva de Ghersi, Conciencia, Peru

Amparo Giraldo, Conciencia, Colombia

Silvani Gomez, Dominican Association of Women Voters, Dominican Republic

Silvia Grandile de Gonzalez, Conciencia, Argentina

Phunkhang Goranangpa, International Fund for the Development of Tibet, Connecticut

Fernando Guzman, Employers' Confederation, Mexico

Paruir Hayrikian, Alliance for Self-Determination of Armenia, California

Jessica Douglas Home, Jan Hus Educational Foundation, Great Britain

Frantisek Janouch, Charta 77, Sweden

Sahid Kahn, *For Di People*, Sierra Leone

Ojars Kalnins, American Latvian Association, Maryland

Marta Kolomayets, Twentieth Century Human Rights Foundation, New Jersey

Zofia Kuratowska, Solidarity Medical Fund, Poland

Sabahuddin Kushkaki, Cultural Council of the Afghan Resistance, Pakistan

Martin Kvetko, Slovak Studies and Research Center, New York

Joseph Lebenbaum, Independent Polish Agency, Sweden

Sonia Torres de Mallen, Dominican Association of Women Voters, Dominican Republic

Maria Rosa S. de Martini, Conciencia, Argentina

Jerzy Milewski, Brussels Office of Solidarity, Belgium

Victor Nakas, Lithuanian Information Center, Washington, D.C.

Bozhena Olshaniwsky, Americans for Human Rights in the Ukraine, New Jersey

Conciencia President Maria Rosa S. de Martini.

Doan Van Toai, President of the Institute for Democracy in Vietnam, poses a question during the "Idea of Democracy" panel.

Geoffrey Onegi-Obel, *Financial Times*, Uganda

Jose Luis Ortiz, Vicente Rocafuerte Foundation, Ecuador

Gina Pascual, KABATID, the Philippines

Vladlen Pavlenkov, Freedom of Communications Committee, New Jersey

Marcelo Rozas, Editorial Andante, Chile

Mabel Chaneton du Ruvira, Encuentro, Uruguay

Aishe Seitmuratova, National Movement of the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union, New York

Frantisek and Larisa Silnitsky, *Problems of Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C.

Josef Skvorecky, *Sixty Eight Publishers*, Canada

Eduardo Sposito, University Foundation of the River Plate, Argentina

Barbara Torunczyk, *Literary Notebooks*, France

Dorin Tudoran, *Agora*, Washington, D.C.

Vo Van Ai, *Que Me*, France

Doan Van Toai, Institute for Democracy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C.

Noel Wood, Caribbean Publishing and Broadcasting Association, Barbados

Yuri Yarim-Agaev, Center for Democracy, New York

Rose Yenko, KABATID, the Philippines

Xavier Zavala, Libro Libre, Costa Rica

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

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